Morgan v. Morgan

MEE RAN YU MORGAN v. LARRY MORGAN

No. 0802-2020

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

August 3, 2021

Circuit Court for Prince George's County Case No CAD16-40619

Berger, Nazarian, Leahy, JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

LEAHY J.

Mee Ran Yu Morgan, appellant, and Larry Morgan, appellee, married on January 6, 2010. Soon after they were married, the parties separated in April 2010. As a result of the separation, the parties entered into a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement ("First Agreement"). After resuming marital cohabitation, the parties agreed to terminate the First Agreement in 2012. In July 2015, however, the parties separated again and entered into a second separation agreement ("Second Agreement").

On November 1, 2016, Mr. Morgan filed a complaint for absolute divorce in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and requested that the Second Agreement be merged into the final divorce decree. Ms. Yu filed a counter-complaint for limited divorce and later moved to set aside the Second Agreement, arguing that the agreement was unconscionable and obtained by abuse of a confidential relationship between the parties. On October 30, 2017, at the conclusion of a hearing to address the complaint, counter-complaint, and pending motions in the divorce action, the circuit court granted Mr. Morgan an absolute divorce. The court held that there was no confidential relationship between the parties and that the agreement was not unconscionable. The court entered its judgment of absolute divorce on November 9, 2017 and incorporated the Second Agreement into the divorce decree.

Ms. Yu appealed to this Court. Morgan v. Morgan, No. 1946, September Term, 2017 (filed July 22, 2019) ("Morgan I"). In that appeal, Ms. Yu presented two questions for our review: 1) "Did the court err by first considering whether confidential relationship existed between the parties before considering whether there existed unconscionability?"; and 2) "Did the court err by looking at dominance as the only factor in considering whether a confidential relationship existed?" Id. at 1-2. We held that the circuit court did not err in addressing, preliminarily, the issue of whether a confidential relationship existed between the parties. Id. However, we determined that the circuit court did err in concluding that no confidential relationship existed between the parties without considering the factors outlined in Bell v. Bell, 38 Md.App. 10, 14 (1977) ("Bell factors"). Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for proceedings "consistent with the opinion." Id.

On remand, Ms. Yu moved to re-open the case in the circuit court on August 14, 2019. Soon thereafter, on March 5, 2020, Mr. Morgan filed "Plaintiff's Motion for Appropriate Relief" requesting, among other things that the circuit court issue an Order explaining how the Bell factors were considered in its original decision, based on the existing record. Ms. Yu filed a form request for a hearing on March 26, 2020 and checked the box for a pendente lite hearing. She filed a second request for a hearing on April 23, 2020, ^[1] this time checking the box for a "trial on the merits." Several months later, she filed a motion to bifurcate the trial.

On September 22, 2020 the circuit court issued the underlying "Memorandum and Order of Court." In her memorandum opinion, the trial judge reviewed the record, including the testimony from the hearing held on October 30, 2017, and addressed each of the Bell factors before granting the absolute divorce. The memorandum also explained that the court would incorporate, but not merge, the Second Agreement into the absolute divorce. Finally, the court found that Ms. Yu's motion to bifurcate the trial was moot.

Ms. Yu filed a motion to reconsider and Mr. Morgan filed an opposition. Before the circuit court ruled on the motion to reconsider, Ms. Yu timely filed her Notice of Appeal. Ms. Yu presents two questions for our review, which we have reordered as follows:

1. "Did the Circuit Court err by not conducting any further proceedings to ascertain the facts of the case?"

2. "Did the Circuit Court err in its 2020 Order by contradicting the finding of the Opinion [in Morgan I] ?"

BACKGROUND

We begin by incorporating the relevant facts and procedural history recited in Morgan I.

A. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS

The First Separation Agreement

Prior to the parties' marriage, Ms. Yu had emigrated from Korea to the United States in 2004. Morgan I at 2. Six years later, Mr. Morgan and Ms. Yu married on January 6, 2010 and then quickly separated sometime in April. Id. The couple had no children together. Id. On June 2 2010, Ms. Yu and Mr. Morgan entered into the First Agreement. Id. The First Agreement stated it, "[wa]s not executed for the purpose of [the parties] obtaining a divorce from each other, nor [wa]s it an agreement or consent by either party for the other to obtain a divorce[.]" Id. At the time of the First Agreement, the parties lived together in an apartment, and the terms reflected the circumstances of the parties at the time:

Under the agreement, Ms. Yu could remain in the apartment, provided she assumed full responsibility for the lease and paid all the rent, but Mr. Morgan would retain sole ownership of real property in Illinois ("Illinois Property) that he had acquired prior to the marriage. The First Agreement provided that the parties would retain ownership of personal property owned prior to the marriage and divide any such property acquired during the marriage. Accordingly, Ms. Yu would keep her 2000 Toyota Camry and Mr. Morgan would keep his 1998 Mitsubishi; both parties agreed to maintain their own car insurance as of the date of the agreement. The parties also agreed to release any claim to property divided pursuant to the agreement.

Mr. Morgan agreed to provide Ms. Yu with health, dental, and vision insurance until the entry of any divorce decree. The First Agreement also provided that Ms. Yu would acquire the entirety of the funds in the parties' joint savings account with TD Bank but that all other financial accounts and "[a]ny and all pension, retirement, employee stock ownership, profit sharing plans, annuities or the like shall be the sole and separate property of the party whose name it is in[.]" Mr. Morgan agreed, further, to refrain from interfering with Ms. Yu's ability to obtain U.S. citizenship but would "not agree to support her financially in the event that she is not able to support herself."

Id. at 3. After the parties resumed marital cohabitation, they "agreed to 'terminate, void and nullify' the First Agreement on June 7, 2012." Id.

The Second Separation Agreement

Five years later, in July 2015, the parties entered into the Second Agreement. At the time, Mr. Morgan was working as an engineer earning a yearly income in excess of $100, 000 while Ms. Yu was earning $8 per hour as a personal care assistant. On July 3, 2015, Mr. Morgan's attorney, Brandon Bernstein, sent Ms. Yu a written letter advising her of his representation of Mr. Morgan in negotiating and formalizing the parties' separation. He clarified that he represented Mr. Morgan, only, and advised Ms. Yu to retain her own legal counsel to represent her in the matter. Mr. Bernstein attached a written copy of the Second Agreement to the letter for Ms. Yu's signature in the event that she was "satisfied with the [Second Agreement] in its current form[.]" Both parties signed the Second Agreement on July 12, 2015.

The Second Agreement expressed its purpose as follows:

WHEREAS, the Parties agree to separate on or about July 15th, 2015, with the express purpose and intent of ending their marriage, and [] shall thereafter live separate and apart without cohabitation. There is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation; and

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to settle and determine all obligations to each other, including their support obligations to one another, property rights, and all other rights, claims, relationships or obligations between them arising out of the marriage relationship or otherwise making this their final and absolute Agreement.

The parties waived any right to receive alimony. Mr. Morgan would provide Ms. Yu health insurance through his employer-provided insurance plan only until December 30, 2015, rather than until the entry of the divorce decree, as per the First Agreement.

Under the Second Agreement, just as under the First Agreement, Mr. Morgan would retain sole ownership of the Illinois Property, which he acquired prior to the parties' marriage. Unlike the First Agreement, which entitled Ms. Yu to the entirety of the funds in their joint savings account with TD Bank, the Second Agreement related that the parties would "evenly divide" the funds in the account. Otherwise, the agreement stated that the parties had no other joint assets, and that each party would retain "as his or her sole and separate property any checking and savings accounts, retirement assets, pensions, Thrift Savings Plans, 401(k) accounts, stocks, certificates of deposit, bonds, mutual funds, or other financial assets titled in his or her individual name." The parties waived any interest in the other party's retirement interests and other future expectancies or interests, such as death benefits.

Mr. Morgan would receive the 2011 Hyundai, 1998 Mitsubishi, and 1987 Mazda, and Ms. Yu would have the same 2000 Toyota that she was promised under the First Agreement. With respect to furnishings and personal belongings, the parties agreed to retain that which he or she owned prior to the marriage and evenly divide that which the parties acquired during the marriage. The agreement also indicated that the parties would be responsible for their

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