Morales v. United States Fed. Gov't

1

YONI JUNIOR MORALES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERMNET, et al., Defendants.

No. 24-CV-24444-MOORE/Elfenbein

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

November 22, 2024

Yoni Junior Morales, PRO SE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Yoni Junior Morales's Complaint filed pro se pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1001, 1832, and 2708, 28 U.S.C § 351, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730, and 5323, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 300, 1983, and 2000e-2 (the “Complaint”), ECF No. [1], and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Motion”), ECF No. [3]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore has referred this case to me “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law regarding all pre-trial non-dispositive matters and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive matters.” ECF No. [5]. Because Plaintiff has not paid the Court's filing fee, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. Under that statute, courts are permitted to dismiss a suit “any time [] the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). After reviewing the record and relevant law, I recommend that the Complaint, ECF No. [1], be DISSMISSED, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B)(2)(i) and (ii), and that the IFP Motion ECF No. [3], be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings the instant action against the following 28 entities: (1) the United States Federal Government, (2) the Department of Justice, (3) the U.S. Attorney General, (4) the Securities and Exchange Commission, (5) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (6) the Federal Trade Commission, (7) the Department of the Treasury, (8) the Federal Reserve System, (9) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, (10) the Federal Election Commission, (11) the Department of Health and Human Services, (12) the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, (13) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (14) the Department of State, (15) the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (16) the National Security Council, (17) the Department of Defense, (18) the Department of Homeland Security, (19) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (20) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, (21) the Intelligence Community, (22) the Central Intelligence Agency, (23) the Drug Enforcement Administration, (24) the National Security Agency, (25) the Defense Intelligence Agency, (26) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, (27) the Secret Service, and (28) the Port of Palm Beach (collectively “Defendants”). ECF No. [1] at 1. Against these Defendants, Plaintiff seeks $400,000,000,000 in damages “[f]or whistleblower reward money, the State rewards program, combat pay, irreparable damages, and provisioned compensatory justice for the monumental transgression of the defendant's subordinates['] conniving judicial misconduct.” Id. at ¶ 139.

The Complaint is little more than a racialized, political screed filled with conspiracy theories. See generally id. For that reason, this Report and Recommendation will only detail the factual portions of the Complaint that are discernable and otherwise necessary to orient the reader with the pleading. Plaintiff begins the Complaint with the allegation that the Miami-Dade Department of Justice wrongly detained him based on “[u]nlawfully concocted, falsified, and fabricated police reports, court documents, and judicial proceedings[.]” Id. at ¶ 2. While Plaintiff does not explicitly allege as much, it appears he was arrested for beating another individual. See id. at ¶ 4 (“The racist n**ro presented pictures of self-inflicted wounds to the defendant's subordinate the Miami-Dade Department of Justice. Concocted a story of receiving a Rodney King beating that never took place and falsely claimed to be a victim like Andrea Puerta[.]”). Due to his arrest, Plaintiff claims that his employer, Defendant Port of Palm Beach, terminated his employment. See id. at ¶ 10. From this allegation onwards, the Complaint devolves into a confused narrative that employs vile and racist language, which the Court need not repeat in this Report and Recommendation.^[1]See, e.g., id. at ¶ 124; id. at ¶ 14. Indeed, the Complaint's 51 pages contain meandering allegations that are difficult to summarize in a digestible fashion. For that reason, the Report and Recommendation turns to directly address the procedural and substantive deficiencies that necessitate the Complaint's dismissal.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (alterations added). “A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). More importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration adopted; other alteration added; citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis

Before reaching the merits of the Complaint, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff has properly initiated this action by filing a meritorious IFP Motion. In the IFP Motion, Plaintiff states that he has a monthly income of $3,200.00 and approximately $9,000.00 in various bank accounts at Wells Fargo. See ECF No. [3] at 2. Drawing against those assets are Plaintiff's monthly costs that total $3,499.00.^[2]See id. at 4-5. In addition, Plaintiff's IFP Motion explains that his income fluctuates as it is based on work availability and, as a result, he sometimes goes several days in a row without any work or income. Id. at 6. Based on Plaintiff's representations, he has demonstrated his indigency and, therefore, is eligible to initiate the instant action without prepaying the Court's $405.00 filing fee.

B. The Complaint

Having determined that Plaintiff has filed a meritorious IFP Motion, the Court must next screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). As explained below, a review of the allegations reveals that the Complaint is subject to dismissal because it (1) is a shotgun pleading, (2) is frivolous, and (3) invokes federal statutes that do not create a private right of action.

1. Shotgun Pleading

Courts must “construe pro se pleadings liberally holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Arrington v. Green, 757 Fed.Appx. 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Still, a pro se party must abide by Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim[,]” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (alteration added); see Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021). As explained above, under Rule 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Plaintiff's Complaint is a “shotgun pleading” that fails to meet the foregoing standards - even under the relaxed pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants. There are four types of shotgun pleadings that violate Rule 8(a), Rule 10(b), or both:

The most common type - by a long shot - is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type . . . is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015) (footnote call numbers omitted). The “unifying characteristic” of shotgun pleadings is they “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323 (footnote call number omitted).

Upon review of the allegations, the Complaint falls under the second and third categories of shotgun pleadings. First, the Complaint is replete with immaterial facts. Towards the beginning of the Complaint, Plaintiff complains of the conduct of an unspecified judge and the Honorable Eleana Sosa-Bruzon; however, neither individual is a party to the instant action, so it is unclear how the actions of these individuals have any bearing on the resolution of this case. See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶ 13-19. Additionally Plaintiff makes the outlandish assertion that the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the World...