Mortland v. Local Cantina Dublin LLC

DEREK MORTLAND, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL CANTINA DUBLIN LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01123

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

July 19, 2021

Vascura, Magistrate Judge.

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 36). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

When Derek Mortland visited the Local Cantina in Dublin, Ohio in February 2019, he encountered numerous barriers to accessibility. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). Mr. Mortland, who is a paraplegic and uses a wheelchair to travel in public, came to Local Cantina for lunch. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 14; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 2-3).^[1] He encountered numerous architectural barriers at the restaurant, which he claims denied him full and equal access to the property in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15-16, 20-22). A month later, Mr. Mortland filed suit under the ADA and Ohio law against Local Cantina Dublin LLC and Bridge Park BBlock LLC, who leases the property to Local Cantina. Both Defendants filed answers to the Plaintiff's Complaint in May 2019. (ECF Nos. 9-10). Mr. Mortland then voluntarily dismissed Bridge Park BBlock, LLC from the suit. (ECF No. 16).

The parties engaged in discovery, including an inspection of the property by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 34(A)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 20). Mr. Mortland is also the President of Advanced Access, LLC, a consulting company specializing in accessibility and barrier removal. (ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 8). In his capacity as President, he is also acting as his own expert in this case. (Id. ¶ 9).^[2] He performed his Rule 34 inspection of the premises on August 3, 2020 and subsequently drafted a Site Accessibility Survey of his findings. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12). In total, he enumerated fifty separate findings of noncompliance at Local Cantina's restaurant. (ECF No. 35-4). He has updated the report to indicate that certain findings have been remediated by the Defendant, such that these findings are marked as “CORRECTED” in his report. (Id.; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 12). Mr. Mortland's report found numerous issues had not been remediated in the restaurant's dining, bar, and outdoor seating areas, as well as both restrooms. (ECF No. 35-4).

Local Cantina filed a motion for summary judgment in February 2020, which this Court denied as premature following the Plaintiff's motion to stay consideration pending discovery. (ECF Nos. 21-22, 28). The parties then cross-filed motions for summary judgment in October 2020. (ECF Nos. 35, 36). The cross-motions became fully briefed in December 2020. (ECF Nos. 37-40). The Defendant requested oral argument on its motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 36). This Court heard oral argument in this case on Friday, July 2, 2021 and this matter is now ripe.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Tysinger v. Police Dep't of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)). This Court then asks “whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative, ” however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249-50.

On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden rests upon the movant to present the court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Cox v. Ky. Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that after the burden shifts, the nonmovant must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury”). In considering the factual allegations and evidence presented in a motion for summary judgment, the court “views factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009). Self-serving affidavits alone, however, are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Johnson v. Wash. Cnty. Career Ctr., 982 F.Supp.2d 779, 788 (S.D. Ohio 2013). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support [the non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.

The standard of review does not change when the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. See Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he standards upon which the court evaluates the motions for summary judgment do not change simply because the parties present cross-motions.”). Thus, in reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court must still “evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994).

Where a judge, not a jury, will be the ultimate finder of fact, he need not grant a motion for summary judgment if the necessary showing has not been made that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that one party or the other is entitled to summary judgment. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2001). In these circumstances, the case must still be sent to trial. Id. When one party fails to satisfy the burden of his own Rule 56 motion, this does not automatically indicate that the opposing party has satisfied her own burden such that summary judgment must be granted. 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720. If a court finds that the facts are fully developed in a nonjury case, the court may proceed to decide the factual issue and render a judgment on the merits without any further delay “if it is clear that there is nothing else to be offered by the parties and there is no prejudice in proceeding in this fashion.” B.F. Goodrich, 245 F.3d at 593 n.3 (quoting Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720). The necessary factual development may occur at the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Implementing Regulations

When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act over thirty years ago, it also set forth its motivations in doing so at the outset of this landmark legislation. Congress found that disabled people had been precluded from full participation in all aspects of society, isolated and segregated from society at large, and subject to discrimination “in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(1-3). “The ADA [was] geared to the future-the goal being that, over time, access will be the rule rather than the exception.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 91 (1990). Congress passed the ADA to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against disabled people, as well as to provide “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” addressing disability discrimination in all aspects of society. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act in direct response to decisions of the Supreme Court that “narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 355. Thus, entities subject to the ADA, including places of public accommodation, have been on notice for thirty years that they must comply with the ADA.

The passage of the ADA came after decades of demonstrations by disability rights activists-and decades after the Civil Rights Act of 1965. The Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1973 only prevented discrimination by programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.^[3]Implementing regulations, however, were slow to follow and the...