Morgan v. AR Res.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has sued a debt collector claiming that it employed unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt and thereby violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant used "unfair and unconscionable" means when it reported to a credit reporting agency false amounts that he owed. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. Because the record discloses no genuine of material fact and establishes that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court will award summary judgment to the defendant.

Procedural Background

In March 2019, Plaintiff Christopher Morgan filed a Warrant in Debt^[1] against Defendant AR Resources in the General District Court, Orange County, Virginia. Dkt. 1-2 at 2-3. Plaintiff claimed that AR Resources owed him $1, 000.00, suing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") "§ 808(1)," codified at 15 U.S.C. § l692f(1), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act

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("FCRA") "§ 623(a)(1)(A)," which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Dkt. 1-2 at 3. AR Resources removed the case to this Court on the grounds that it presented a federal question. Dkt. 1 at 2.

The procedural history of this case is set forth more fully in this Court's Memorandum Opinion, in which the Court granted in part and denied in part AR Resources' motion to dismiss. Dkt. 34. Therein, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claim under the FCRA, holding that there is no private right of action for violations of 15 U.S.C. § l68ls-2(a), as asserted. Id. at 7. However, the Court allowed Plaintiffs claim under the FDCPA to proceed, stating, among other things, that Plaintiff plausibly alleged in the complaint that AR Resources was a debt collector attempting to collect a debt, notwithstanding AR Resources' arguments to the contrary. Id. at 6-7. The parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment, which have been fully briefed. See Dkts. 54, 55, 56, 57, 67, 68. The Court cancelled the scheduled jury trial pending resolution of the parties' motions for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, however, will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment"-only the existence of a "genuine issue of material fact" will preclude summary judgment, meaning that it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law ...." Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted).

"When cross-motions for summary judgment are before a court, the court examines each motion separately, employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure." Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, 630 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011). Thus, "[w]ith respect to each side's motion," the Court must "view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 130 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A pro se litigant's filings must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But where no genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial judge has an "affirmative obligation ... to prevent factually unsupported claims and defense from proceeding to trial." Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Reasoning

The Court first addresses AR Resources' motion for summary judgment, reciting the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. The only remaining claim is whether AR Resources violated 15 U.S.C. § l692f(1). Dkt. 11-1 at 1; Dkt. 56 at 1-2; Dkt. 67 at 1. The Court concludes that AR Resources is entitled to summary judgment for several, independent reasons.

Section l692f states that "[a] debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 15 U.S.C. § l692f It then provides a non-exhaustive list of certain types of conduct that violate the statute, including "[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." Id. § l692f(1) (emphasis added).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the summary judgment record does not disclose any genuine issue of material fact on the issue whether AR Resources either collected or attempted to collect unauthorized amounts from Plaintiff. Indeed, the only

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evidence in the record that AR Resources attempted to collect any debt at all from Plaintiff are two letters in which AR Resources sought to collect uncontested amounts of $420 and a later charge of $42. Dkts. 55-2, 55-4, 55-5. But Plaintiff admits that he owed $420 for medical services received at Martha Jefferson Hospital. Dkt. 55-1; Dkt. 56 at 2 ("the correct original amount owed is $420").^[2]

To be sure, there is one page of the January 2019 Experian report that, as this Court noted in its opinion on AR Resources' motion to dismiss, see Dkt. 34 at 6-7, references incorrect amounts Plaintiff owed. While the Court determined on the motion to dismiss that Plaintiffs allegations on this issue were sufficient to state a plausible claim to relief, the summary judgment record as set forth more fully below demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact that AR Resources did not collect or attempt to collect unauthorized amounts from Plaintiff- notwithstanding this stray remark in one credit report (that was subsequently corrected the following month). See infra. Thus, while Plaintiff disputes that he owed between $1004 and $1129 to AR Resources at any time, Dkt. 56 at 1, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, still the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that AR Resources ever actually collected or attempted to collect any such sum from him. Having failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact on this element of Plaintiff s FDCPA claim, the Court concludes that AR Resources is entitled to summary judgment on the...