Moreno v. Sanderson Farms, Inc.

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GLENDA MORENO, Plaintiff, v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC. PROCESSING DIVISION, Defendant.

No. 6:21-CV-00450-JCB-KNM

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division

October 4, 2022

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20) and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 21). Having considered the motion, the Parties' submissions, and the relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 20) be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Glenda Moreno (“Plaintiff” or “Moreno”) began to work for Sanderson Farms, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Sanderson Farms”) in Tyler, Texas during September 2020.^[1] Plaintiff worked on the debone line, which required the use of knives to rapidly cut chicken on a moving production line.^[2] After Sanderson Farms offered Plaintiff a job, Plaintiff completed the post-offer job placement medical form that Sanderson Farms requires of all employees.^[3] At the end of the postoffer job placement medical form, employees sign an acknowledgment, attesting that:

I hereby affirm that the statements and responses set forth above are true, complete and correct. I understand that any falsification, misrepresentation, or omission of information in this form shall be grounds for the company to withdraw an offer of employment or to discharge me if already employed.^[4]

In response to the questions on the form, Plaintiff “expressly denied (1) taking any prescription medications; (2) any hospitalizations; and (3) that she ‘bleeds easily.'”^[5]

On October 30, 2020, Plaintiff fell while walking up some stairs at work after her meal break.^[6] On November 10, Moreno spoke with the company nurse about her injury from falling up the steps.^[7] The company nurse offered Plaintiff Ibuprofen, but she refused, disclosing that she “had been hospitalized with a pulmonary embolism in September 2019, had been taking a prescription blood thinner ever since, and therefore could not take ibuprofen for pain and inflammation from her fall.”^[8] On November 20, 2020, Moreno was terminated from her job at Sanderson Farms for the stated reason that she did not disclose her prescription blood-thinning medication on her postoffer job placement medical form.^[9]

Plaintiff asserts five claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”): (1) Disparate treatment regarding Defendant's termination of Plaintiff based on qualification standards and other criteria that screened her out as an individual with disabilities; (2) Disparate impact based upon a fitness-for-duty policy which requires a full-duty release which had an impact on Plaintiff as an individual with disabilities by screening her from employment because she was required to take blood-thinning medication (3) unlawful medical inquiry by Defendant's use of the post-offer medical forms; (4) failure to make reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff's disabilities of needing to take her blood-thinning medication; and (5) Defendant regarded Plaintiff as disabled.^[10],^[11]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 323 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. Issues of material fact are “genuine” only if they require resolution by a trier of fact and if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party may meet its burden by pointing to the absence of evidence supporting any claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.

If the movant meets its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts in the record sufficient to support his claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by argument, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the factors, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585; Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant must submit competent summary judgment evidence sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). “The nonmovant is also required to articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim.” Smith v. United States, 392 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004).

Summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence before the court, viewed as a whole, could lead to different factual findings and conclusions. Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court must look to the full record, including the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Under this standard, fact questions are considered with deference to the nonmovant. Reid v. State Farm Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The Court resolves factual controversies for purposes of summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. The Court does not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).

ANALYSIS

Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to each of Plaintiff's four claims.^[12] Defendant makes the following arguments: (1) Plaintiff's unlawful medical inquiry claim fails as a matter of law^[13]; (2) Plaintiff's disparate impact claim is not supported by evidence^[14]; (3) Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim is not supported by evidence^[15]; and (4) the undisputed material facts entitle Defendant to summary judgment on Plaintiff's discriminatory disparate treatment claim^[16].

A. Plaintiff's unlawful medical inquiry claim

Unlawful medical inquiries are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). An entity may require a medical examination or make a medical inquiry “after making an offer of employment to a job applicant and before the applicant begins his or her employment duties...if all entering employees in the same job category are subjected to such examination regardless of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). Under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3), such pre-employment medical examinations do not have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. However, § 1630.14(b)(3) goes on to state that “if certain criteria are used to screen out an employee.as a result of such an examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business necessity[.]”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's medical inquiry was unlawful in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Under 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), [a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant used Plaintiff's medical form as an offensive tool to screen out Plaintiff based on her actual or perceived disability.^[17]

Plaintiff and Defendant disagree regarding the event that triggered protection under the ADA regarding Plaintiff's claim for unlawful inquiry. Plaintiff appears to assert that the ADA was triggered by Defendant's inquiry into Plaintiff's condition after Defendant's discovery of the medical information.^[18] To the extent that Plaintiff references Defendant's later questioning of Plaintiff's condition, such was not initiated by Defendant.^[19] Defendant's questioning occurred in response to information disclosed by Plaintiff as she was seeking care for an on-the-job injury.^[20]

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filled out a post-offer job placement medical form at Defendant's behest prior to beginning work.^[21] Defendant states that all employees in the processing department are required to complete the post-offer pre-employment medical form in the presence of a company nurse regarding past and present health conditions, hospitalizations, and medications, and answer any follow-up questions the nurse may have regarding information disclosed on the form.^[22] As such, Plaintiff was required to complete the medical form along with all other post-offer employees of the processing department of Sanderson Farms.

Although there is disagreement as to whether Plaintiff's failure to disclose her prior hospitalization as well as her current prescription on the medical form was purposeful or accidental, it is...