Morton v. Syriac

196 Conn.App. 183

229 A.3d 1129

Michele MORTON

v.Neil SYRIAC

AC 40608

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 13, 2019

Officially released March 3, 2020

Brian S. Mead, for the appellant (defendant).

Michael D. O'Connell, with whom, on the brief, was Stan Michael D. Maslona, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Alvord, Elgo and Devlin, Js.

DEVLIN, J.

The defendant, Neil Syriac, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting a permanent injunction enjoining him from obstructing the use of a shared driveway that runs across the defendant's property by the plaintiff, Michele Morton, who is his former wife. The defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) issuing a permanent injunction when the plaintiff neither alleged nor proved that she would suffer irreparable harm and that she lacked an adequate remedy at law, (2) modifying the separation agreement previously stipulated to by the parties and incorporated into an earlier judgment of dissolution, (3) allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence that contradicted judicial admissions contained in her complaint, and (4) denying his motion to disqualify the trial judge without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant. This appeal arises from a property dispute originating with the April 13, 2010 dissolution of the parties' marriage. At that time, the parties entered into a separation agreement, incorporated into the dissolution judgment, that in relevant part divided between the parties two parcels of land located in Woodstock. The separation agreement provided that the defendant would quitclaim his ownership interest in 95 Rocky Hill Road to the plaintiff and the defendant would retain sole interest in 97 Rocky Hill Road. The separation agreement further provided that "[t]he defendant agrees to allow the plaintiff and or her agents access to the property located at 95 Rocky Hill Road, Woodstock ... through 97 Rocky Hill Road, until ... [the defendant], at his sole expense, install[s] a driveway similar to the driveway presently at use at 97 Rocky Hill Road, from the property located at 95 Rocky Hill Road to [Route] 171 in Woodstock ...." (Emphasis added.) The subsequent quitclaim deed that transferred ownership of 95 Rocky Hill Road to the plaintiff provided an express easement that conveyed "the right with others to pass and repass by foot and/or vehicle, and to install and maintain utilities, over and across that portion of the premises now or formerly of [the defendant] known or formerly known as ‘Old Connecticut Path’ from the herein described tract [95 Rocky Hill Road] westerly to Rocky Hill Road."

The trial court in the present action, Boland, J. , described the properties as follows: "[95 Rocky Hill Road's] westerly boundary is entirely coextensive with a portion of the easterly boundary of [the] defendant's tract .... Both these tracts lie northerly of and abut upon a portion of a discontinued highway called the Old Connecticut Path, or OCP.

"The nearest public highway to the west of the two parcels is a town road named Rocky Hill Road. Rocky Hill Road runs northerly and westerly from State Route 171. Route 171, which runs generally in a north-south direction, is the nearest public highway to the east. The OCP connects these two thoroughfares, and if all three roads ran perfectly straight they would form the shape of a triangle.

"The plaintiff's property consists of about an acre of land lying almost dead center on the portion of the OCP connecting the two public roads. Absent a right-of-way either to the east or the west over the OCP, her piece is landlocked. The defendant's property is much larger, and in parts lies north, west, and south of the OCP. Similarly, his only access to a public highway is via the OCP. To the west of his land, and to the east of the plaintiff's, lie lands belonging to abutters who are not parties to this action.

"The defendant holds title to the stretch of the OCP leading in the westerly direction (the west branch), and that part of the path enables him to access Rocky Hill Road. The plaintiff has a claim to ownership of the portion of the path which leads to Route 171 on the east (the east branch), but present or former abutters also possess claims to that strip adverse to hers." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

On August 10, 2015, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint seeking a "permanent injunction ordering the defendant to refrain [from] engaging in any action or omission thereto including building, erecting, constructing or allowing to be built any structures, temporary or permanent, within the easement area that would in any way limit or impede foot and/or vehicle access to 95 Rocky Hill Road from the Rocky Hill Road entrance or circumvent or hamper the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the easement." In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant has repeatedly obstructed her access to 95 Rocky Hill Road through various means, including placing hay baling equipment, boulders, wire fencing, and a black metal gate across the shared driveway that runs across 97 Rocky Hill Road. The plaintiff further alleged that she has previously obtained a postjudgment order from the family court instructing the defendant to cease his obstruction of the easement. In response, the defendant alleged that, per the terms of the separation agreement, he has provided the plaintiff a "similar" driveway across the east branch and, thus, the plaintiff no longer has a right to cross the west branch.

On June 9, 2017, following a trial to the court, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting a permanent injunction. The court's judgment was based on the following findings of fact regarding the ownership of the two parcels of land at issue. "First, it was in 1922 that the town of Woodstock discontinued all public use of the [OCP]. Upon that event, any public easement encumbering the path was extinguished. In 1922, one William Buell owned all the land along both sides of the path between Rocky Hill Road and Route 171. At later times in the mid-twentieth century, William Buell or his heirs subdivided that large parcel.... [T]hey conveyed the easterly half to the predecessors in interest of [Jon] Grosjean, [Karen] Christie, and [Karen] Roy. Along with those conveyances went such title as Buell had to the east branch of the OCP. Separately, and at a later date ... the westerly half of [Buell's] holdings, approximately 34.4 acres in size ... were acquired by [the] defendant's father, Cyrille Syriac. As a result of these various transfers, Cyrille Syriac owned both the fee simple and all rights of usage to the western branch of the path.

"Conveyances in Cyrille Syriac's chain at times included a clause transferring to him ‘any interest the grantor may have in and to that section of the [OCP] running from Rocky Hill Road easterly for about 1500 feet,’ that is, to the entire stretch of the path between the two public roads....

"Eventually, in 1984, Cyrille Syriac conveyed his interest in the parcels to [the defendant]. As in the prior deeds of which he was the grantee, Cyrille attempted to provide that [the defendant] would also enjoy the right to use the entirety of the OCP by tendering him his 34.4 acres ‘[t]ogether with any interest the grantor may have in and to that section of the [OCP] running from Rocky Hill Road easterly for about 1500 feet.’ ...

"Next in the chain of title is a quitclaim deed dated December 31, 1986, by which [the defendant] conveyed to his brother, Eric, a tract about one acre in size. This is the parcel upon which stands the house now known as [95 Rocky Hill Road], and is the same tract the 2010 separation agreement and family court decree awarded to [the] plaintiff; the deed alludes to it as ‘Tract A.’ In addition to Tract A, the deed grants as ‘Tract B’ the east branch of the OCP, employing a newly devised metes and bounds description prepared from a survey [the defendant] had obtained sometime between 1984 and 1986....

"The map depicts an inhibiting, triangular wedge of the path as belonging to Anna Petrone, an abutting predecessor in interest to Karen Roy; the Petrone piece alone cuts by half the usable width of so-called Tract B. On June 10, 1987, [the defendant] delivered to his brother an instrument captioned ‘Grant of Easement’ conveying to Eric a right-of-way over the west branch ... which [the defendant] today opposes when demanded by [the plaintiff].

"No evidence was offered as to whether Petrone or Roy has had any interaction with the plaintiff or with either Syriac brother. However, in December of 1987, abutter [Jon] Grosjean declared an overt challenge to Eric's claim to ownership of or right to use the east branch. Grosjean wrote to Woodstock's first selectman asserting his own interest in the path and objecting to Eric's making use of it. The controversy over the east branch did not abate, for in 1993 an attorney for Grosjean wrote directly to Eric Syriac challenging his erection of a fence at the Route 171 intersection of the path and threatening legal action to contest any claim that title to the path belonged to [Eric]. After that time, there is no evidence that Eric again used the east branch, but it is clear that the west branch became his primary if not exclusive means of access to [95 Rocky Hill Road].

"On May 11, 2005, via a survivorship warranty deed, Eric reconveyed all his interest in these various pieces to [the defendant] and the plaintiff, including the easement he obtained in 1987. Eric's deed to them also includes the vague reference to the right to use the OCP ‘SUBJECT to the rights of others,’ as exists in Cyrille's 1984 deed but which was absent from [the defendant's] 1986 deed. As to the east branch, Eric granted Tract B merely by adding to the house lot ‘any rights the Mortgagor ... may have in and to a certain parcel of land running easterly from the above described premises to ... Route 171,...