Mosier v. Evans

90 F.4th 541

Timmy Lee MOSIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph EVANS; Crockett County, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-5189

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Decided and Filed: January 9, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson. No. 1:20-cv-02197—J. Daniel Breen, District Judge.

ON BRIEF: Jeffrey S. Rosenblum, Matthew T. May, ROSENBLUM & REISMAN, PC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Nathan D. Tilly, Dylan E. Sutherland, PENTECOST, GLENN & TILLY, PLLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

LARSEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, C.J., joined in full. CLAY, J. (pp. 556-63), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

LARSEN, Circuit Judge.

After being arrested for public intoxication, Timmy Mosier resisted being escorted to the booking area of the Crockett County Jail. In response, Crockett County Deputy Joseph Evans pulled Mosier to the ground, which he hit head-first. Mosier brought federal civil-rights and state-law tort claims against Evans and Crockett County. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the civil-rights claims and their partial motion to dismiss the negligence claims. Mosier argues that the district court erred in granting each of those motions. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND.

I.

Timmy Mosier spent the evening of March 2, 2019, drinking heavily and smoking marijuana. Deputy Joseph Evans arrested him on suspicion of public intoxication and took him to the Crockett County Jail.

Mosier was handcuffed, with his hands behind his back, and dressed in overalls and socks when he arrived at the jail. Evans held the strap of Mosier's overalls and walked him toward the booking area. Mosier cursed at Evans and resisted his escort. Mosier turned to face Evans, rather than walking in the direction of the booking area. He walked forward a few steps but then forcefully pivoted away from Evans. Mosier stepped backwards, away from Evans and the booking area and swung his elbow upward toward Evans' arm in an apparent effort to break his grip. Evans, still holding Mosier's overall strap, grabbed it with both hands. Mosier braced himself as Evans pulled him forward by the strap. Evans then pulled the strap down and toward him, causing Mosier to twist down to the concrete floor, which he hit head-first.

Evans asked whether Mosier was okay and called for medics. Evans removed Mosier's handcuffs and wiped the blood from Mosier's face. When the medics did not immediately arrive, Evans went to ask for them again. They attended to Mosier within eight minutes of his hitting his head. The medics concluded that Mosier had a concussion and should see a doctor the next day. Evans asked his supervisor, Captain Roy Mosier,¹ whether Timmy Mosier could be taken to the emergency room that night. That request was granted, and Mosier was taken to the hospital where he received treatment for his cuts and fractures to the bones of his face and spine.

Sherriff Troy Klyce asked Captain Mosier to investigate the incident. Crockett County has a use of force policy that prohibits the use of unnecessary force. Captain Mosier concluded that Evans did not use unnecessary force. Crockett County also requires its officers to complete use-of-force training certified by the Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (POST). Evans had received that training and was POST-certified.

Mosier sued Evans and Crockett County in Tennessee state court, bringing federal civil-rights and state-law tort claims against each. The defendants removed the suit to federal court. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the civil-rights claims and their partial motion to dismiss the negligence claims.

Mosier appeals.

II.

Summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review de novo a district court's order granting a motion for summary judgment, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 584 (6th Cir. 2009).

A.

The district court granted Evans' motion for summary judgment on Mosier's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive-force and inadequate-medical-care claims based, in part, on qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects officials when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). When it is asserted, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013). Applying qualified immunity requires asking: (1) whether an official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). When the answer to either of those questions is "no," the other need not be addressed. Price v. Montgomery County, 72 F.4th 711, 723 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808).

1.

The district court concluded that Evans' use of force did not violate Mosier's clearly established rights. We agree. At the time of the events in question, Evans had "been arrested but ha[d] not yet received a judicial determination of probable cause, either through an arrest warrant or a post-arrest probable cause hearing." Colson v. City of Alcoa, 37 F.4th 1182, 1187 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2010)). So the Fourth Amendment governs his claims. Id. The operative question is whether the force used was " 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting" the officer. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)).

To show that Evans' actions violated his clearly established rights, it is not enough for Mosier to argue that there is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. That defines the right at too high a level of generality. See Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457, 467 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014)). "[T]he salient question" in evaluating whether a constitutional right is clearly established is whether an official had "fair warning" that his or her conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). That means that, at the time of the events in question, the contours of the right must have been sufficiently well-defined that "every reasonable official" would have understood that his or her actions crossed the constitutional line. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5, 142 S.Ct. 4, 211 L.Ed.2d 164 (2021) (per curiam) (citation omitted). That usually requires a case with "a fact pattern similar enough" to put the defendant on notice. Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 932 (6th Cir. 2019). Although the case need not be "directly on point[,] . . . existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). "[S]pecificity is especially important" in Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases, where the constitutional boundaries are intensely fact-dependent. Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 6, 142 S.Ct. 4 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Mosier has not met his burden of identifying a case that should have put Evans "on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful." Id.; see Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2022). He relies heavily on Lawler v. City of Taylor, 268 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2008). But "a plaintiff cannot point to unpublished decisions to meet" the burden of showing a clearly established right. See Bell, 37 F.4th at 367. And, in any event, the facts of Lawler do not put Evans' conduct "beyond debate;" and neither do the facts of Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002), the published case on which Lawler relied.

Lawler was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Lawler, 268 F. App'x at 385. In the booking room, Lawler offered only mild resistance: he refused to follow instructions, cursed at an officer, and "raised his left arm slightly." Id. at 386. An officer responded by tackling Lawler to the floor face-down and, once he was on top of Lawler, with Lawler under his control, the officer slammed his knee into Lawler's back twice and hit Lawler with his elbow. Id. Phelps was similar. Phelps, who had been arrested for violating a municipal ordinance, lifted his feet to comply with an officer's instruction. Phelps, 286 F.3d at 297. Another officer tackled Phelps, thinking that Phelps was trying to kick his colleague. Id. Once that officer was on top of Phelps, who was handcuffed, the officer hit Phelps in the face twice, grabbed his shirt, and banged his head against the floor three times. Id. We said that the officers in both cases had violated the plaintiffs' clearly established right to be free from "gratuitous force" in the booking room, "beyond the point at which any threat could have been reasonably perceived." Lawler, 268 F. App'x at 388.

Those cases did not provide Evans fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508. As the district court found, the video evidence makes clear that Mosier was more aggressive and threatening than either Lawler or Phelps. And Evans' response was less severe. Evans...