Morgan v. Natale

2022-Ohio-1281

CAROL LYNNE MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY NATALE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2021-T-0038

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Trumbull

April 18, 2022

Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2020 CV 00704

Carol Lynne Morgan, pro se, (Plaintiff-Appellant).

Lisa M. Zaring and Lindsay M. Upton, Montgomery Jonson LLP, (For Defendants-Appellees, Anthony Natale, David E. Boker, Raymond Delost, Judge Sandra Harwood, Retired Visiting Judge Joseph Giulitto, and Deborah Smith).

Holly Marie Wilson, Reminger Co., LPA, (For Defendant-Appellee Deborah Smith).

Elise M. Burkey, Burkey, Burkey & Scher Co., L.P.A., (For Defendant-Appellee, Leby Sassya).

Michael A. Partlow, pro se, (Defendant-Appellee).

Charles M. Draa, pro se, (Defendant-Appellee).

Jessica A. Reese and Mary McWilliams Dengler, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., (For Defendant-Appellee, Linda Baer Bigley).

Raymond J. Hartsough, Assistant Prosecutor, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, (For Defendant-Appellee, Julie Rudolph, c/o Mahoning County CSB).

Thomas A. Prislipsky, Reminger Co., LPA, and Brianna M. Prislipsky, Reminger Co., LPA, (For Defendant-Appellee Kim Lydic).

OPINION

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

{¶1} This appeal stems from over a decade of lengthy tortured divorce and custody proceedings between appellant, Carol Lynne Morgan ("Ms. Morgan"), and her ex-husband, appellee, Leby Sassya ("Mr. Sassya"). Ms. Morgan sued 12 individuals who participated in her family court proceedings, namely the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas/Domestic Relations Division ("Family Court") judges and magistrates, the guardian ad litem ("GAL") who represented her children, attorneys who represented Ms. Morgan and Mr. Sassya, and witnesses from the custody proceedings.

{¶2} Ms. Morgan alleged claims for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, retaliation, fraud upon the court, and interference with her civil rights with vague, conclusory allegations that the Family Court order vacating her dissolution agreement and separation agreement was forged; that the participants in the family court proceedings colluded against her; and that a "secret committee" of attorneys made decisions behind the scenes that separated her from her children.

{¶3} The trial court granted the appellees' various motions to dismiss, motions for judgments on the pleadings, and motions for summary judgment and issued a final appealable order in its last judgment entry.

{¶4} Ms. Morgan raises six assignments of error on appeal, contending that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motions for leave to amend her complaint to add a defendant, Elise Burkey ("Attorney Burkey"), Mr. Sassya's attorney; (2) the trial court erred in granting the appellees various motions to dismiss and for summary judgment; (3) while her third assigned error states that the trial court committed reversible error by striking two of her pleadings, her argument reveals she is contending that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to Mr. Sassya because he did not attach any evidence in support and/or an affidavit; (4) in granting the appellees' motions, the trial court committed "egregious" error and violated the United States and Ohio Constitutions by denying her right to a trial by jury; (5) the trial court allowed a "group of attorneys [sic] decide that my separation agreement contract should remain unenforced"; and (6) the trial court committed a fraud upon the court by preventing her from pleading her side of the case, violating her rights to due process and equal protection, committing ethical violations, and failing to perform its judicial duties.

{¶5} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find Ms. Morgan's assignments of error to be without merit.

{¶6} Before setting out our holding, we are compelled by the history and record in this case to observe that Family Court proceedings regarding the allocation of parental rights, responsibilities, and support are one of the most difficult and emotionally charged proceedings our judicial system tackles. Two people, once joyously joined as one, produce children who are the special creation of that union. When the union sadly fails, and the parties cannot amicably resolve the determination of the allocation of parental rights, responsibilities, and support, the aggrieved parent seeks the intervention of the Family Court and this court. The process becomes a source of incredible pain and perceived need for retaliation.

{¶7} Our courts appreciate the emotion and the source of that emotion, but we are duty-bound to decide cases based on the law and the facts in the record before us. The healing an aggrieved parent seeks will never be found via lawsuits.

{¶8} Based on the record presented to this court, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Morgan's motion to amend her complaint to add Mr. Sassya's counsel as a defendant in this case because Ms. Morgan failed to set forth any operative facts establishing a prima facie case against her, and the amendment would have caused undue prejudice to Mr. Sassya.

{¶9} The "family court appellees" had absolute immunity from Ms. Morgan's claims, since her claims derived from alleged misconduct in the family court proceedings.

{¶10} Further, the trial court properly granted Mr. Sassya's summary judgment as a matter of law because there were no genuine issues of material fact. Mr. Sassya had absolute immunity arising from his role as a party in the litigation proceedings.

{¶11} The doctrine of res judicata barred Ms. Morgan's attempts to relitigate the family court proceedings, and her claim of civil interference necessarily failed since Mr. Sassya was not a state actor.

{¶12} Additionally, since the trial court dismissed all of the appellees based on matters of law, there were no issues of fact remaining to be tried; thus, Ms. Morgan's right to trial by jury was not violated. There is no dispute that the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of questions of law.

{¶13} Further, Ms. Morgan's breach of contract claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata since the separation agreement was vacated by the family court over ten years ago, a judgment from which she failed to appeal.

{¶14} Finally, Ms. Morgan failed to identify any specific alleged violations of due process, equal protection, and/or ethical violations, much less demonstrate any prejudice resulting therefrom.

{¶15} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Substantive and Procedural History

The Morgan-Sassya Family Court Proceedings

{¶16} A brief history of the decade-long family court proceedings underlying this case is necessary since it is the genesis of Ms. Morgan's claims of a fraud perpetrated on and by the court and all those involved, which affected her vacated dissolution and separation agreement and then her divorce case and the subsequent custody proceedings with Mr. Sassya.

{¶17} In Sassya v. Morgan, 2014-Ohio-3278, 17 N.E.3d 104 (11th Dist.) ("Morgan I "), we reviewed the parties' unique circumstances, explaining that the family court action began with the filing of a petition for a dissolution with an attached separation agreement. Id. at ¶ 2. The separation agreement provided for a distribution of the marital property which included a lump sum payment of $46, 000 and a $1, 800 monthly child support payment to Ms. Morgan. Id. at ¶ 4, ¶ 28.

{¶18} After determining that the separation agreement and dissolution decree were not in agreement, the family court vacated the dissolution decree in a judgment entry dated June 12, 2013. Id. at ¶ 8. Thus, the parties' separation agreement was no longer valid and found to be void by the family court. Id. No appeal was taken from the family court's judgment. Id. at ¶ 9.

{¶19} Upon Mr. Sassya's motion, the matter was later converted into a divorce action, and Mr. Sassya filed a complaint for divorce. Id. at ¶ 2. The family court set a temporary custody and companionship schedule, as well as a temporary child support order of $743 per month (five children were born as issue of the marriage, and Ms. Morgan was designated as the residential parent for the three youngest children). Id. at ¶ 3, ¶ 10.

{¶20} Mr. Sassya filed a motion for summary judgment in the family court, claiming that the separation agreement had resolved the issue of the marital property distribution. Id. at ¶ 12. Ms. Morgan filed a response, asserting that she had waived all property claims in the separation agreement in exchange for $1, 800 in child support, an upward deviation from the child support guidelines. Id. Since the family court vacated the dissolution decree, however, she argued that all the issues were to be revisited and that Mr Sassya sought an inequitable distribution in his motion for summary judgment. Id.

{¶21} After holding a hearing, the family court granted Mr. Sassya's motion for summary judgment, finding that the marital property had been divided and that no issues remained for determination. Id. at ¶ 14. The court preserved its prior order that Mr. Sassya pay $743 per month in child support. Id. We reversed and remanded because the family court did not consider all the factors in determining an equitable division of property provided for in R.C. 3105.171(F). Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶22} After remand, the parties entered into stipulations regarding the division of assets. Sassya v. Morgan, 11th Dist Trumbull No. 2015-T-0026, 2018-Ohio-3445, ¶ 15 ("Morgan II"). After holding a hearing, the family court determined that Mr. Sassya had already paid Ms. Morgan the remaining $5, 000 of the $45, 000...