Morris v. Precoat Metals

JOHN KRIS MORRIS, Plaintiff,

v.PRECOAT METALS, a division of SEQUA CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:11-cv-0053-SLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONE: March 4, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is currently before the court on plaintiff John Kris Morris's ("Morris") Motion to Supplement the Record, and Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 59(e), (doc. 55),¹ and defendant Precoat Metals' ("Precoat"), a division of Sequa Corporation, Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits from Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion, (doc. 60). Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that Morris's Motion to Supplement and for Reconsideration, (doc. 55), is due to be denied, and Precoat's Motion to Strike, (doc. 60), is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion for Reconsideration

A Rule 59(e) motion² allows parties the chance to, within 28 days, convince the district court to alter or amend a final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) ("A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment."). However, the standard that must be met is a high one: "The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact." Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Evans v. Books-A-Million, CV-07-S-2172-S, 2012 WL 5954118, *1 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 28, 2012) ("Rule 59(e) is silent regarding the substantive grounds for a motion to alter or amend. Even so, courts have identified three circumstances that may justify granting such motions: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) newly available evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear errors of law or fact."). Notably, newly discovered evidence does not include evidence that was already presented to the trial court, evidence that a party already had possession of but chose not to present, or even evidence that could have been reasonably discovered during the pendencyof the case through the exercise of due diligence. See Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343 ("[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." (alteration in original) (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005))); Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[W]here a party attempts to introduce previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider, the court should not grant the motion absent some showing that the evidence was not available during the pendency of the motion."); 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2808 (3d ed. 2012) ("The moving party must have been excusably ignorant of the facts despite using due diligence to learn about them.").

Additionally, parties may not use a motion to alter or amend to make arguments they could have made while the case was ongoing. See O'Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Motions to amend should not be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment was issued."). Moreover, there "is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments." Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012). Ultimately, these strict rules are in place because "[r]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservationof scarce judicial resources." Sonnier v. Computer Programs & Sys., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1336 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

B. Motion to Strike

Generally, district courts have broad discretion when considering a motion to strike. See Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Access Telecom, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) sets forth the standard for granting a motion to strike, stating in pertinent part that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The terms of the Rule only apply to pleadings, which are defined in Rule 7(a) as "(1) a complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; [or] (7) . . . a reply to an answer." Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Accordingly, based on this Rule, some courts refuse to grant motions to strike evidence or other non-pleadings. See, e.g., Jallali v. Am. Osteopathic Ass'n, 11-60604-CIV, 2011 WL 2039532, *1-2 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2011) (noting that motion to dismiss was not a pleading, and therefore denying motion to strike); Riviera S. Apartments, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 07-60934 CIV, 2007 WL 2506682, *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2007) ("[B]ecause the exhibit that Defendant seeks to have stricken is not a 'matter' included in any pleading, it cannot be stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f)."); Smith v. Se. Stages, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 593, 594 (N.D. Ga. 1977)(observing that "affidavits submitted in support of a motion are clearly not within [the pleading] category").

However, other courts have noted that evidence submitted in support of motions or pleadings may be "challenged by motions to strike because the Federal Rules provide no other means to contest [its] sufficiency." Anderson v. Ga. Gulf Lake Charles, LLC, 2:07-CV-1378 LEAD, 2008 WL 919716, *1 (W.D. La. Apr. 4, 2008) (citing cases).³ Based on both this rationale and the concept that a motion to strike evidence may sometimes be treated like a motion in limine, see, e.g., Moulton v. Desue, 3:11-CV-382-J-37JBT, 2012 WL 2865809, *1 n.2 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2012); Moody v. Coliseum Psychiatric Ctr., LLC, 5:04-CV-364 (DF), 2006 WL 1652281, *4 n.3 (M.D. Ga. June 12, 2006); Hiscox Dedicated Corporate Member, Ltd v. Matrix Group Ltd., Inc., 8:09-CV-2465-T-33AEP, 2011 WL 2148088, *3(M.D. Fla. May 31, 2011), many courts entertain motions to strike evidence.⁴ Under this view, motions to strike evidence may be granted where the evidence that is offered is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Pashoian v. GTE Directories, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (stating a court may strike inadmissible evidence); see also Alston v. Infirmary Health Hosps., Inc., 1:11-CV-550-CG-M, 2012 WL 5045369, *2 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012) (granting motion to strike affidavit attached to motion); 5C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1383 (3d ed. 2012) (inadmissible evidence may be stricken). They may also be granted on a motion to alter or amend where a party does not truly offer newly discovered evidence, but rather, "points to evidence and makes arguments that could have been offered at the time the motion for summary judgment was briefed." Phillips v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., CIV.A. 04-0634-CG-B, 2006 WL 1889564, *1 (S.D. Ala. July 10, 2006) aff'd, 238 F. App'x 537 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Rawls v. Ala. Dep't of Human Res., 2:11CV59-MHT, 2012 WL 1957618, *1 (M.D. Ala. May 31, 2012) (striking evidence submitted on motion for reconsideration because it had not been submitted during the pendency of the case). Finally, this court has traditionally entertained motions to strike evidence. See, e.g., Franks v. Indian Rivers Mental Health Ctr., 7:08-CV-1035-SLB, 2012WL 4736444, *13, *24 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2012) (striking portions of affidavit containing inadmissible evidence).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Morris makes fifteen arguments as to why this court should alter its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). (Doc. 55.) These are as follows: (1) Precoat did not supply the court with supplemental evidence requested by the court at oral argument; (2) Morris has acquired supplemental evidence as to the use of his insurance card between September 1, 2008, and February of 2009; (3) a statute exists under Alabama law that does not require one to be unemployed in order to receive unemployment benefits; (4) Morris filed his unemployment claim by phone and his separation from Precoat was listed as "lack of work"; (5) he has acquired supplemental evidence showing the Alabama Department of Labor ("ADOL") sent Precoat a standard form requesting information as to why Morris was no longer employed, but that it never received a response; (6) evidence exists which shows that a notice was sent to Precoat informing it that Morris was receiving unemployment compensation and describing Precoat's right to appeal; (7) Morris again lists provisions from the Alabama Code, stating the conditions for when an individual shall be disqualified for unemployment; (8) he argues that because Precoat did not contest his receipt of unemployment, he still believed that he would be returned to work and was not on notice of his termination; (9) he presents additional evidence of his injuries, requesting that the court reconsider his equitabletolling arguments; (10) Morris also presents additional evidence demonstrating that his insurance payments had been deducted from his paycheck in order to show that he did not affirmatively stop paying benefits; (11) he argues that Precoat attempted to improperly influence the court by claiming that it could prove Morris did not call Adriane Louie ("Louie") from the date he filed for unemployment (on September 1, 2008) until February 3, 2009, and that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the...