Moore v. Berryhill

313 F.Supp.3d 275

Angalia MOORE, Plaintiff,

v.Nancy A. BERRYHILL,¹ Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16–cv–527 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 3, 2018

Angalia Moore, Washington, DC, pro se.

Lauren Donner Chait, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Region III, Maija Pelly DiDomenico, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Angalia Moore, appearing pro se , challenges the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Defendant has moved for judgment of affirmance (ECF No. 14), and Plaintiff has moved for judgment of reversal (ECF No. 17). For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion will be GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 2, 2013, Plaintiff, approaching her 55^th birthday, applied for disability benefits, alleging that she was unable to work because of disabling conditions that began on April 10, 2012 (onset date). (Admin. Record ("AR") 191, ECF No. 7). Plaintiff listed her disabling conditions as depression, asthma, liver disease and thyroid. (See AR 276). Her claim was denied initially on March 22, 2013, and upon reconsideration on June 6, 2013. Plaintiff was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on March 4, 2015. Plaintiff, appearing with a non-attorney representative (AR 150), testified at the hearing, as did an impartial vocational expert, Dr. James Michael Ryan. (See AR 18–28, June 9, 2015 ALJ Dec., ECF No. 7–2; AR 47–80, Tr. of Oral Hrg.). The ALJ found:

1. Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 30, 2017.

2. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 10, 2012, the alleged onset date. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.

3. Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: "probable" confusional migraine, asthma, and obesity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

4. Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526.

5. Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work.

6. Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a tax preparer, accounts receivable clerk, and an office manager[,] [which] does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565.

7. Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 10, 2012, through the date of this decision (on June 9, 2015). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

(AR 20, 22, 27). In a letter dated December 31, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 1).

1. Physical Impairments

The ALJ found that Plaintiff's physical impairments "have caused more than minimal limitation in [Plaintiff's] ability to work" but found "very little objective evidence to support [Plaintiff's] allegations of disabling impairments." (AR 20). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's reports and testimony that she had experienced seizures and "seizure-like activity," and had a speech impediment, but found no "clinical and/or diagnostic evidence of a seizure disorder or epilepsy" and thus no "medically determinable impairment." (Id. ). Similarly, the ALJ did not "consider" Plaintiff's alleged speech impediment to be a medically determinable impairment partly because of "the lack of a formal diagnosis," but also because of Plaintiff's "inconsistent statements" and testimony about its appearance and duration. (AR 21).

2. Mental Impairments

The ALJ acknowledged that "[t]he record documents a mental health impairment variously diagnosed" but found no "evidence of mental health concerns or treatment other than the diagnosis of ‘major depression, in remission,’ " which "was made [in March 2011] at a court-mandated psychiatric evaluation." (AR 21). The ALJ determined from the 2011 medical report that Plaintiff had then "endorsed a history of depression, with crying spells and suicidal thoughts[,]" received therapy between 2008 and 2010, was prescribed medicine "in the past," but "had not taken any medication in two years." (Id. ). The ALJ added that Plaintiff's "mental status evaluation was normal." (Id. )

The ALJ considered "the four broad functional areas set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders," encompassing "activities of daily living, social functioning, concentration, persistence or pace, and episodes of decompensation, of extended duration" but found that the record contained "no [documented] limitations" on Plaintiff's daily living, social functioning and concentration. (AR 22). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had "experienced no episodes of decompensation ... of extended duration," and attributed Plaintiff's self-described mental limitations "solely ... to her physical impairments." The ALJ concluded: "Because the claimant's medically determinable mental impairments cause no limitation in any of the first three functional areas and ‘no’ episodes of decompensation, which have been of extended duration in the fourth area, they are nonsevere." (AR 22) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1) ).

The ALJ examined various other medical diagnoses in the record made between 2011 and 2015 but concluded that none of Plaintiff's impairments, singularly or combined, met or medically equaled the severity of one of the Act's listed impairments. (AR 21–22).

3. Medical Opinions

The ALJ considered the written report of Dr. Rebecca Brosch, who conducted a consultative psychological examination of Plaintiff in January 2015. At that time, Plaintiff "indicated that she was living with her adult son, who had ‘essentially become her caretaker.’ " (AR 21). Plaintiff attributed her work stoppage in 2012 to a "seizure disorder and development of a severe speech impediment" and conveyed the concerns of her neurologist "that she may have Huntington's disease." (Id. ). Plaintiff also described engaging in seriously impulsive behavior, as well has having anxiety, panic attacks and mood elevations, among other symptoms. (Id. ). Dr. Brosch "observed" Plaintiff as having "a ‘severe speech impediment,’ with stuttering and stammering," and "a ‘dysphoric and irritated’ affect, and dysthymic mood." (Id. ). Dr. Brosch "opined" that Plaintiff "had ‘moderate’ limitation in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting; ‘moderate’ to ‘marked’ limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, and [to] interact appropriately with the public[,] co-workers[,] [and] supervisors; and ‘marked to ‘severe’ limitations in her ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions." (AR 21–22). The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Brosch's observations, finding them "inconsistent with the record as a whole and appear based solely on [Plaintiff's] subjective report[ing]." (AR 22).

The ALJ also considered the findings of Dr. Justine Magurno, who also conducted a consultative examination of Plaintiff in January 2015. Dr. Magurno "observe[d]" Plaintiff's " ‘abnormal speech’ and assessed her with ‘marked communication limitations.’ " (AR 26). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had reported dizziness "but the physical examination findings were normal." (Id. ). Dr. Magurno opined that Plaintiff "retained the ability to lift and carry up to ten pounds continuously, and up to twenty pounds occasionally; ... had no limitations in sitting, standing, or walking; and ... had to avoid exposure to unprotected heights, moving machinery, humidity and wetness, pulmonary irritants, and extreme temperatures." (Id. ). The ALJ assigned "partial weight" to Dr. Magurno's opinion, finding the lifting, carrying, and speech limitations "not substantiated by any objective clinical findings of record." (Id. ). The ALJ further found "no clinical or diagnostic findings of record that would warrant more significant [lifting and carrying] limitations than those found by the State medical consultants" (id. ), who found that Plaintiff "had retained the capacity to perform work at a medium exertional level, with additional environmental limitations, given her asthma and alleged history of fainting" (id. at 25).

The ALJ considered as well numerous outpatient and emergency room hospital records and the treatment records of Plaintiff's primary care physicians, Dr. Anne Cioletti and Dr. Godswill Okoji. (See generally AR 20–27).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Statutory Framework

The D.C. Circuit has explained:

To qualify for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Act, [the claimant] must establish that she is "disabled." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(D), 1382(a)(1). "Disability" means the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Id. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). With certain exceptions ..., an individual is disabled "only if [her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for assessing a claimant's alleged disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant carries the burden of proof on the first four steps. Id. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not presently engaged

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