Moran v. Berryhill

LINDA A. MORAN, Claimant, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,¹Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent.

No. 15-cv-4027

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 20, 2017

Jeffrey T. Gilbert

Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant Linda Moran ("Claimant") seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Claimant's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 6]. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. [ECF Nos. 19, 23]. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's motion is granted and Claimant's motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July, 2008, Claimant filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2007. (R. 121-127). After these applications were denied initially and uponreconsideration (R. 45-48), Claimant filed a request for an administrative hearing, (R. 76-77). At a hearing held on September 24, 2009, Claimant, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. (R. 10-44). Ultimately, the ALJ denied Claimant's applications, finding she was not disabled under the Act. (R. 52-60). The Appeals Council denied Claimant's subsequent request to review that decision. (R. 1-6).

Claimant then challenged the ALJ's determination in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Moran v. Astrue, 2013 WL 53893 (N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 2013). Judge Valdez ruled the ALJ erred in assessing Claimant's credibility because she relied on boilerplate language, did not address Claimant's testimony regarding lotion usage and exposure to cold and hot temperatures, did not explain why Claimant's daily activities were inconsistent with her testimony, and improperly relied on the absence of objective medical evidence and Claimant's desire to return to work. Id. at *7-8. Judge Valdez found the ALJ further erred by neither discussing whether Claimant's hand and foot limitations were consistent with the medical evidence nor explaining why those limitations were not incorporated into the RFC. Id. at *9. Although Judge Valdez remanded the case because of these errors, she also rejected some of Claimant's arguments. Judge Valdez determined the ALJ did not err in her consideration of Claimant's obesity, despite minimal discussion of the impairment, because, in light of the evidence in the record, Claimant did not show further discussion would have changed the ALJ's decision. Id. Judge Valdez also held substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Claimant's depression did not affect her functional capacity. Id.

The ALJ held another hearing on October 31, 2013. (R. 361-406). Again, Claimant, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. Id. A vocational expert ("the VE") and a medical expert, Dr. Ronald Semerdjian ("Dr. Semerdjian"), also testified. Id. On November 21,2013, the ALJ again denied Claimant's applications. (R. 308-321). The ALJ's decision followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by Social Security Regulations. Id. At step one, the ALJ found Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (R. 311). At step two, the ALJ found Claimant had the severe impairments of congenital lamellar ichthyosis, and, since February, 2011, low back pain/degenerative disk disease. Id. At step three, the ALJ found Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 505.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (R. 313).

Before step four, the ALJ found Claimant had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work. (R. 314). The ALJ limited Claimant, though, to work that involved no more than occasional bilateral grasping and fine manipulation with her hands, and occasional bending, stooping, crawling, and climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Id. The ALJ further found Claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to open heights, moving and hazardous machinery, and heat. Id. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found, at step four, Claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 320). At step five, the ALJ concluded there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant could perform. Id. Specifically, the ALJ found Claimant could work as an information clerk, an usher, and a locker room attendant. (R. 321).

When the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review, the ALJ's denial became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). Claimant now seeks review in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Baumhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). A claimant then may seek review of this final decision in the district court. Id. Judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision. Nelms, 553 F.3d at 1097. The reviewing court may enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A "mere scintilla" of evidence is not enough. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). Even when there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, however, the district court will not uphold the ALJ's findings if the ALJ did not "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion." Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the substantial evidence standard is deferential, a reviewing court must "conduct a critical review of the evidence" before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008). The court may not, however, "displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence." Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Claimant asserts the ALJ made four errors in her decision. First, Claimant argues the ALJ improperly assessed Claimant's mental impairments and the limitations caused by those impairments. Second, Claimant contends the ALJ did not adequately account for Claimant's obesity. Third, Claimant maintains the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility. Fourth, Claimant claims the ALJ relied on the VE's flawed testimony at step five. The Court finds the ALJ did not commit any of these errors.

1. The ALJ Developed A Full And Fair Record And Adequately Incorporated Claimant's Mental Impairments Into Her RFC

Claimant raises two arguments related to the ALJ's evaluation of her mental impairments. The first is that the ALJ "had no medical evidence whatsoever to guide her in evaluating the severity of [Claimant's] mental impairments." [ECF No. 25], at 4. According to Claimant, the ALJ "should have recognized that she needed additional evidence" to apply the special technique. Id. Specifically, Claimant contends the ALJ either should have requested Claimant undergo a psychological examination or submitted her health records to a medical expert who was trained in psychiatry of psychology. [ECF No. 19], at 10. Claimant asserts that, because the ALJ did not have an opinion from a mental health specialist, the ALJ relied on "her own lay speculation" to determine the severity of Claimant's mental impairments. Id.

When this case was before Judge Valdez in 2013, Claimant asserted a different but related argument. Claimant contended "the ALJ improperly rendered her own independent medical assessment" of Claimant's depression and, as a result, impermissibly discounted the seriousness of those impairments. Moran, 2013 WL 53893, at *9. Judge Valdez rejected Claimant's position. Judge Valdez noted the record contained two GAF scores, an RFC completed by a medical professional that "made no mention of emotional limitations," and therecords of another doctor who found Claimant to be emotionally stable. Id. Judge Valdez held "[t]he inconsistences of the GAF scores and the diagnoses, combined with the ALJ's review of several of Moran's mental health assessments, are sufficient to meet the standard for 'substantial evidence.'" Id. The Court recognizes, of course, that the record and the parties' arguments were different in the case before Judge Valdez and provides this summary merely as background.

An ALJ has a duty to develop a full and fair record. Martin v. Astrue, 345 F. App'x 197, 201 (7th Cir. 2009). Because of this duty, an ALJ must ensure the record contains enough information to assess a claimant's RFC and make a disability determination. Id. "Failure to fulfill this obligation is 'good cause' to remand for gathering of additional evidence." Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 2000). But courts generally uphold the Commissioner's...