Moore v. Texas

139 S.Ct. 666

Bobby James MOORE

v.TEXAS

No. 18-443

Supreme Court of the United States.

Decided February 19, 2019

PER CURIAM.

In 2015, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that petitioner, Bobby James Moore, did not have intellectual disability and consequently was eligible for the death penalty. Ex parte Moore , 470 S.W.3d 481, 527–528 ( Ex parte Moore I ). We previously considered the lawfulness of that determination, vacated the appeals court's decision, and remanded the case for further consideration of the issue. Moore v. Texas , 581 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1053, 197 L.Ed.2d 416 (2017). The appeals court subsequently reconsidered the matter but reached the same conclusion. Ex parte Moore , 548 S.W.3d 552, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ( Ex parte Moore II ). We again review its decision, and we reverse its determination.

I

When we first heard this case, in Moore , we noted that the state trial court (a state habeas court) "received affidavits and heard testimony from Moore's family members, former counsel, and a number of court-appointed mental-health experts." 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1045. We described the evidence as "reveal[ing]" the following:

"Moore had significant mental and social difficulties beginning at an early age. At 13, Moore lacked basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, and the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend the standards of measure or the basic principle that subtraction is the reverse of addition. At school, because of his limited ability to read and write, Moore could not keep up with lessons. Often, he was separated from the rest of the class and told to draw pictures. Moore's father, teachers, and peers called him ‘stupid’ for his slow reading and speech. After failing every subject in the ninth grade, Moore dropped out of high school. Cast out of his home, he survived on the streets, eating from trash cans, even after two bouts of food poisoning." Ibid . (citations omitted).

On the basis of this and other evidence, the trial court found that Moore had intellectual disability and thus was ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). App. to Pet. for Cert. 310a–311a. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that determination, Ex parte Moore I , 470 S.W.3d 481, and we reviewed its decision, Moore , 581 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 197 L.Ed.2d 416.

At the outset of our opinion, we recognized as valid the three underlying legal criteria that both the trial court and appeals court had applied. Id ., at –––– – ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1045–1046 (citing American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (11th ed. 2010) (AAIDD–11); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM–5)). To make a finding of intellectual disability, a court must see: (1) deficits in intellectual functioning—primarily a test-related criterion, see DSM–5, at 37; (2) adaptive deficits, "assessed using both clinical evaluation and individualized ... measures," ibid .; and (3) the onset of these deficits while the defendant was still a minor, id ., at 38. With respect to the first criterion, we wrote that Moore's intellectual testing indicated his was a borderline case, but that he had demonstrated sufficient intellectual-functioning deficits to require consideration of the second criterion—adaptive functioning. Moore , 581 U.S., at –––– – ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1048–1050. With respect to the third criterion, we found general agreement that any onset took place when Moore was a minor. Id ., at ––––, n. 3, 137 S.Ct., at 1045, n. 3.

But there was significant disagreement between the state courts about whether Moore had the adaptive deficits needed for intellectual disability. "In determining the significance of adaptive deficits, clinicians look to whether an individual's adaptive performance falls two or more standard deviations below the mean in any of the three adaptive skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical)." Id ., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1046 (citing AAIDD–11, at 43). Based on the evidence before it, the trial court found that "Moore's performance fell roughly two standard deviations below the mean in all three skill categories." 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1046 ; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 309a. Reversing that decision, the appeals court held that Moore had "not proven by a preponderance of the evidence" that he possessed the requisite adaptive deficits, and thus was eligible for the death penalty. Ex parte Moore I , 470 S.W.3d at 520. We disagreed with the appeals court's adaptive-functioning analysis, however, and identified at least five errors.

First, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "overemphasized Moore's perceived adaptive strengths." Moore , 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1050. "But the medical community," we said, "focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits ." Ibid .

Second, the appeals court "stressed Moore's improved behavior in prison." Id ., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1050. But "[c]linicians ... caution against reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting,’ as a prison surely is." Ibid . (quoting DSM–5, at 38).

Third, the appeals court "concluded that Moore's record of academic failure, ... childhood abuse[,] and suffering ... detracted from a determination that his intellectual and adaptive deficits were related." 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1051. But "in the medical community," those "traumatic experiences" are considered " ‘risk factors ’ for intellectual disability." Ibid . (quoting AAIDD–11, at 59–60).

Fourth, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals required "Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to ‘a personality disorder.’ " 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1051 (quoting Ex parte Moore I , 470 S.W.3d at 488 ). But clinicians recognize that the "existence of a personality disorder or mental-health issue ... is ‘not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual disability.’ " 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1051 (quoting Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Moore v. Texas , O.T. 2016, No. 15797, p. 19.

Fifth, the appeals court directed state courts, when examining adaptive deficits, to rely upon certain factors set forth in a Texas case called Ex parte Briseno , 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Ex parte Moore I , 470 S.W.3d at 486, 489. The Briseno factors were: whether "those who knew the person best during the developmental stage" thought of him as "mentally retarded"; whether he could "formulat[e] plans" and "car[ry] them through"; whether his conduct showed "leadership"; whether he showed a "rational and appropriate" "response to external stimuli"; whether he could answer questions "coherently" and "rationally"; whether he could "hide facts or lie effectively"; and whether the commission of his offense required "forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose." 135 S.W.3d at 8–9.

We criticized the use of these factors both because they had no grounding in prevailing medical practice, and because they invited "lay perceptions of intellectual disability" and "lay stereotypes" to guide assessment of intellectual disability. Moore , 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1051. Emphasizing the Briseno factors over clinical factors, we said, " ‘creat[es] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.’ " 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1051 (quoting Hall v. Florida , 572 U.S. 701, 704, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014) ). While our decisions in " Atkins and Hall left to the States ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce’ the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled," 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1048 (quoting Hall , 572 U.S. at 719, 134 S.Ct. 1986 ), a court's intellectual disability determination "must be ‘informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework,’ " 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1048 (quoting Hall , 572 U.S. at 721, 134 S.Ct. 1986 ).

Three Members of this Court dissented from the majority's treatment of Moore's intellectual functioning and with aspects of its adaptive-functioning analysis, but all agreed about the impropriety of the Briseno factors. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote in his dissenting opinion, the Briseno factors were "an unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee of Atkins " and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "therefore erred in using them to analyze adaptive deficits."

Moore , 581 U.S., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1053 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.)

For the reasons we have described, the Court set aside the judgment of the appeals court and remanded the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Id ., at ––––, 137 S.Ct., at 1053.

II

On remand the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered the appeal and reached the same basic conclusion, namely, that Moore had not demonstrated intellectual disability. Ex parte Moore II , 548 S.W.3d at 555. The court again noted the three basic criteria: intellectual-functioning deficits, adaptive deficits, and early onset. Id ., at 560–562. But this time it focused almost exclusively on the second criterion, adaptive deficits. The court said that, in doing so, it would "abandon reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors." Id ., at 560. It would instead use " ‘current medical diagnostic standards’ " set forth in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM–5. Id ., at 559–560. In applying those standards to the trial court record, it found the State's expert witness, Dr. Kristi Compton, " ‘far more credible and reliable’ " than the other experts considered by the trial court. Id ., at 562. (As in our last opinion, we neither second nor second-guess that judgment.) And, as we have said, it reached the same conclusion it had before.

Moore has now filed...