Moreau v. Harris Cnty.

1

Lynwood Moreau, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harris County, Texas, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:19-CV-646

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

March 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Peter Bray United States Magistrate Judge

This is a case under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C, § 207(a) (FLSA).^[1] Plaintiffs are lieutenants and captains employed by the Harris County Sheriffs Office (HCSO). Plaintiffs seek relief against Defendant Harris County for its failure to pay them overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA. ECF No. 1. Consistent with the parties' consent, the district judge transferred this case to the undersigned to conduct all further proceedings, including final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF No. 148. Pending before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 159.^[2] Defendant contends that lieutenants are exempt administrative employees and that captains are exempt administrative and executive employees, and consequently, that neither are entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA.

Plaintiffs fall into three categories: (1) law enforcement patrol; (2) law enforcement investigation; and (3) criminal justice. Plaintiffs also fall into two ranks: captains and lieutenants. The court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether lieutenants in the law enforcement patrol and investigative categories are exempt administrative employees. Those employees' overtime claims will proceed to trial. However, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the criminal justice lieutenants and all captains are exempt administrative employees. They are. There are also no genuine issues of material fact as to Plaintiffs' underreported hours claims or willfulness, and summary judgment will be granted on those claims. In sum, summary judgment will be granted as to all captains, the criminal justice lieutenants underreported hours, and willfulness. The law enforcement lieutenants (both in patrol and investigations) may proceed to trial.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

HCSO utilizes a paramilitary chain of command: deputies report to sergeants, who report to lieutenants, who report to captains, who report to majors, who report to assistant chiefs, who report to the chief deputy, who ultimately reports to the sheriff. See Chief Thomas Diaz Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, ECF No. 159-11; HCSO Org. Chart, ECF No. 163-13. HCSO is divided into two commands: (1) Law Enforcement Command, which includes the Criminal Investigations Bureau and the Patrol Bureau; and (2) Criminal Justice Command, which includes the 701 Justice Housing Bureau, the 1200 Housing Bureau, and the Justice Management Bureau. See HCSO Org. Chart, ECF No. 163-13. Each command is led by an assistant chief. See id. Each bureau is led by a major. See id. Each bureau is divided into different divisions or districts, which are led by captains. See id. The lieutenants function as the “watch commander” for a given shift within a district. ECF No. 159-11 ¶ 4.

B. Procedural History

Defendant has twice before moved for summary judgment. On June 10, 2019, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Lieutenant Moreau was an exempt executive employee. ECF No. 22. Judge Hughes, to whom this case was previously assigned, denied the motion without prejudice and permitted Defendant to file another summary judgment motion. ECF No. 50. On August 13, 2021, Defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment, again arguing that Lieutenant Moreau was an exempt executive employee. ECF No. 54. Judge Hughes denied that motion, finding that Moreau was a salaried employee, but that there were genuine issues of material fact remaining as to his primary duty, whether his direction of other employees constituted a law enforcement duty, and whether he had the ability to hire or fire employees. ECF No. 64. Judge Hughes explained that “[b]ased on the limited discovery at this point, it is clear Moreau performed a mix of managerial and law enforcement duties,” and “[n]either party present[ed] sufficient evidence to conclude how Moreau splits his time.” Id. at 4.

When the first two motions for summary judgment were filed, Moreau was the only plaintiff in this case. Thereafter, numerous other' plaintiffs, of different ranks and in different commands and bureaus, joined in the case. ECF Nos. 66 114. After transfer to the undersigned, the court ordered that the parties conduct discovery. ECF Nos. 146, 153. The court held a status conference, at which the court advised that it would entertain further dispositive motions before trial. ECF Nos. 154, 158. Thereafter, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 159.

C. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant raises five arguments. First, Defendant contends that, as required by the FLSA's administrative and executive exemptions, both lieutenants and captains are paid on a salary basis. ECF No. 159 at 19-20. Second, Defendant contends that all lieutenants are exempt administrative employees. Id. at 24-33. Third, Defendant argues that all captains are exempt administrative or executive employees. Id. at 33-35. Fourth, Defendant asserts that “Plaintiffs have no evidence that [Defendant] knew or should have known that some of [Plaintiffs] were allegedly working off-the-clock,” and that such “underreported time is not compensable under the FLSA.” Id. at 35. Finally, Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs have no evidence that [Defendant] willfully violated the FLSA.” Id. at 37-38.^[3]

D. Plaintiffs' Response

Plaintiffs respond with nine arguments, attacking both the merits and the procedural posture of Defendant's motion. ECF No. 163. First, Plaintiffs argue that the court should deny Defendant's motion because the better course is to proceed to trial. ECF No. 163 at 35-38. Second, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's motion should be denied because Defendant “waived its affirmative defenses that [Plaintiffs] are exempt . . . under the executive exemption and/or the administrative exemption by failing to plead them.” Id. at 39-40. Third and fourth, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's motion should be denied “because Judge Hughes's prior order denying summary judgment on the exact same issues is the law of the case” and is “preclusive.” Id. at JO-44. Fifth, Plaintiffs urge the court to construe Defendant's motion as a motion for reconsideration. Id. at 44. Sixth, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant cannot establish that Plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis. Id. at 46-55. Seventh, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has not established the applicability of the administrative or executive exemptions as a matter of law. ECF Id. at 55-62. Eighth and ninth, Plaintiffs urge the court to defer the issue of willfulness, and if considered, find that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant willfully violated the FLSA. Id. at 62-63.^[4]

The court begins with the procedural arguments.

II. The court will determine the merits of Defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 56(c).

Plaintiffs raise five procedural challenges to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Each lacks merit.

A. Trial is not a better course.

Plaintiffs first argue that the court should deny Defendant's motion because, even if Defendant meets their summary judgment burden, trial is a better path forward. ECF No. 163 at 35. Plaintiffs argue that “the dispositive-motion process in this case is tainted with procedural unfairness,” because this is Defendant's third motion for summary judgment and because the application of the FLSA's exemptions are a question for the jury even if an employee's primary duties are undisputed. Id. at 37. Defendant responds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish procedural unfairness rising to the level that would warrant denial of their motion. ECF No. 164 at 18-19. Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs are mistaken-when the facts are undisputed, the determination of whether an employer qualifies for an exemption is a question of law, not fact. Id. at 18.

The first two motions for summary judgment were filed when Moreau was the only plaintiff in the case and before discovery pertaining to all issues had been conducted. Although this is the third motion for summary judgment, Defendant moves for summary judgment on exemptions that have not been previously considered by the court. Moreover, prior to the filing of the instant motion, the court informed the parties that it would entertain a successive motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 154 at 26,^[5] and adopted the dispositive motions deadline jointly proposed by the parties, ECF Nos. 156, 158. Although Plaintiffs objected to the re-urging of any issue previously raised by Defendant, ECF Nos. 152, 156, the court did not include any such limitation in setting the motions deadline. ECF No. 158. Plaintiffs have not put forth any compelling reason for the court to now deny the motion based on alleged procedural unfairness.

Additionally, the court finds that the issues raised by Defendant are appropriate for summary judgment. See Singer v. City of Waco, Tex., 324 F.3d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 2003) (“It is true that the ultimate determination of whether an employer qualifies for an exemption under the FLSA is a question of law. That ultimate determination, however, relies on many factual determinations. . . .”) (citing Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 203 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 954 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1992)).^[6]

B. Defendant did not waive its affirmative defenses.

Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant waived its exemption defenses because it did not identify the specific exemption(s) it relies upon in its answer....