Morin v. Fye

1

GREGORY MORIN and NICOLE MORIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRIAN FYE Defendant-Appellant, and TORRI MORIN, Defendant. SARRA WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN FYE, Defendant-Appellant, and TORRI MORIN, Defendant. RAINEE HEINZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN FYE, Defendant-Appellant, and TORRI MORIN, Defendant.

Nos. 362619, 362620, 362622

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 13, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

St Clair Circuit Court LC Nos. 14-002648-DC, 14-001709-DC, No 14-002304-DC Before: Cameron, P.J., and Jansen and Borrello, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 362619, defendant, Brian Fye (father), appeals as of right the trial court order granting sole physical custody of LF1 to defendant, Torri Morin (mother), and granting father and mother joint legal custody. In Docket No. 362620 father appeals as of right the trial court order granting plaintiff, Sarra Williamson (Williamson), sole physical custody of BF and KF, and granting mother, father, and Williamson joint legal custody. In Docket No. 362622, father appeals as of right the trial court order granting sole physical custody of LF2 to plaintiff, Rainee Heinz (Heinz) and granting mother, father, and Heinz joint legal custody. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mother and father were married and share four children: LF1, LF2, BF, and KF. Father and mother's relationship involved domestic violence, and they both abused substances. They ultimately divorced, and it was determined by mother's family members that mother and father were unable to adequately parent the children. In 2014, Williamson successfully petitioned for custody of BF and KF. In 2015, Heinz successfully obtained custody of LF2, and plaintiffs, Gregory Morin and Nicole Morin, mother's parents, were granted custody of LF1. Although mother and father were granted parenting time, they continued to demonstrate periods of instability. At times, the guardians would not permit them to see the children. In 2018, mother began to demonstrate sobriety. Father also began making positive changes in his life, including obtaining stable housing, participating in therapy with Camella Gild, completing anger management and parenting classes, and working toward obtaining his bachelor's degree.

In April 2021, father moved the trial court to grant him sole legal and physical custody of the children, arguing proper cause or a change of circumstances existed to revisit the custody orders. Father noted his constitutional right to parent his children. Jolene Pemberton, a clinical social worker, conducted assessments. Pemberton recommended that the children be returned to father's care in a gradual manner and with therapeutic support because of the amount of time the children had spent in the care of their guardians. After father filed his motion for custody, Gregory died and mother moved for custody of LF1. Nicole, who was having serious health issues, agreed that mother should regain custody of LF1.

The contested custody hearing was held over several months. The parties disputed father's ability to parent the children and provide them with a stable environment. The parties' ability to facilitate relationships between each other and the children was also highly contested. After interviewing the children in camera after the close of proofs, the trial court made detailed findings of fact on the record. The trial court reviewed the best-interest factors contained in MCL 722.23, and noted the relevant standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence. After reviewing the best-interest factors, the trial court made the custody determinations outlined above, and granted father increased parenting time. These appeals followed, and were consolidated by this Court.^[1]

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In custody cases, we apply three standards of review. Merecki v Merecki, 336 Mich.App. 639, 644; 971 N.W.2d 659 (2021).

The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. In a child custody dispute, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue. Specifically, [this Court] review[s] under the great-weight-of-the-evidence standard the trial court's determination whether a party demonstrated proper cause or a change of circumstances. A finding of fact is against the great weight of the evidence if the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's discretionary rulings such as custody decisions. An abuse of discretion, for purposes of a child custody determination, exists when the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error. A trial court commits legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets or applies the law. [Id. at 644-645 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

We defer to the trial court concerning issues of credibility. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich.App. 700, 705; 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008).

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT

At the outset, we note that father argues that the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings concerning the best-interest factors. We disagree.

When ruling on a motion to change custody, the trial court must make findings of fact with respect to each of the relevant best-interest factors in MCL 722.23. MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich.App. 449, 451-452; 705 N.W.2d 144 (2005).

"These findings and conclusions need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties." Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich.App. 462, 475; 730 N.W.2d 262 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "[I]f the trial court determines that a particular factor is irrelevant to the immediate issue, it need not make substantive factual findings concerning the factor beyond this determination, but need merely state that conclusion on the record." Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich. 81, 91; 782 N.W.2d 480 (2010).

Review of the record establishes that the trial court made sufficient findings concerning the best-interest factors. While the trial court sometimes did not consider father, mother, the children, and the guardians individually when making certain findings, the trial court thoroughly discussed each factor and clearly considered each of the children, whose circumstances were often similar. There was voluminous testimony in this case, and it is unreasonable to expect the trial court to comment on every matter. Importantly, the trial court is not required to do so. See Rittershaus, 273 Mich.App. at 475. Multiple witnesses testified about the individual children, and there is no indication that the trial court did not consider that evidence. Indeed, the trial court thoroughly explained the best-interest factors and considered the children's individual needs when appropriate to do so. As this Court explained in Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich.App. 1, 12; 634 N.W.2d 363 (2001), "[t]he trial court need not necessarily engage in elaborate or ornate discussion because brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions regarding the contested matters are sufficient." The trial court made more than a sufficient record from which this Court can conduct a proper review. While some of the trial court's findings may appear brief to father, the entirety of the record reveals that the trial court gave each party ample opportunity to present their case and intently listened and then issued its findings and ultimate ruling. While the custody decision partially went against father, this is not, by itself, indicative of the trial court failing to make proper findings.

Factor (i) of the best-interest factors is "[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference." MCL 722.23(i). Father argues that this Court cannot consider whether factor (i) weighed in favor of mother, father, or the guardians because the trial court failed to keep a record of the in camera interviews of the children. However, father does not provide any authority that the trial court was required to do so and does not provide any meaningful analysis. Parties "may not merely announce [their] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [their] claims, nor may [parties] give issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority." Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller, 256 Mich.App. 336, 339; 662 N.W.2d 854 (2003) (citations omitted). Consequently, because father merely announced his position without providing binding authority or meaningful analysis, the argument is abandoned and need not be considered by this Court. See id.^[2]

IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S CUSTODY DECISION WITH RESPECT TO LF1

Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by granting mother sole physical custody of LF1, and granting father and mother joint legal custody. We disagree.

A "child custody dispute" means "any matter that relates to the custody of a child from the time the issue of custody arises until the child reaches the age of majority." Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17 22 n 1; 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000). "The purposes of the Child Custody Act ["CCA"], MCL 722.21 et seq., are to promote the best interests of the child and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted custody changes." Merecki, 336 Mich.App. at 645 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The CCA "governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for minor children in Michigan, and it...