Moore v. State

297 Ga. 773

778 S.E.2d 210

MOORE

v.The STATE.

No. S15A1211.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 5, 2015.

Gregory Davis Smith, The Smith Group, LLC, Atlanta, for appellant.

J. David Miller, Dist. Atty., Harriet Michelle Thomas, Asst. Dist. Atty., Southern Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jason Matthew Rea, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, for appellee.

Opinion

MELTON, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Alfonso Moore was found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Dominga Trejo and the theft of her truck.¹ON APPEAL MOORE COntends thAt the trial court erred by allowing a State's witness to sit at the prosecution table during the trial, and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to make improper comments during its closing argument. We affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence reveals that, on the evening of November 9, 2012, Trejo drove to a Quick Mart convenience store at the Regency Village trailer park to pick up her husband from work. Moore arrived at the scene riding a bicycle. After Trejo arrived at the convenience store in her Ford truck at around 7:00pm, but before her husband was able to meet her, Trejo was shot by Moore four times. Moore also stole Trejo's truck. Witnesses at the scene heard the gunshots and also saw Moore driving the truck. Trejo died from her gunshot wounds, and her body was found later that same evening lying in the road towards the back of the trailer park. Moore admitted at trial that he was the man on the bicycle at the scene of the crime and that he had stolen the truck, but he also claimed that he never saw Trejo and that he had not shot and killed her.

This evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Moore guilty of all of the crimes of which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Moore contends that the trial court erred by allowing the primary investigator in the case, GBI Agent Walsingham, to sit at the prosecution table during the trial in violation of the rule of sequestration. Pursuant to OCGA § 24–6–615:

Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 24–6–616, at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that each witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order on its own motion. This Code section shall not authorize exclusion of: (1) A party who is a natural person; (2) An officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney; or (3) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause.

(Emphasis supplied). In this regard, “[i]n the situation in which the State maintains that it needs the presence of the primary investigator for the orderly presentation of the case, excepting the investigator from the rule of sequestration is within the discretion of the trial court.” (Citation omitted.) Holloman v. State,291 Ga. 338, 339–340(2), 729 S.E.2d 344 (2012). Here, the prosecutor specifically explained to the trial court that Agent Walsingham was needed to assist in the orderly presentation of this case, which involved over thirty witnesses and a significant amount of paperwork and CDs. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to allow Agent Walsingham to sit at the prosecution table here. Id.

3. Moore argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to comment during its closing argument on a Quick Mart surveillance video that had been admitted...