Moore v. Hiram Twp.

LAVON MOORE, SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE, CLARENCE M. MOOREAND LAURA P. MOORE TRUST, Plaintiff, v. HIRAM TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendant.

CASE NO. 5:19CV1750

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

January 31, 2020

MAGISTRATE JUDGE GEORGE J. LIMBERT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants Hiram Township, Gary Bott, Thomas Franek, Richard Gano, Janet Pancost, and "DOES 1-10" (collectively, "Defendants") on October 24, 2019. ECF Dkt. #17. Defendants seek dismissal of all of the claims alleged in the complaint by Plaintiff successor trustee of the Moore Trust ("Plaintiff¹"). Id. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF Dkt. #17) and DISMISSES this case in its entirety WITH PREJUDICE.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay the trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court reviews a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010); Jackson v. Prof'l Radiology Inc., 864 F.3d 463, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2017); Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2019). A motion for judgment on the pleadings "is granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir.1991)).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Thus, "[f]or purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 728 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it does require more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).

"[A] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simplycalls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a "plausible" claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. Therefore, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Generally, a court must convert a party's motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment if matters that are outside of the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, in addition to the pleadings, federal courts may also consider the following without converting the motion into one for summary judgment:

(1) any documents attached to, incorporated by, or referred to in the pleadings; (2) documents attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings that are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's allegations, even if not explicitly incorporated by reference; (3) public records; and (4) matters of which the court may take judicial notice.

Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, LLC, 702 F. Supp. 2d 826, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2010); see, e.g., Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (N.D. Ohio 2009); New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2003); Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir.2008) (noting that "matters of public record" may be taken into account when considering Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)); Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Although typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment."); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes."). Court records are public records, and, therefore, the court may consider them. See Dudek, LLC, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 832 ("[C]ourt filings are admissible as public records."). Alternatively, the Court may take judicial notice of the existence of the prior proceedings because it is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity, but judicial notice is not appropriate for the truth of the facts stated therein. See Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[O]n a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of another court's opinion not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity."); see New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2003) (finding that the court could consider a prior complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss because "such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice")). The undersigned chooses to consider the prior state court proceedings as matters of public record.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the Court must test the sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims, all disputed facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. ECF Dkt. #1. Plaintiff's allegations are also taken as true. Where necessary, the undersigned supplements the recitation of the facts from the administrative appeal documents, attached as exhibits to Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF Dkt. #17).

A. The Moore Property and Far View Airport

The dispute in this case concerns the use of ultralight aircrafts and hang gliders at the Far View Airport, a small airport located on Plaintiff's trust property in Portage County, Ohio. TheMoore family has operated the airport since 1948. ECF Dkt. #1 at 3 ¶¶13-14. The Township enacted a Zoning Resolution in or around 1951, which zoned the property as Rural-Residential and which rendered the airport a nonconforming use. Id. at 3-4 ¶17-21. "In recent years," use of ultralight aircraft and hang-gliders began at the airport. Id. at 3 ¶14. However, this resulted in nuisance complaints. Id. at 3 ¶28. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants erroneously informed Moore that a certificate of nonconforming use was required to continue the airport's nonconforming use. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 25-27. Moore requested a certificate more than once and was eventually directed to apply to the Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"). Id. at 5 ¶¶ 28-34.

B. Board of Zoning Appeals Hearing and Meeting

On September 28, 2016, the BZA conducted a public hearing for the purpose of determining whether to issue a certificate of nonconforming use to Moore. ECF Dkt. #1 at 5-6 ¶37. At the conclusion of the hearing, the BZA granted Moore a certificate but imposed several conditions on the nonconforming use, including: (a) only Moore family members are permitted to operate aircraft at the airport; (b) aircraft powered by engines used at the airport must be owned by the Moore family; (c) "engineless" aircraft may be operated by any person, provided the aircraft is towed or lifted into the air by a Moore family member in a Moore family owned aircraft; (d) no exchange of money, goods, services, barter or donations is permitted as related to the airport; and (e) the use of the airport must "abide by" the terms of a certain 2004 Agricultural Easement. Id. at 6-7 ¶42; ECF Dkt. #1-9.

On October 19, 2016, the BZA held a regular private business meeting to journalize the meeting minutes from the September 28, 2016 hearing. ECF Dkt. #1 at 7 ¶45-46. The BZA voted affirmatively to issue a conditional certificate and journalized the same by signature. Id. at 8 ¶51.

C. Administrative Appeal to the Portage County Common Pleas Court

Pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 et seq., Plaintiff appealed the BZA's decision to the Portage County Common Pleas Court in the administrative appeal litigation on November 16, 2016. See ECF Dkt. #17-1 at 2; #17-3. In her appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) the BZA erred by not issuing Moore a certificate of nonconforming use per R.C. 519.19 and Art. VII, Sec. 701-1(I) of the Hiram Township Zoning Resolution; (2) The Township exceeded its authority pursuant to R.C. 519.12 and the Zoning Resolution by placing conditions on Moore's nonconforming use...