Moore v. Gunnison Valley Hosp.

170 F.Supp.2d 1080

Thomas P. MOORE, M.D., Plaintiff, v. GUNNISON VALLEY HOSPITAL, Robert P. Austin, Brian K. Moloney, M.D., Gloria Beim, M.D., Ronald A. Long, M.D., Jay McMurren, M.D., and Jay Wolkov, D.O., Defendants.

No. 99-WM-990.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

October 22, 2001.

Daniel R. Satriana, Jr., Steven M. Gutierrez, Hall & Evans, L.L.C.

David Baumgarten, Gunnison County Attorney, Gunnison.

Donald T. Trinen, Hart & Trinen, L.L.P., Denver.

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS¹

MILLER, District Judge.

The plaintiff brings this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Gunnison Valley Hospital (Hospital) and the individual defendants, all members of the medical staff or officers of the Hospital, violated his rights to due process by summarily suspending his Hospital privileges and then issuing two admonitions against him. The individual defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them on the bases of absolute and qualified immunities.

Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is appropriate where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir.1995). I must accept as true all well pleaded facts and construe all reasonable allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.1996).

Background

Accepting the well-pleaded allegations of the amended complaint as true, plaintiff was a licensed, practicing physician with staff privileges at the Hospital. On March 21, 1998, those privileges were summarily suspended by the president of the Hospital, defendant Robert Austin (Austin), and the chief of the Hospital's medical staff, defendant Bryan Moloney, M.D. (Moloney). Complaint, ¶ 9. According to Article IX.B.1 of the Hospital's Bylaws, Rules of Regulations of the Medical Staff (Bylaws),² Austin, Moloney, an Executive Committee of the Hospital's Board of Trustees (Board), or the Board itself may summarily suspend a person's staff membership or privileges whenever the person's "conduct requires that immediate action be taken to protect the life of any patient(s) or to reduce the substantial likelihood of immediate injury or damage to the health or safety of any patient, employee or other person present in the Hospital ...." Plaintiff's suspension apparently followed a recommendation by an ad hoc committee appointed by defendants Austin and Moloney and consisting of Moloney and two other defendants, Gloria Beim, M.D. and Ronald A. Long, M.D. (Long). Complaint, ¶ 9.³

The supposed factual basis for the summary suspension was plaintiff's alleged incompetent treatment of a particular patient at a different hospital. (Plaintiff had no patient at the Hospital when the suspension issued.) Complaint, ¶ 11.

The complaint states that the individual defendants did not make a reasonable investigation of the facts prior to suspension and failed to give plaintiff any notice or opportunity to be heard, either before or after the suspension. Id.

Pursuant to Article VIII.B.2 of the Bylaws, the medical staff, upon review, terminated plaintiff's suspension on March 26, 1998, apparently without the necessity of plaintiff exercising his procedural rights under the Bylaws.⁴ Complaint, ¶ 14.

Nevertheless, nine months later, defendants Austin and Moloney, acting through another ad hoc committee,⁵ this time composed of defendants J. McMurren, M.D., Jay Wolkov, D.O. and Long, "procured and effected the issuance of two admonitions" of plaintiff for the same conduct that gave rise to the suspension. Complaint, ¶ 16. Again, plaintiff was provided no notice or opportunity to be heard. Id. In contrast to a summary suspension, however, the Bylaws specifically declare that a letter of admonition "shall not entitle a staff member to a hearing or appellate review." Bylaws, Art. X.1.A.

Plaintiff has demanded that the admonitions be vacated or, if not, that he be given a hearing on the admonitions. Defendants have refused both demands. Complaint, ¶ 19.

Plaintiff seeks damages against the individual defendants as well as the issuance of a mandatory injunction against the Hospital requiring, alternatively, the vacation of the summary suspension and admonitions ab initio or a fair hearing on those issues. The individual defendants seek dismissal, asserting absolute, quasi-judicial immunity or, minimally, qualified immunity.

Discussion

I. Absolute Immunity

Defendants assert that, given the alleged judicial nature of their roles under the Bylaws, they are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Absolute immunity for judges (and others) has been deemed necessary to assure that those involved in the judicial process "can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation" by the parties to the dispute. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Although significant, the loss of the right to seek private redress for unconstitutional conduct is countered in this instance by the nature of the judicial process. Id. Given the protections built into the judicial process, the risk of an unconstitutional act by a judicial officer "is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of such people." Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. 2894. In considering safeguards against improper acts, the Supreme Court stated:

The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are carefully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are, of course, subject to the rigors of cross examination and the penalty of perjury.

Id. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894.

Judicial immunity is not limited to appointed or elected judges but includes those performing roles "functionally comparable" to judges, such as hearing examiners and administrative law judges. Id. The Tenth Circuit has extended absolute immunity to the Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1514-15 (10th Cir.1987); parole boards, Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir.1992); county administrative review boards, Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir.1993); and municipal hearing officers, Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525, 1529 (10th Cir.1996).

Although defendants focus on their alleged quasi-judicial status, absolute immunity has been extended to essential participants in the judicial process such as the prosecutor and witnesses. In particular, absolute immunity of the prosecutor in his or her advocacy role has been established since Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The Imbler court relied on the observations of Judge Learned Hand that the lack of civil redress for improper actions of a prosecutor is the price for vigorous advocacy:

As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.

Id. at 428, 96 S.Ct. 984 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950)).

Absolute immunity does not, however, extend to all prosecutorial functions. On the one hand, when the prosecutor is the advocate in the judicial proceeding he is protected by absolute immunity. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-493, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (prosecutor presenting evidence in support of motion for search warrant is absolutely immune). On the other hand, when the prosecutor performs investigative services he or she is like a police officer and entitled only to qualified immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-74, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (prosecutor performing role of complaining witness is not immune). Therefore, to determine whether or not a prosecutor is absolutely immune depends upon the function performed and not simply his or her title. Id.

In making the determination whether the immunity is qualified or absolute it should be remembered that "[t]he presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect [most] government officials in the exercise of their duties." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934. "Because absolute immunity is of a `rare and exceptional character,' Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), `[it] extends no further than necessary to protect those activities' `intimately associated' with the judicial process. Rex [v. Teeples], 753 F.2d [840]at 843 [(10th Cir.1985)]." Villescas v. Richardson, 124 F.Supp.2d 647, 654 (D.Colo.2000) (Babcock, C.J.).

The essential inquiry is, therefore, whether or not the roles of the defendants were "functionally comparable" to that of a judge, prosecutor or witness entitled to absolute immunity. The Butz Court provides hallmarks of the judicial process against which the procedures of the defendant Hospital can be compared. The subsequent decision of Cleavinger v. Saxner summarized the characteristics of judicial process by listing six nonexclusive factors:

(a) The need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence...