Moore v. The City of Clarksdale

LASHEA MOORE, PLAINTIFF v. THE CITY OF CLARKSDALE, MS, et al. DEFENDANTS

No. 4:22-CV-41-DMB-JMV

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division

December 22, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

DEBRA M. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Lashea Moore sued District Attorney Brenda Mitchell and Assistant District Attorney Stephanie Brown, among other defendants seeking injunctive relief and damages based on allegations that a pending criminal case against her amounts to a double jeopardy violation. Mitchell and Brown move to dismiss all Moore's claims against them, arguing primarily that (1) the United States Supreme Court's decision in Younger v Harris bars Moore's injunctive relief claims, (2) Moore's § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity, and (3) Heck v Humphrey prohibits Moore's claims from moving forward while her state criminal charges are pending. Because the Court agrees with these arguments, the motion to dismiss will be granted in part, Moore's injunctive relief claims and § 1983 claims against Mitchell and Brown in their official capacities will be dismissed without prejudice, and the remaining claims against Mitchell and Brown will be stayed pending resolution of Moore's criminal charges.

I Relevant Procedural History

On March 25, 2022, Lashea Moore filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against the City of Clarksdale, Mississippi Police Chief Sandra Williams, in her individual and official capacities; Police Officer Fernando Harris, in his individual and official capacities; District Attorney Brenda F. Mitchell, in her official capacity; Assistant District Attorney Stephanie A. Brown, in her individual and official capacities; and “John Does 1-5.” Doc. #1. Moore alleges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of her Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and related state law claims based on her arrest and prosecution for simple assault and for simple assault on an educator. Id. at 7-13. In addition to damages, Moore “requests injunctive relief against ... Mitchell enjoining [Mitchell] from continuing to prosecute [her] in the Coahoma County Circuit Court in violation of the 5th Amendment.” Id. at 11.

Moore filed “Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief (Urgent and Necessitous Motion -Expedited Hearing Requested)” on April 29, 2022, seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining her prosecution for simple assault on an educator based on her assertion that she had already pled guilty to a simple assault charge in municipal court arising from the same occurrence such that a second prosecution violated her right against double jeopardy. Doc. #6. After the conclusion of briefing on the preliminary injunction motion,^[1] Mitchell and Brown filed a motion to dismiss all Moore's claims against them. Doc. #21. The motion to dismiss is fully briefed. Docs. #22, #51, #52.

On June 22, 2022, before briefing on the motion to dismiss was complete, the Court denied Moore's preliminary injunction motion following a June 1, 2022, evidentiary hearing.^[2] Doc. #40. Addressing its jurisdiction, the Court found the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), applied such that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction unless an exception applied. Id. at 6. Because the “Fifth Circuit has recognized that double-jeopardy claims can constitute the kind of extraordinary circumstances that justify an exception from Younger” when the “party seeking the injunction . show[s] a likely double-jeopardy violation” and because the likelihood of a double-jeopardy violation impacted both the jurisdictional question and the merits of Moore's request, the Court assumed jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. Id. The Court ultimately concluded that Moore failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her double jeopardy claim “because the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to accept [her] plea [to simple assault], [such that] there [was] no bar to the defendants proceeding with the simple assault on an educator charge against her.”^[3] Id. at 9.

II Standard

Based on their initial memorandum brief, Mitchell and Brown move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Doc. #22 at 5-6.

Motions brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenge a court's subject matter jurisdiction.

The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. The Court may find a plausible set of facts to support subject matter jurisdiction by considering any of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.

Traweek v. Gusman, 414 F.Supp.3d 847, 855-56 (E.D. La. 2019) (cleaned up) (citing Choice Inc. of Tex. v. Greenstein, 691 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2012), and Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)).

To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Henley v. Biloxi H.M.A., L.L.C., 48 F.4th 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2022). “While the court must accept the facts in the complaint as true, it will not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III Relevant Factual Allegations

Following growing tension between Lashea Moore's daughter and LaQwenia Simon's son, Moore and Simon were involved in a physical altercation on October 14, 2019. Doc. #1 at 4. “Realizing the error of her ways, ... Moore took responsibility for her involvement in the altercation and pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of Simple Assault on October 15, 2019 in the Clarksdale Municipal Court.” Id. “Having full knowledge of the facts surrounding the charge, the Municipal Court Judge accepted [Moore's] guilty plea and sentenced her accordingly.” Id.

Later the same day, officers arrived at Moore's home “and barged into [her] home without consent, [or a] warrant].” Id. at 5. “The officers explained to [her] that her name had came up at the police station, and they were instructed to go to her home to arrest her for a charge that she had previously pleaded guilty[ to because] this time the charge was being upgraded to a felony.” Id.

“Since that time, [Moore] has been the subject of a subsequent criminal prosecution ..” Id. District Attorney Brenda Mitchell and Assistant District Attorney Stephanie Brown initiated the criminal proceedings. Id. at 6.

IV Analysis

In support of their dismissal motion, Mitchell and Brown argue:

Adjudicating, or even litigating, this case now would run afoul of well-established Younger abstention principles. Such action would contravene clear Fifth Circuit precedent governing Section 1983 claims that are intwined with state criminal proceedings. Such action would also inappropriately thwart the Heck bar's potential future application to Moore's claims. Additionally, [her] federal claims against DA Mitchell and ADA Brown in their official capacities are barred by the sovereign immunity. And, as to the claims in their individual capacities, they are entitled to prosecutorial and qualified immunities. Moore's state law claims are barred due to immunities provided by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”).

Doc. #22 at 7.

Generally, “[w]hen facing a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction and other challenges on the merits, [a court] must consider first the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge prior to addressing the merits of the claim.” Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, 757 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2014). While Younger is “not a jurisdictional issue,” a court may abstain under Younger without first determining whether jurisdiction exists. Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 532 (5th Cir. 2022). “Sovereign immunity is indeed a jurisdictional bar.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021). But “Heck does not pose a jurisdictional bar to the assertion of § 1983 claims.” Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021). So the Court will first address whether Younger abstention is warranted on the injunctive relief claims and then whether it has jurisdiction over the § 1983 damages claims against Mitchell and Brown in their official capacities before determining whether Heck bars consideration of Moore's claims against them in their individual capacities.

A. Younger Abstention

Mitchell and Brown argue that because all three conditions for Younger abstention are met and no exceptions apply, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Moore's claims. Doc. #22 at 7-9.

Moore responds that Younger applies to prosecutions that were “brought lawfully and in good faith” and she “explicitly asserted in her complaint that Defendants initiated the second criminal proceeding in bad faith and without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.” Doc. #51 at 4-5. Additionally, she argues that her case satisfies an exception to Younger because “the federal right at issue will not be given its intended scope absent this court's intervention.” Id. at 6. She further asserts that “[t]he state's interests would be best served by preventing public officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct, and neither the public nor Defendants...