Morris v. Huffman

LEON A. MORRIS, SR., Plaintiff, v. MARY KATHERINE HUFFMAN, JUDGE, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-278

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division, Dayton

December 28, 2022

Michael J. Newman, Judge

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CAROLINE H. GENTRY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Leon A Morris, Sr., a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and without the assistance of counsel, has filed a civil rights complaint with this Court. (Doc. 1-1). He alleges that his rights were violated during criminal proceedings against him in the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. (Id., PageID 6).

The matter is currently before the Court to conduct the initial screening of the Complaint as required by law. 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the Complaint in its entirety.

I. Initial Screening Standard

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to conduct an initial screening of his Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

A complaint must also be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Court must construe the complaint in plaintiff's favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f) [now (e)]). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements' to recover under some viable legal theory.” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 Fed.Appx. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).

II. Parties and Claims

Plaintiff Morris sues Mary Katherine Huffman, a judge of the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. It appears that Judge Huffman is or was presiding over two criminal cases against Plaintiff in that court. Plaintiff identifies one case by case number in the Complaint. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 6). See State of Ohio v. Leon Morris, C.P. No. 2020 CR 03962. It appears that Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to community control in 2021 in this First Case, but the court terminated his probationary status because of a subsequent offense.^[1]It also appears that Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of incarceration on that subsequent offense in a Second Case.^[2] See State of Ohio v. Leon Aaron Morris, C.P. No. 2022 CR 01403. These cases, referred to together as the Criminal Cases, are available by name or case number search at https://pro.mcohio.org/ (accessed Dec. 28, 2022).^[3]

Plaintiff also names as defendants David Merrell, who appears to have been an assistant prosecuting attorney for a time in the First Case; Christopher Thompson, who appears to have been an assistant public defender representing Plaintiff for a time in the First Case; and Poloa Kinsey,^[4] a probation officer who allegedly provided a “falsified Report” to Judge Huffman in the First Case. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 4, 6).

Plaintiff's claims center on Judge Huffman's decisions to deny him bond/bail in the First Case in early 2022, allegedly on the basis of someone else's record. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 6). This appears to have been in the context of an alleged violation of community control sanctions. See January 28, 2022 “Notice of CCS Revocation Hearing and Order” in the First Case. Plaintiff alleges that the denial of bond/bail deprived him of the opportunity to bury his son. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 6). Plaintiff also contends that his rights were violated by sentences imposed by Judge Huffman.^[5](Id.). He seeks damages in the amount of $4 billion, plus punitive damages of $2 billion, and attorney fees of $60,000. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 7).

Plaintiff raises these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 5; Civil Cover Sheet, Doc. 1-2, PageID 8; Doc. 6, PageID 40). This statute allows a plaintiff to seek redress from state actors for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

III. Application for Default and Motions to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff has filed an application for default judgment. (Doc. 5). He withdrew this Application on December 7, 2022. (See Doc. 8, PageID 52). As Plaintiff notes, Defendants have not yet been served, so default judgment would not be appropriate. (Id.) His request to withdraw the application is GRANTED. The application (Doc. 5) is considered WITHDRAWN.

Plaintiff has also filed three motions to amend the Complaint. First, on November 22, 2022, he filed two documents that include argument and “evidence” in support of his claims. (Doc. 6-7). Three new allegations are included in these materials. First, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Huffman knew that Plaintiff had violated his probation, but she “failed to violate my probation and sentence[] me to prison for the violation. Instead [Judge]Huffman Re-enstated my probation and Terminated it in order to Deny me my Jail-Time Credit of 81 days.” (Doc. 6, PageID 39-40). With respect to Prosecutor Merrell, Plaintiff asserts that “he failed to do his work he's paid to do. On sidebar Merrell admits to NOT knowing what was going on in this Court hearing where had he been doing his Job that the STATE OF OHIO pays him to do he could have protected my rights . . .” (Doc. 6, PageID 41). Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are not entitled to any immunity “because they acted in the CLEAR ABSENCE OF ALL JURISDICTION when they committed these offenses.” (Doc. 6, PageID 41). There is no information about why jurisdiction was lacking.

The Undersigned CONSTRUES these two documents (Doc. 6-7) together as a First Motion to Amend the Complaint and GRANTS the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1).

On December 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second motion to amend the Complaint. (Doc. 8). In this motion, Plaintiff withdraws his application for default judgment (as discussed above) and clarifies that he sues Defendants only in their official capacities. (Id.) The Undersigned GRANTS this motion to amend. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

On December 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a third motion to amend the Complaint. (Doc. 10). In this motion, Plaintiff asserts that the allegations in the Complaint are true and accurate. (Id.) The Undersigned GRANTS this motion to amend as well. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). These materials (Doc. 6-7, 8, 10) will be considered as part of the Court's initial screening of the Complaint (Doc. 1-1).

The Undersigned cautions Plaintiff that he is not entitled to amend his Complaint as often as he likes. He will be required to ask for, and obtain, permission from this Court to file any further amendments. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed for several overlapping reasons. He seeks to undermine his criminal convictions, seeks monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief, or who are otherwise immune, or who are not state actors.

A. Some Claims...