Moore v. Centralized Mgmt. Servs.

JUSTIN MOORE v. CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC and EPISODE SOLUTIONS, LLC

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1592 SECTION M (2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

February 28, 2020

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a motion by defendants Centralized Management Services, LLC ("CMS") and Episode Solutions, LLC ("Episode") (collectively, "Defendants") for summary judgment¹ on plaintiff Justin Moore's disability discrimination claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et seq., as amended. Moore responds in opposition.² Both Defendants and Moore filed multiple replies in further support of their respective positions.³ Having considered the parties' memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants Defendants' motion because Moore has not demonstrated that he is a qualified individual under the ADA.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves alleged employment discrimination against a recovering alcoholic based on his episodic binge drinking. Defendants develop and manage value-based payment structures for musculoskeletal care in partnership with surgeons and hospitals.⁴ On August 28, 2017, Defendants hired Moore to work as an orthopedic implant coordinator.⁵ From the beginning,Moore's performance was "lacking" because he "failed to put forth any genuine effort" to accelerate Defendants' business development in New Orleans, which was a core objective of his job.⁶ Moore failed to schedule meetings and circulate reports in a timely fashion, failed to attend conference calls or answer client calls, and conducted himself in an unprofessional manner.⁷ Moore attributes his lackluster job performance to a relapse of alcoholism. On September 25 or 26, 2017, Moore informed his supervisor he was an alcoholic and, although he had been in recovery for years, he had relapsed.⁸

Moore began treatment for his relapse on September 27, 2017.⁹ While undergoing treatment, Moore periodically updated Defendants on his progress.¹⁰ Moore completed his treatment on October 27, 2017, and informed Defendants that he was able to come back to work.¹¹ That same day, Defendants instructed Moore to forbear from contacting any clients and to speak to his supervisor before commencing anything work-related.¹² On November 1, 2017, Moore's supervisor informed him that Defendants were discharging him for poor performance.¹³

Moore brought this action for disability employment discrimination, alleging that Defendants terminated him from employment because of his alcoholism and because he sought treatment for the disease.¹⁴ According to Moore, "Defendants made no individualized assessment to determine whether [he] could perform the essential functions of his job or whether a reasonable accommodation would enable him to be employed in his position, as required under the ADA."¹⁵Moore alleges that due to Defendants' actions, he "has suffered and will continue to suffer economic and non-economic harm."¹⁶

II. PENDING MOTION

Defendants seek summary judgment on Moore's ADA discrimination claims, arguing that Moore "cannot meet his prima facie or ultimate burden of proof on critical aspects of his disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims."¹⁷ Specifically, Defendants argue that Moore cannot prove either that he qualifies as disabled under the ADA or that Defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.¹⁸ Moore responds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.¹⁹

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Rule 56(c) mandatesthe entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for summary judgment and identifying those portions of the record, discovery, and any affidavits supporting the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the moving party meets that burden, then the nonmoving party must use evidence cognizable under Rule 56 to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. Material facts are not genuinely disputed when a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party upon a review of the record taken as a whole. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). "[U]nsubstantiated assertions," "conclusory allegations," and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court may not resolve credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts, and draw any appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001). Yet, a court only draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant "when there is an actual controversy, that is, whenboth parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).

After the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute, the nonmovant must articulate specific facts and point to supporting, competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (c)(2). Such facts must create more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. When the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the moving party may simply point to insufficient admissible evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmovant's claim in order to satisfy its summary judgment burden. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). Unless there is a genuine issue for trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075-76.

B. Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... discharge ...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability, or was regarded as disabled; (2) that he was qualified for the job; and (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability. Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014)). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "a presumption of discrimination arises," and the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. Thereafter, if the defendant meets its burden, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to

offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative).

LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 702 (citing Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Evans v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 626, 640 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (applying this familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to cases under the ADA)).

The term "disability" is defined under the ADA, "with respect to an individual," as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment ...." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The phrase "substantially limits" is interpreted with respect to a person's ability "'to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.'" Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). "Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Major life activities also include "the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,...