Moreno v. Idaho, Case No. 4:15-cv-00342-BLW

ASHLEY MORENO, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO STATE POLICE, RYAN BLACKHAWK, individuallyand in his capacity as a police officer for Idaho State Police;PAUL OLSEN, individually and in his capacity as a police officer for Idaho State Police;and LT. JOHN KEMPF, individuallyand in his capacity as Idaho State Police supervisor of Blackhawk and Olsen, Defendants.

Case No. 4:15-cv-00342-BLW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

March 31, 2017

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. See Dkts. 25, 42, 43. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on February 13, 2017 and took the matters under advisement. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment re Tracking Device (Dkt. 43), grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 25), and grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 42).

BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

Plaintiff Ashley Moreno brings suit against the State of Idaho, Idaho State Police ("ISP), and three ISP officers—Ryan Blackhawk, Paul Olsen, and John Kempf—relating to the warrantless installation and use of a GPS tracking device and Moreno's subsequent arrest and interrogation.

On August 21, 2013, Idaho State Police detective Olsen had been informed that Ryan Dalley, a friend or acquaintance of Moreno, had missed several probation check-ins. Def. SOF ¶ 3, Dkt. 42-1. Dalley's probation officer intended to file a probation violation and agent warrant for Dalley's arrest. Id ¶ 3. Based on that information, Idaho State Police conducted surveillance on Dalley as he drove to various locations around Pocatello. Compl. ¶ 17, Dkt. 1. Dalley was alone and driving a gold-colored Chevrolet Blazer during his visits to these locations. Def. SOF ¶ 7.

The vehicle's registered owner was Casey Casper. Pl. SOF ¶ 6, Dkt. 52-1. Casper agreed to allow Moreno to use and take care of the vehicle "as if it were her own" until Mr. Casper was released from jail. Casper Aff. Dkt. 43-2. Moreno, in turn, had allowed Dalley to use the Blazer to run errands on August 21. The Officers were aware that Casper was the Blazer's registered owner and that Ashlyn Moreno had previously driven the vehicle. Pl. SOF ¶¶ 2, 6.

On August 21, 2013, while the vehicle was parked in a grocery store parking lot, and without a warrant, Officer Olsen installed a GPS tracking device on the Blazer. Pl.SOF ¶¶ 1, 10, 12. On August 22, 2013, Officers Blackhawk, Olsen, Edgely and Kempf used the GPS tracking device to locate the Blazer on the public streets. Pl. SOF ¶ 13. Dalley was driving the Blazer and Moreno was a passenger at that time. Def. SOF ¶ 15. A traffic stop was attempted, but Dalley did not stop the vehicle. Id. ¶ 16. Officers thereafter used the GPS tracking device to relocate the Blazer on Maryzelle Lane in Pocatello. Pl. SOF ¶ 17.

Detective Blackhawk was first to arrive at the location of the stopped Blazer. Id. ¶ 18. Olsen followed closely behind. Id. Dalley had fled the scene by the time Blackhawk arrived but Moreno remained in the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Upon arriving, Detective Olsen drew his weapon and ordered Ashlyn to exit the car with her hands up, and she complied. Id. ¶¶ 21. Ashlyn was handcuffed and ordered to kneel on the concrete driveway on which they were standing. Id. ¶ 22.

Olsen and Kempf questioned Moreno while she knelt on the ground in handcuffs, seeking information about Dalley's whereabouts. Id. ¶ 23; Blackhawk Dec., ¶¶ 25-28, Dkt. 29-3. Moreno was not informed of her Miranda rights during this questioning. Pl. SOF ¶ 24. Ashlyn remained kneeling in handcuffs on concrete for 25 to 45 minutes while additional officers, including Lieutenant John Kempf, a supervisory officer, searched the surrounding neighborhood looking for Ryan Dalley. Id. ¶ 26. When Kempf returned from the search, he ordered Blackhawk and Olsen to arrest Moreno for resisting and obstructing. Id. ¶ 28. They did so. Id.

2. Litigation Background

Plaintiff filed this action under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging the following constitutional deprivations: (1) unlawful search, through the warrantless installation and use of the GPS tracking device; (2) coercive questioning and compelled self-incrimination; (3) unlawful arrest; (4) excessive force; and (5) failure to train and supervise. Plaintiff brought additional claims against Defendant Blackhawk, not at issue here, for a violation of her right to bodily integrity.

Defendants State of Idaho, Idaho State Police, Olsen, and Kempf filed an early motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that they have qualified immunity from the unlawful search claim. Dkt. 25. They later filed a second motion for summary judgment encompassing all but Counts V and VI - in those counts, only Blackhawk is a named defendant. Dkt. 42. Specifically, these defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff has failed to establish the above-mentioned constitutional violations; (2) that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on all § 1983 claims; and (3) that all claims against the State of Idaho, Idaho State Police, and Officer Defendants, in their official capacities, are barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff then filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim. Dkt. 43.

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims . . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). There must be a genuine dispute as to any material fact - a fact "that may affect the outcome of the case." Id. at 248.

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 255. Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute as to material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. WundermanCato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Deveraux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by her [ ] affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

2. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity gives government officials "breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).

In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "(1) . . . show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood his or her conduct to be unlawful in that situation." Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). If there is a material dispute as to the "facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge," or"what the officer and claimant did or failed to do," summary judgment is inappropriate. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

To determine whether the right was clearly established, the Court turns to Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged acts. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996). In the absence of binding precedent, the district court should look to available decisions of other circuits and district courts to ascertain whether the law is clearly established. See id.

The inquiry of whether a right was clearly established "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). "This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action...