Moore v. Ga. Dep't of Corr.

ELLA M. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.

4:13-cv-228

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

September 15, 2014

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ella M. Moore brings this Title VII action against Defendant Georgia Department of Corrections ("GDOC") alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing complaints with the Georgia Commission on Equal Opportunity ("GCEO") and the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). ECF No. 1 at 1. Moore also states that she is entitled to relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law, though she does not include this claim in her causes of action. Id. at 1, 7-8.

GDOC has moved for summary judgment on Moore's Title VII claims, arguing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact raised in Plaintiffs Complaint and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. 13-1 at 1. Because the Court agrees with GDOC, it GRANTS GDOC's motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTS

Moore currently is a GDOC employee. ECF No. 1 at 1. Moore began her employment with GDOC in September 2000. ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 13-2 at 1. In 2006, she was transferred to Smith Transitional Center where she worked as a Correctional Officer until going on leave in May 2012. ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 13-2 at 2.

Moore began experiencing problems at work in May 2011. ECF No. 13-2 at 2. On May 24, 2011, Moore's supervisor, Assistant Superintendent Greg Steward, made a comment to an inmate to the effect of, "women should be barefoot, naked and in the kitchen," while in Moore's presence. ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 13-2 at 3. Moore filed an administrative charge with GCEO/EEOC regarding this incident on June 28, 2011, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. ECF Nos. 13-2 at 3; 13-10 ("Charge 93C"). On October 14, 2011, Moore filed a second administrative charge with GCEO/EEOC, this time for retaliation only, alleging that she had faced adverse treatment at work as a result of filing the earlier discrimination complaint. ECF Nos. 13-2 at 4; 13-15 ("Charge 9C"). Moore filed a third administrative charge with GCEO/EEOC on September 11, 2012, for disability discrimination and retaliation, alleging again that she was subject to retaliation for filing her prior complaints of gender discrimination. ECF Nos. 13-2 at 4; 13-18 ("Charge 102C").

Moore has been on medical leave from GDOC since May 21, 2012. ECF Nos. 1 at 6; 13-2 at 7.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court views the facts and inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008). Courts, moreover, may consider all materials in the record, not just those cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Reese, 527 F.3d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

The nonmoving party then "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading[s], but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

IV. ANALYSIS

GDOC has moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Court is procedurally barred from hearing Moore's claims predicated on Charge 93 C and Charge 9C; and (2) GDOC is entitled to summary judgment on Moore's claims predicated on Charge 102C. ECF No. 13-1 at 7, 10.

A. Moore's Claims Predicated on Charge 93C Are Procedurally Deficient And The Court May Not Equitably Modify Title VII's Procedural Requirements Here

"Before instituting a Title VII action in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint against the discriminating party and receive statutory notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue the respondent named in the charge." Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Here, although Moore filed an EEOC complaint for Charge 93C, ECF No. 13-10, Moore has provided no evidence that the EEOC ever issued her a right-to-sue letter.

GDOC argues that because no right-to-sue letter issued on Charge 93 C, that alone precludes the Court from hearing claims based on that charge. This argument misses the mark, but on the facts GDOC still carries the day as to Charge 93 C. Title VII's time limitation periods are not jurisdictional requirements. The Eleventh Circuit "has held 'that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather, is a statutory precondition which is subject to equitable modification.'" Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc., 366 F. App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1569-70). Thus, in cases where "[i]t would not be equitable to dismiss plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies," courts exercising their equitable powers may excuse procedural deficiencies under Title VII. E.g., Wilson v. Big Lots, Inc., 2013 WL 5532712, at *2, 7 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2013) (allowing plaintiff "an additional ninety (90) days to supplement her complaint by filing a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC"). "[T]he Eleventh Circuit [has] held that the plaintiff bears the burden in arguing for equitable modification." Ramsay v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 6861073, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2007) (citing Forehand, 89 F.3d at 1572); see also Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (M.D. Ala. 1998) ("The burden is on the plaintiff to show that equitable modification should apply . . . .").

Here, Moore has provided no explanation as to why she has not produced a right-to-sue letter or as to why she is entitled to equitable modification of Title VII's procedural requirements. Where even "the mere allegation of a right to sue letter" is insufficient to carry plaintiff's burden in invoking the equitable powers of the Court, see Bell v. Ala. Dept. of Corrs., 2007 WL 3024572, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2007), the Court certainly will not invoke its equitable powers in the absence of a reason to do so.

Accordingly, in light of Moore's failure to respond to GDOC's allegation that procedural deficiencies bar her claims predicated on Charge 93 C, summary judgment as to those claims is appropriate. See id.

Moore has neither alleged that she has a right-to-sue letter, nor that she has yet to receive a right-to-sue letter for Charge 93C. In circumstances such as these, the proper course for the Court to take is to dismiss the charges predicated on Charge 93 C without prejudice to allow time for Moore to receive a right-to-sue letter, if she has not yet received one, or to otherwise provide a right-to-sue letter that is not time barred. See, e.g., Wilson, 2013 WL 5532712, at *2.

B. Moore's Claims Predicated on Charge 9C Are Barred as Untimely and the Court May Not Equitably Toll the Limitations Period Here

Title VII imposes upon claimants certain time limitations. In order to maintain Title VII claims, plaintiffs must file their complaint within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). "Once the defendant contests [the issue of timeliness], the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that [s]he met the ninety day filing requirement." Green, 281 F.3d at 1234.

Here, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on Charge 9C on December 14, 2012. ECF No. 13-16. Moore did not file hercomplaint in this Court until October 16, 2013. ECF No. 1. The time between issuance of the right-to-sue letter and the filing of this suit vastly exceeds the ninety-day period provided for under Title VII. GDOC argues that, because of this failure to comply with Title VII's procedural requirement, Moore's claims under Charge 9C are not preserved for suit. ECF 13-1 at 9.

However, like failure to receive a right-to-sue letter, failure to comply with the time limitations provided for under Title VII is not an absolute bar on bringing suit. Courts may toll the statute of limitations under Title VII "if it finds that an inequitable event prevented the plaintiff from filing a timely action." Patel v. Ga. Dept. of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities, 517 F. App'x 750, 753 (11th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs bear the burden in "establishing] that [equitable] tolling is warranted." Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004). "The Supreme Court has made clear that [equitable] tolling is an extraordinary remedy which should be extended only sparingly." Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Irwin v. Veteran's Admin., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). This Circuit has held that '"traditional equitable tolling principles require a claimant to justify her untimely filing by a showing of extraordinary circumstances." Brown v. John Deere Prod, Inc., 460 F. App'x 908, 910 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting ...