Montoya ex rel. S.M. v. Española Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., CV 10-651 WPJ/LFG

Sandra Montoya, on Behalf of her Minor Child, S.M., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Española Public School District Board of Education, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 10-651 WPJ/LFG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Dated: March 21, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BRIAN

MARTINEZ' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 9 AND 10 OF THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT ON CLAIMS ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFF G.T.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Brian Martinez' Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint and for Qualified Immunity, filed April 30, 2012 (Doc. 257). Having reviewed the parties' briefs and applicable law, I find that Defendant's motion is well-taken and shall be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are students who were enrolled at either Española Valley High School or Carlos Vigil Middle School in northern-central New Mexico. The Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 196), brought by the students' parents, seeks class certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), and alleges negligence, third-party beneficiary claims of breach of contract and breach of implied contract, and violations of various rights under the New Mexico and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs allege that the school administration is apathetic about school safety, and that Defendants have created a dangerous environment for students, and have taken little or no action to prevent attacks on students by other students.

A. Alleged Facts Relevant to Plaintiff G.T.

Plaintiff G.T. is the only Plaintiff asserting claims against Defendant Martinez ("Defendant"), alleging claims of Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and excessive force, Counts 9 and 10, respectively.¹ Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support these claims. Plaintiff G.T. was a seventeen year-old girl who was in Special Education classes at Española Valley High School ("Española"). The facts, according to the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 196) are as follows.

132. In December 2009, G.T. got into a fight with another girl at Española Valley High School.

133. Security Guards separated the girls. When G.T. began to walk away, Defendant Security Guard John Doe carried her to the school's Teen Center.

134. Once at the Teen Center, Defendant John Doe held G.T.'s arms behind her back causing G.T. extreme pain.

135. As G.T. attempted to relieve the pain and pressure, Defendant John Doe applied even more pressure to her arms, causing extreme pain and distress to G.T.

136. Defendant Assistant Principal Devanna Ortega insisted that law enforcement arrest G.T.

137. Defendant Police Officer Bryan Martinez arrived at the Teen Center and restrained G.T. on the floor.

138. G.T.'s parents were called to the school.

139. G.T.'s parents asked Defendant Bryan Martinez if he knew that G.T. had a Behavioral Intervention Plan (BIP).

140. Defendant Bryan Martinez told the parents, "None of that matters to us. What is that? What is her disability?"

141. G.T.'s parents explained that G.T. suffers from ADHD and defiant opposition disorder.

142. Defendant Bryan Martinez waited for instructions from a Juvenile Probation and ParoleOfficer ("JPPO").

143. Based on the information provided by these Defendants, the JPPO's office told Defendant Bryan Martinez to arrest G.T.

144. Defendant Bryan Martinez handcuffed G.T. and took her to the police station.

145. The police took G.T. to the Española hospital for a physical exam and then took her to the Santa Fe County Detention Center.

Doc. 196.

Plaintiff exhorts the Court to "consider the context and full scope of the Third Amended complaint" in considering the motion. Doc. 284 at 3. However, in determining whether G.T.'s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the only relevant facts are those concerning G.T. See U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960); Cotner v. Campbell, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986) (in an action under § 1983, "a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities"). Therefore, in determining whether Plaintiff G.T. has asserted a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Martinez, while the Court considers the facts favorably to Plaintiff, facts which concern other Defendants or other Plaintiffs are not relevant here.

B. Legal Standard

Plaintiff also requests that the Court deny the motion to dismiss, and in the alternative, convert the motion into a summary judgment motion and allow Plaintiff an opportunity to conduct limited discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). The alternative requested by Plaintiff is denied. The Court has already found Plaintiff's Rule 56(d) affidavit to be deficient. See Docs. 326 & 328. In addition, the Court finds there is no need to convert this motion into a summary judgment motion, thereby rendering Plaintiff's alternative request moot.

Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofaras their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Once a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show both that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that that law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A right is clearly established "if [t]he contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. The challenged action need not have been previously declared unlawful, but its unlawfulness must be evident in light of existing law. Beedle vs. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2005). This is generally accomplished when there is controlling authority on point or when the clearly established weight of authority from other courts supports plaintiff's interpretation of the law. Id.

The Court applies the same standard in evaluating the merits of a motion to dismiss in qualified immunity cases as to dismissal motions generally: a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shero v. City of Grove, Okl., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). The complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide plausible grounds that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Unlawful Seizure

Defendant does not dispute that a seizure took place (Doc. 318 at 2), but disputes onlythat the seizure was unlawful because a lawful seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

With limited exceptions, a search or seizure requires either a warrant or probable cause. Pacheco v. Hopmeier, 770 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1182 (D.N.M.,2011). The United States Supreme Court has held that while the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials on school grounds, the special circumstances of the public school environment justify departure from the probable cause requirement. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333, 341 (1985). T.L.O. established that as applied to school administrators, the legality of a search should depend on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. It established a two-part test: (1) whether the officers initially had justification for the search; and (2) whether the scope of the search was reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the interference. Id. The Tenth Circuit applies the T.L.O. standard not just to searches, but also to seizures by school administrators on school grounds. Pacheco, 770 F.Supp.2d at 1183 (citations omitted). Thus, in this Circuit, a seizure made by a school administrator on school grounds must be both (1) initially justified and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial seizure. Id.

However, in Jones v. Hunt, the Tenth Circuit held that relevant Fourth Amendment standard is not the T.L.O. standard where a joint police officer-school administrator seizure is not for the purpose of maintaining order on school property. 410 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005). In Jones, the Tenth Circuit made clear that there is no justification for easing the usual requirement of probable cause and instead applying the T.L.O. reasonableness standard when the police are involved in a seizure that is not designed to maintain school order or security. Pacheco, 770 F.Supp.2d at 1183. In addition, even where a defendant officer's initial conduct was governed by the T.L.O. standard, once an officer removes a person from his home or otherplace in which he is entitled to be (such as a school) and transports that person to the police station for investigative purposes, the line is crossed and the probable cause standard applies. Pacheco, 770 F.Supp.2d at 1184. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in T.L.O. and of the Tenth Circuit in Jones were clearly established at the time of the underlying incident involving Plaintiff G.T.

The Third Amended Complaint ("complaint") alleges that Defendant removed G.T. from the school after handcuffing her. Thus, regardless of whether T.L.O. was the correct standard to apply initially, G.T.'s removal from the school by Defendant requires that the Court apply the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard in looking at Defendant's conduct. The existence of probable cause for the arrest means that the seizure was lawful, in which case Defendant would be entitled to dismissal on this claim.

Based on Plaintiff's own facts, G.T.'s conduct was disruptive...