Morris v. State Bar Of Cal.

GREGORY MORRIS, Plaintiff,

v.STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. CV F 09-0026 LJO GSA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Filed: December 2, 2010

ORDER ON DEFENDANT COUNTY AND ELIZABETH EGAN'S RULE 12(c) MOTION

By notice filed on November 1, 2010, Defendants the County of Fresno, the Fresno County District Attorney's office and District Attorney Elizabeth Egan (all collectively referred to as "defendants") move for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs' Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action in the Complaint, and for judgment that the Fresno County District Attorney's office is an improper party. Plaintiff Gregory Morris did not file an opposition. On November 23, 2010, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), this matter was submitted on the pleadings without oral argument. On November 29, 2010, Morris filed a request to continue the motion. The Court denied the request to continue the hearing for the reasons stated in that order. (Doc. 178.) Therefore, having considered the moving papers, as well as the Court's file, the Court issues the following order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action by plaintiff Gregory Morris ("plaintiff") against multiple persons and entities, generally alleging numerous violations of plaintiff's civil rights and other rights protected by federal disability laws.

Plaintiff was an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the State of California. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 53.) In 2002, plaintiff also owned a home located in Fresno, California. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 19, 90.) Plaintiff's home was insured for fire damage and limited property damage/loss. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 216.) On August 15, 2002, plaintiff alleges an accidental fire occurred at plaintiff's home. The fire was investigated by the insurer and the Fresno Fire Department, among other persons and entities. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 14, 20, 22.) After the investigations, on August 25, 2002, plaintiff was arrested and charged with arson and insurance fraud. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 91, 96.) After spending nearly two and one half years defending himself against the charges, the charges ultimately were dismissed in December 2004. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 99.)

Plaintiff alleges that following causes of action against the County of Fresno, the Fresno County District Attorney's office and District Attorney Elizabeth Egan.

1. Fourth Cause of action-for conspiracy to violate plaintiff's civil rights in the arrest, charge and prosecution for arson. (Doc. 1, Complaint p. 36).

2. Sixth Cause of action-for supervisory liability for constitutional violations against defendants. (Doc. 1, Complaint p. 30).

3. Seventh Cause of action-for supervisory liability for constitutional violations as a class action.

4. Eighth Cause of Action-for intentional infliction of emotional distress

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The standard applied on a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as that applied on Rule 12(b)(6) motions: i.e., judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all material facts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). The court must assume the truthfulness of the material facts alleged in the complaint and all inferences reasonably drawn from these facts must be construed in favor of the responding party. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990). Defendant is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the complaint raises issues of fact which, if proved, would support recovery. Id. at 230.

Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Rule 12(c) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of an opposing party's pleadings. "When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Id. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "While a complaint...does not need detailed factual allegations...a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1964. To survive this motion, plaintiff's allegations must be plausible on their face. Id. at 1973.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to the merits of the motion.

B. Fresno County District Attorney's office as a Defendant

Defendant County of Fresno moves for judgment as to the Fresno County District Attorney's office because the District Attorney's office is not a proper party to this action. (Doc.1, Complaint ¶ 16.) The County of Fresno argues that the Fresno County District Attorney's office should be dismissed because it is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 applies to the actions of "persons" acting under color of state law. A local governmental unit or municipality can be sued as a "person" under section 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Municipal police departments and bureaus are generally not considered "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir.1995). Other types of governmental associations are only subject to suit under Section 1983 if the parties that created them intended to create a separate legal entity. Hervey, 65 F.3d at 792 (intergovernmental narcotics team is not subject to suit). See also Sanders v. Aranas, 2008 WL 268972, 3 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (the Fresno Police Department is not a proper defendant because it is a sub-division of the City of Fresno).

The Complaint alleges claims against the Fresno County District Attorney's office, as well as the County of Fresno. The County of Fresno is the proper party because it is the governmental entity considered a "person" under §1983. The Fresno County District Attorney's office is a "sub-unit" of the County of Fresno and is not a person under §1983. Therefore, judgment is granted to the Fresno County District Attorney's office.

C. Official Capacity Against Defendant Elizabeth Egan

The complaint alleges claims against District Attorney Elizabeth Egan in both her official capacity and in her individual capacity. She argues she should be dismissed in her official capacity because the County of Fresno is a named defendant.

Official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472, 105 S.Ct. 873 (1985)). Such an action is not against the public employee personally, "for the real party in interest is the entity." Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099.

Local government officials sued in their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983 in cases where a local government would be suable in its own name. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "For this reason, when both an officer and the local government entity are named in a lawsuit and the officer is named in official capacity only, the officer is a redundant defendant and may be dismissed." Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). "Section 1983 claims against government officials in their official capacities are really suits against the governmental employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded." Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9^th Cir. 2002).

"[I]t is no longer necessary or proper to name as a defendant a particular local government officer acting in official capacity." Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204. As the district court in Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204, explained:

A plaintiff cannot elect which of the defendant formats to use. If both are named, it isproper upon request for the Court to dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the local government entity as the correct defendant. If only the official-capacity officer is named, it would be proper for the Court upon request to dismiss the officer and substitute instead the local government entity as the correct defendant.

There are no grounds to maintain the section 1983 claims against District Attorney Egan in her official capacity given that the County of Fresno is a defendant. The complaint's section 1983 claims are dismissed against defendant Egan in her official capacity.

D. Absence of Allegations of Wrongful Conduct by Egan in the Eighth Cause of Action

The eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not specifically identify District Attorney Egan as an individual defendant. The eighth cause of action identifies conduct by "defendants" as causing plaintiff's emotional distress, but fails to allege charging allegations against defendant Egan in her individual capacity. The allegations do not set forth conduct in which defendant Egan individually harmed...