Moore v. Granlund

569 F.Supp.3d 205

Thomas MOORE, Plaintiff,

v.Kenny GRANLUND, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:12-CV-00223

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed November 3, 2021

David I. Fallk, Scranton, PA, Stuart M. Niemtzow, Pro Hac Vice, Havertown, PA, for Plaintiff.

Brian Platt, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Vincent R. Mazeski, Chief Counsel's Office Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Mechanicsburg, PA, Chase M. DeFelice, Office of General Counsel PA Department of Corrections, Mehanicsburg, PA, for Defendants Kenny Granlund, Perks, Hall, Fisher.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew W. Brann, Chief United States District Judge

For the past decade, former Pennsylvania state prisoner Thomas Moore has sought redress for civil rights violations by prison staff that he allegedly suffered while incarcerated. But over the years, the scope of Moore's civil rights claims has been narrowed considerably, with multiple counts and defendants dismissed from the suit. Now, on the eve of trial, Moore has signaled his intent to resuscitate a count this Court dismissed four years ago. That is not permissible.

The Defendants filed a motion in limine asking the Court to prohibit Moore from introducing at trial any testimony or evidence regarding the alleged actions of a corrections officer who is not, and never has been, a party to this action. The Defendants argue that this evidence is relevant only to the conspiracy cause of action the Court previously dismissed and has no probative value to the remaining claims. The Court agrees. For these reasons, the Defendants’ motion in limine is granted, subject to certain conditions discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

Thomas Moore, a former Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed this civil rights complaint—which he later amended with assistance from counsel—alleging that several corrections officers violated his rights during his incarceration at State Correctional Institution Rockview ("SCI Rockview").¹ The Amended Complaint includes four causes of action: Count I, Civil Rights Violation/Retaliation against all individual Defendants; Count II, Civil Rights Violations against Defendant Marirosa Lamas for failure to establish appropriate policies, practices, or customs, and for sanctioning an alleged "cover up"; Count III, Assault and Battery against Defendant Kenny Granlund; and Count IV, False Imprisonment and Conspiracy against all Defendants.²

Relevant here, Moore alleges that in the latter half of 2010, he was sexually and physically abused by the Unit Manager at SCI Rockview, Defendant Granlund. Specifically, Moore asserts that during the fall of 2010, Granlund "engaged in improper sexual contact with [Moore] in Granlund's office on several occasions," and on December 6, 2010, Granlund "struck [Moore] in his mouth" and "stomped his back and other parts of his body," causing "cuts to his face and damage to his front teeth and other parts of his body."³ Additionally, Moore alleges that three corrections officers at SCI Rockview—Defendants Brock Perks, Edward Hall, and Chad Fisher—"mopped cleaning fluid into [Moore's] cell when he complained of not getting any food," causing Moore to "pass[ ] out and [fall] onto the concrete floor."⁴

In July 2015, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, among other things, that Moore failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.⁵ Moore filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment on the sexual abuse claim.⁶ My late colleague, the Honorable Richard P. Conaboy, then presiding over the case, denied the parties’ pending motions⁷ and referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick for the purpose of conducting evidentiary hearings on the exhaustion issue.⁸

Magistrate Judge Mehalchick conducted two evidentiary hearings, the first on April 6, 2016⁹ and the second on April 29, 2016.¹⁰ During the first evidentiary hearing, the Defendants presented Lieutenant Gregory Dyke¹¹ as a witness to discuss a grievance Moore filed regarding the alleged February 2011 chemical incident.¹² Lt. Dyke testified that Moore "voluntarily, under his own accord, withdrew" the grievance,¹³ a fact seemingly corroborated by a March 21, 2011 grievance withdrawal form bearing Moore's signature.¹⁴ In response, Moore testified that although Lt. Dyke asked him to sign the grievance withdrawal form, he declined to do so.¹⁵ According to Moore, Lt. Dyke then said that he would "take care of it [himself]."¹⁶ Moore accused Lt. Dyke of forging his signature on the grievance withdrawal form and wrongfully withdrawing his grievance claim.¹⁷

After conducting the evidentiary hearings and considering extensive post-hearing briefing and related documents, Magistrate Judge Mehalchick concluded that Moore's Amended Complaint¹⁸ should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust the remedies available through the grievance process.¹⁹ In September 2017, Judge Conaboy adopted Magistrate Judge Mehalchick's Report and Recommendation in part, but concluded that the Defendants "have not met their burden of showing that all of [Moore's] claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies."²⁰ Specifically, Judge Conaboy permitted claims to proceed related to the following allegations:

(1) Defendant Granlund engaged in improper sexual contact with Moore during the fall of 2010; (2) Granlund physically assaulted Moore on December 6, 2010; and

(3) Defendants Hall, Perks, and Fisher mopped chemicals into Moore's cell on February 19, 2011, which resulted in Moore passing out and striking his head on the ground.²¹

In so doing, Judge Conaboy dismissed Counts II (Civil Rights Violations)²² and IV (False Imprisonment and Conspiracy)²³ in their entirety. For Count I, Judge Conaboy dismissed the retaliation claim as to all defendants other than Granlund²⁴ and permitted the Civil Rights Violation claim to stand only as to Granlund²⁵ and Hall, Perks, and Fisher.²⁶ Count III (Assault and Battery), which named only Granlund as a defendant, likewise remains.²⁷

Following Judge Conaboy's September 2017 ruling, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.²⁸ In September 2018, Judge Conaboy denied both motions.²⁹ The parties then filed motions for reconsideration.³⁰ Judge Conaboy died in November 2018 and this matter was administratively reassigned to the undersigned. On June 18, 2019, this Court denied the parties’ motions for reconsideration.³¹

After efforts at settlement failed, the Court issued a scheduling order on May 14, 2021, setting a date for trial and requiring the parties to file all motions in limine by September 3, 2021.³² Consistent with the Court's scheduling order, the Defendants filed the instant motion on September 3, 2021.³³ The motion has been fully briefed³⁴ and is now ripe for disposition.

II. ANALYSIS

In their motion in limine , the Defendants ask the Court to "preclude [Moore] from presenting any evidence, questions, testimony, statements or arguments regarding his claim that non-defendant Lt. Dyke allegedly forged [Moore's] signature and wrongfully withdrew [Moore's] grievance regarding the chemical assault in order to cover for one of the Defendants."³⁵ Specifically, the Defendants argue that even if Moore's allegations about Lt. Dyke were true (a fact the Defendants’ ardently contest), evidence on this issue would be irrelevant because it would not "make it more probable that [Officers Perks, Hall, and Fisher] placed chemical fluids in [Moore's] cell causing a fall and injury."³⁶ The Defendants further assert that whatever probative value this evidence does have "is substantially outweighed by danger of prejudice" because it "may cause the jury to believe [Moore's] allegations of chemical assault merely because of [Lt.] Dyke's alleged actions" and would inevitably result "in a mini-trial as to whether or not the accusation against [Lt.] Dyke is true."³⁷

Moore counters that evidence of Lt. Dyke allegedly forging Moore's signature and improperly withdrawing Moore's grievance claim is relevant and admissible for two reasons. First, Moore argues that this constitutes "other acts" evidence admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) because it demonstrates that the Defendants’ actions were "part of a ‘common scheme’ " designed "to ‘motivate’ [Moore] not to pursue his claims."³⁸ Second, Moore contends that this evidence "is clearly relevant to his credibility"—a position that the Defendants took at the April 29, 2016 evidentiary hearing before Magistrate Judge Mehalchick.³⁹

The Court finds both of Moore's theories of admissibility unpersuasive and thus grants the Defendants’ motion in limine , subject to certain conditions.

A. Rule 404

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) stipulates that "evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character."⁴⁰ Section (b)(2) of that Rule provides that such evidence may however be admissible for another purpose, such as proving "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident."⁴¹ The Third Circuit follows a four-part test to determine the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) : "(1) the evidence must have a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the court must charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purposes for which it is admitted."⁴²

Here, Moore argues that testimony and other evidence regarding Lt. Dyke's allegedly improper withdrawal of Moore's grievance claim will be offered as proof of "a concerted ‘plan’ or scheme’ "—a proper, non-propensity purpose under Rule 404(b).⁴³ Accordingly, under the four-part test recognized by the Third Circuit, this Court must determine whether this "other act" evidence—which concerns the actions of a separate corrections officer who is not, and never has been, a defendant in this case...