Moore v. Equity Residential Mgmt., L.L.C.

LEROY MOORE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-07204-MEJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 7, 2017

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 10

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Equity Residential Management, L.L.C.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiffs Leroy Moore, Dominika Bednarska, Perlita Payne, Brett Estes, and AnnaMarie Hara (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 15) and Defendant filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 20). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the March 16, 2017 hearing.¹ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties' positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Defendant owns and operates a building in Berkeley, California (the "Property") that contains at least five dwelling units, and is marketed as a "Mobility Impaired Living Enhancement Property." Compl. ¶¶ 3, 11, Dkt. No. 1. The Property was constructed and first occupied in the year 2000. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs "are or were" tenants living on the Property. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs allege they at all relevant times were "'handicapped persons' or closely associated with a'handicapped person[' . . . or ] closely related to a person with a disability. . . ." Id. ¶ 1. The Complaint does not describe how Moore is disabled or associated with a disabled person. Id. ¶ 22(a). It alleges Bednarska is disabled but does not describe her disability or its impact, e.g., whether she is confined to a wheelchair (id. ¶ 22(b)), and that Payne is married to Bednarska (id. ¶ 22(c)). It also alleges Estes is a quadriplegic (id. ¶ 22(d)), and that Hara's husband is "also disabled and confined to a wheelchair" (id. ¶ 22(e)).

Plaintiffs allege Defendant discriminated against them through its

persistent failure and refusal to make its public and common areas accessible to disabled persons such as Plaintiffs, its further persistent failure and refusal to maintain its accessible features most notably its elevator resulting in denial of access, difficulty, discomfort, embarrassment for Plaintiffs and by failing to make its dwelling units adaptable to the needs of disabled tenants such as Plaintiffs.

Id. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶¶ 15-20 (only elevator on Property frequently malfunctions and must be taken out of service frequently, often without advance notice). Plaintiffs further allege the Property's public use areas are not accessible or useable by disabled/handicapped persons because the public access and courtyard access doors have thresholds that exceed 1/4 inch unbeveled and require excessive opening force, and that the courtyard door is too narrow to allow a wheelchair user access to the courtyard. Id. ¶ 14.

The Complaint asserts federal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Federal Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 23-39. Plaintiffs also assert related state law claims. Id. ¶¶ 40-54. They seek injunctive relief and damages. Id., Prayer.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must therefore provide a defendant with "fair notice" of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when it does not contain enoughfacts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). In addition, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the "court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Court may deny leave to amend for a number of reasons, including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

DISCUSSION

A. Allegations of Disability

An element of each of the federal claims alleged in the Complaint is that Plaintiffs are disabled or closely associated with disabled persons. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complainton the ground that with the exception of Estes, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded they are disabled. See Mot. at 5, 7, 9.

Plaintiffs argue they have sufficiently pleaded that Moore, Bednarska, and Hara have mobility disabilities and that they are not required to identify their "particular diagnos[e]s." Opp'n at 4 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 22). The Complaint alleges Estes is a quadriplegic and that Hara's husband is "also disabled and confined to a wheelchair." Id. ¶ 22(d), (e). But there are no allegations that Hara, Moore, and Bednarska are disabled or that describe the impact of their disability. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 22. The Complaint instead alleges Hara, Moore, and Bednarska are disabled in an unspecified manner or closely associated with a person with a disability. See id. While Plaintiffs may not have to identify their "particular diagnoses", they do need to include factual allegations sufficient to state they have mobility disabilities (or disabilities that were impacted by the barriers identified in the Complaint) in order to state a disability-related claim; they cannot rely on "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of their causes of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES each of Hara's, Moore's, and Bednarska's claims on this ground.

Payne concedes she does not have a mobility disability, but argues she has "associational standing"—i.e., by virtue of her marriage to Bednarska—to pursue the claims asserted in the Complaint. See Opp'n at 4. The Court need not reach this issue because it finds Bednarska insufficiently pleads she is disabled. Thus, Payne cannot have associational standing based on Bednarska's disability, and the Court DISMISSES each of her claims on this ground.

B. ADA

Defendant argues the Court must dismiss the ADA claim because the Property is a residential facility that does "not constitute public accommodations within the meaning of the" ADA. Mot. at 5 (quoting Independent Hous. Servs. of S.F. v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 & n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1993); citing Coronado v. Cobblestone Vill. Comm. Rentals, L.P., 163 Cal. App. 4th 831, 850 (2008)); see also Arceneaux v. Marin Hous. Auth., 2015 WL 3396673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2015) ("[A]partment complexes do not constitute 'public accommodations' within the meaning of the ADA") (citing cases)). While apartment complexes,such as the Property, are not subject to the requirements of the ADA, some spaces within apartment complexes are considered places of public accommodation. Chief among this exception is commercial space within apartment complexes. See Carolyn v. Orange Park Comm. Ass'n, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1100 (2009) ("[C]ommercial real estate open to the public qualifies as a public accommodation even though it is a part of a residence or residential development") (citing Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705-06 (D. Md. 1999) (model unit could be public accommodation if found to be sales office)); Johnson v. Beahm, 2011 WL 5508893, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) ("A private residential apartment complex contains a rental office. The rental office is a place of public accommodation." (quoting ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual (1993) to answer question of Title III of ADA applies to common areas within residential facilities, and finding leasing office of apartment complex is a place of public accommodation subject to ADA)).

Plaintiffs contend their Complaint states an ADA claim because it alleges discrimination in those areas of the Property that are open to the public. Opp'n at 7. They...