Morton v. Syriac

Michelle Morton v. Neal Syriac

No. WWMCV156009648

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Windham, Putnam

June 9, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

John D. Boland, Senior Judge

This memorandum resolves a dispute between former spouses as to plaintiff's use of a driveway belonging to defendant for access to her adjoining property in the town of Woodstock.

I. Background

A. Geography

To understand the claims of the parties it is essential to understand the physical characteristics of these parcels and their interconnectedness. Plaintiff's property is designated as 95 Rocky Hill Road.^[1] Its westerly boundary is entirely coextensive with a portion of the easterly boundary of defendant's tract, known as 97 Rocky Hill Road. Both these tracts lie northerly of and abut upon a portion of a discontinued highway called the Old Connecticut Path, or OCP.

The nearest public highway to the west of the two parcels is a town road named Rocky Hill Road. Rocky Hill Road runs northerly and westerly from State Route 171. Route 171, which runs generally in a north-south direction, is the nearest public highway to the east. The OCP connects these two thoroughfares, and if all three roads ran perfectly straight they would form the shape of a triangle.

Plaintiff's property consists of about an acre of land lying almost dead center on the portion of the OCP connecting the two public roads. Absent a right of way either to the east or the west over the OCP, her piece is landlocked. Defendant's property is much larger, and in parts lies north, west, and south of the OCP. Similarly, his only access to a public highway is via the OCP. To the west of his land, and to the east of plaintiffs, lie lands belonging to abutters who are not parties to this action.

Defendant holds title to the stretch of the OCP leading in the westerly direction (the " west branch"), and that part of the path enables him to access Rocky Hill Road. Plaintiff has a claim to ownership of the portion of the path which leads to Route 171 on the east (the " east branch"), but present or former abutters also possess claims to that strip adverse to hers.

B. The Family Court Action

1. The Separation Agreement and the Dissolution Judgment

Michelle Morton was formerly known as Michelle Syriac. The parties were married for about fifteen years. On April 13, 2010, their union was dissolved by the family division of this court (Swords, J.) in the case of Syriac v. Syriac, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket #FA 08-4007240S.

The judgment of dissolution incorporated a separation agreement which the court approved. By that agreement, they divided between themselves six parcels of real estate, including the two located along Rocky Hill Road. Pertinent to the instant dispute are subparagraphs 17a, c, g, and h, which read thus:

a. The defendant shall quit claim his right, title and interest to the following properties to the plaintiff:

1. 95 Rocky Hill Road, Woodstock, Connecticut;

c. The defendant shall retain the property located at 97 Rocky Hill Road, Woodstock, CT with no claim by the plaintiff.

g. The defendant agrees to allow the plaintiff and or her agents access to the property located at 95 Rocky Hill Road, Woodstock, CT through 97 Rocky Hill Road, until the terms described below in subparagraph h are complied with.

h. The Defendant shall be responsible to, at his sole expense, install a driveway similar to the driveway presently at use at 97 Rocky Hill Road, from the property located at 95 Rocky Hill Road to Rte. 171 in Woodstock, by October 15, 2010.

The omitted subparagraphs deal with other of the six parcels, and do not shed any light upon the present dispute.

2. Post-Judgment Family Court Proceedings

Post-judgment, the parties have filed a plethora of motions alleging contempt of court orders or aimed at modifying the judgment's provisions, mostly involving parenting and financial issues of no significance to this case. As to the driveway, however, they returned to court within a few months following the execution of their separation agreement with a dispute over its provisions. The family court revisited the driveway dispute a number of times over the next three years. In the present case, they have not even been able to agree upon a description of the current status of the family court orders as it affects this issue. Accordingly, I have reviewed the file in that case in detail.

On November 22, 2010 (filing #141), defendant sought an order restraining plaintiff from using the west branch of the OCP because, he alleged, he had fulfilled the terms and conditions of the decree by installing a new driveway over the east branch and plaintiff was refusing to accept his work as sufficient. The parties initially addressed this motion by a stipulation accepted by the court on December 8, 2010, ordering plaintiff to be responsible for snow removal on " the contested driveway" (without clarifying whether that referred to the east or the west branch). On March 30, 2011, the court conducted a subsequent hearing on that motion. On that occasion, the parties presented the court with a further agreement which is the final word on motion #141. Their agreement deals mainly with custodial issues, but it recites, in paragraph 8, that the parties would arrange to mediate with a family relations officer " the outstanding motions, " including " motions regarding the driveway."

Next, between June and August of 2011, defendant filed motions ##149, 151, and 152, all relating to the driveway. On November 9, 2011, the parties agreed, and the court ordered, that defendant would unblock the west branch path through May 31, 2012, that plaintiff and her tenants would be permitted to access 95 Rocky Hill Road via that path, and that she would henceforth " not . . . pursue the defendant and . . . not hold him liable for the cost to repair" the east branch path.

On May 8, 2012, plaintiff filed her own motion (#154) alleging that there was " an underlying title dispute" regarding the east branch and seeking to modify the 2010 decree accordingly. On May 23, 2012, as part of an agreed interlocutory resolution of the issues raised by that motion, the parties stipulated and the court ordered (#156) that " defendant shall continue to keep the driveway to 95 Rocky Hill Road open . . . until further order of the court." On December 17, 2012, defendant filed another motion to modify (#167) seeking relief from that obligation by alleging, once again, that he had fulfilled the terms of the original decree vis-à-vis the east branch, and requesting a court order setting aside the open-ended order of May 23 and allowing him to block the west branch against access by plaintiff.

On April 22, 2013, the court (Graziani, J.) expressly denied both motion number 154 and motion number 167. The clerk's rendition of the court's order on that occasion is

1.) Defendant^[2] motion for modification #154, paragraph #5 is denied. [and]

2.) The Defendant shall keep the driveway to 95 Rocky Hill Road open, pursuant to the terms of the 11/08/2011 agreement of the parties (paragraph 5) which was made an order of the court on April 9, 2011, ^[3] until further order of the court."

A transcript of the proceeding reveals that Judge Graziani declined to grant either motion #154 or #167 because he determined that the dispute required extensive consideration of legal issues involving easements which would require expert testimony and land record searches. He denied " both motions, without prejudice" after indicating his belief that a civil action brought on the issue would afford the parties a better opportunity to resolve their standoff.

Thereafter, at various times in 2014, and despite Judge Graziani's directive, defendant filed additional motions (##171 and 175) addressing the driveway issue as part of a larger array of issues he believed required court attention. Once again, he maintained that he had fulfilled the terms of the 2010 decree and sought to bar plaintiff from using the west branch. Plaintiff objected in writing on July 7, 2014 (#183). By March of 2015, it appears that the parties had resolved all of their disputes except this driveway issue. By their agreement of that date (#205), they requested a continuance until March 25 " to determine if defendant shall proceed." Apparently, he decided not to, as the dissolution case record ends with the March 15 stipulation. No later orders addressed the driveway issue, and there has been no modification of the 2013 order.

Thus the status quo of family court orders as of April 22, 2013, and at all times since, is that plaintiff's right to use the west branch for access to #95 remains in place " until further order of the court, " and defendant is barred from inhibiting that access.

II. Nature of the Present Dispute

Plaintiff's verified complaint alleges ownership by the parties as set forth above, and alleges a series of actions which defendant has taken designed to impede her use of the west branch driveway. First, she claims, he placed hay bales at the spot where her access in that direction would begin. Later, he escalated to the posting of " no trespassing signs, " placement of boulders, and erection of a wire gate with a lock. As a result, she has kept her residence at another location, and has not been able to rent the property for fear of confrontation between defendant and her tenants. She attempted to sell the parcel, but her buyers backed out when their attorney declined to issue title insurance on account of the right of way dispute. She seeks recognition of the right of way over the west branch as a muniment of title running with her ownership of #95, specifically requesting orders:

1) that the defendant

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