Moore v. Lear Corp.

664 F.Supp.3d 881

Andrew MOORE, Plaintiff, v. LEAR CORPORATION, Defendant.

CAUSE NO.: 1:22-CV-108 HAB

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

Signed March 27, 2023

Christopher C. Myers, Ilene M. Smith, Myers Smith Wallace LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiff.

Kevin E. Roberts, Scott James Preston, Ogletree Deakins, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

HOLLY A. BRADY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Andrew Moore ("Moore") was disciplined by his employer, Lear Corporation ("Lear") for some issues he had while operating a forklift on the job. After Moore, who is black and has been employed by Lear since 2014, was involved in a minor forklift collision, Lear suspended him without pay. After a second incident a month later, Lear removed Moore from his job as a forklift driver and placed him in the position of an assembly worker. These actions, according to him, did not occur when white employees made similar mistakes. Moore also contends that Lear suspended him for refusing to transfer jobs but white employees were not suspended when they refused transfer. Moore filed a Charge of Discrimination and claims after he did so, he was subjected to additional scrutiny and supervision while working. He filed suit against Lear claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Lear moves to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)¹ because Moore, as a union employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), did not avail himself of the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA. (ECF No. 10). Lear also asserts that Moore's claims are preempted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and barred by the statute of limitations for § 301 claims. Id. Because the Court finds that Moore's claim does not fall under § 301 of the LMRA and there is no "clear and unmistakable" language in the CBA requiring that Moore's statutory discrimination complaints be presented through the grievance procedure, the motion to dismiss will be DENIED.

DISCUSSION

a. Procedural Standard

Defendant styled its motion as one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although a proper 12(b)(6) motion depends solely on the allegations of the Complaint, Defendant asserts in its motion facts that are not in the Complaint: that Plaintiff is a bargaining unit member subject to the CBA negotiated between the union and Lear. The CBA is not attached to the Complaint and therefore, not made part of the complaint. This is because Plaintiff says he is not bringing a claim under the CBA, as Lear seems to assert; indeed, there is no mention of the CBA anywhere in the Complaint. Rather, the Complaint on its face is a straightforward discrimination action under federal statutes.

Lear, however, believing that the Complaint implicates the disciplinary provisions in the CBA, attached a copy of the CBA to its motion to dismiss. Lear asserts that the discrimination claims pled in the Complaint are subject to the grievance procedure bargained for in the CBA and thus it is proper to consider the CBA on a motion to dismiss. See Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 294, 300 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[W]hen a complaint refers to and rests on a contract or other document that is not attached to the complaint, a court might be within its rights to consider that document in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint without converting the motion into one for summary judgment, so long as the authenticity of the document is unquestioned."). Plaintiff did not object to the inclusion of the CBA for the Court's consideration, nor does he contest the CBA's authenticity; instead, he contends that attaching the CBA converts the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Both parties are incorrect.

Lear's motion hinges on various assertions. It asserts, for instance, that the broad language in the CBA requires employees to raise any discrimination claims through the negotiated grievance process. Expressed in slightly different terms, Lear argues that even though Moore could have raised his race discrimination and retaliation complaints through the grievance process, he did not and instead bypassed the CBA procedure to assert his claim in court. But "a failure to exhaust is normally considered to be an affirmative defense." Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006). So too, Lear's arguments that Moore's Title VII claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and are outside the statute of limitations for such claims are also affirmative defenses. See Leavell v. Kieffer, 189 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 1999) (the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., 697 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2012) (preemption is an affirmative defense). And affirmative defenses need not be anticipated or negated in a complaint. Thus, a motion to dismiss is usually only granted if a plaintiff pleads facts that show his claim is barred by the affirmative defense. See, e.g., Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718-19 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A complaint that on its face reveals that the plaintiff's claim is barred by a statute of limitations . . . can be dismissed on a motion to dismiss.").

Rule 8(c) states: "In response to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Thus, as the rule suggests, the proper way to seek a dismissal based on an affirmative defense is not by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "[r]ather, the defendant should answer and then move under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings." Burton v. Ghosh, 961 F.3d 960, 965 (7th Cir. 2020). Indeed, "[f]ailure to follow this process may 'deprive[ ] the opposing party of precisely the notice that would enable it to dispute the crucial issues of the case on equal terms.' " Id. (quoting Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971) (purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give opposing party notice of affirmative defense and opportunity to contest it).

As noted above, a narrow exception exists if the affirmative defenses are apparent in the complaint itself. Here, they are not. A cursory review of the Complaint shows that Moore's Complaint relies solely on Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The union is not a party. The Complaint neither mentions the CBA between the parties or any other labor relations act, such as the LMRA, and therefore the defenses depend on evidence outside the Complaint - the CBA - which is not proper for the Court to consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. While the Court could soundly deny the motion to dismiss on this basis alone, that would only prolong the substantive discussion to come and do nothing to advance the ball for judicial economy purposes. The parties have provided the CBA and briefed the relevant issues. So despite the procedural morass Lear created by proceeding as it has, the Court will use its discretionary authority to decide the matter as if it had been presented under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Wardingley v. Ecovyst Catalyst Techs., LLC, 2022 WL 16714139, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2022) (finding the procedural defect to be of no consequence because the Court had all it needed to rule on the defense); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that although the district court judge "jumped the gun" by dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6), the error was harmless since the court had all it needed to rule and the plaintiff did not object).²

Whether or not the Court considers the motion a rule 12(b)(6) or a rule 12(c) motion it is evaluated using the same legal standard. GATX Leasing Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rule 12(c) uses the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). Like Rule 12(b) motions, courts grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief." Craig's, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989)).

b. Factual Background

Moore, an African American male, was employed as a Forklift Driver at Lear's Columbia City, Indiana plant. The precipitating events for this suit occurred in May and June 2021 when Moore was involved in a minor collision while driving a forklift. Moore was suspended without pay for that incident. In June 2021, Moore dropped a foam item from a forklift. After this incident, Moore was removed from his position as a forklift driver and placed in a less desirable position as an assembly worker. Based on these actions taken by Lear, Moore filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against it. Moore asserted that other non-black employees committed similar violations while driving a forklift and were not suspended without pay and were not transferred to less desirable positions. After receiving a Notice of Right to Sue letter, Moore did just that, suing Lear in state court, later removed by Lear to this Court, asserting that the actions taken against him constituted race discrimination under Title VII and § 1981. Moore also asserts that after he filed his EEOC Charge, he has been "subjected to over-scrutiny of his work and Defendant nitpicked his every action" as retaliation for complaining of unlawful discrimination.

During the relevant period, workers at Lear's Columbia City plant were represented by the United Auto Workers Union (the Union), as their exclusive bargaining agent. Their employment was governed by a CBA between Lear and the Union in effect through February 1, 2025. (CBA, ECF No. 11-1). In general terms, the CBA establishes the terms of employment for represented...