Moss v. W & a Cleaners, Civ.A. 99-D-332-N.

Page 1181

111 F.Supp.2d 1181

Annie P. MOSS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. W & A CLEANERS, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 99-D-332-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

April 27, 2000.

Maurice S. Bell, Montgomery, Al, David George Flack, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Terry Alan Sides, Robison & Belser, P.A., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint ("Mot."), together with a Memorandum Brief ("Br."), both filed July 29, 1999. Plaintiffs filed a Response ("Resp.") on August 19, 1999. On August 26, 1999, Defendants filed a Reply. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion To Dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended) ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended) (" § 1981"). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990). Moreover, all factual allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

BACKGROUND

In this action, Plaintiffs bring claims against their former employer, W & A Cleaners, L.L.C. ("W & A"), and its agents, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1981. The eight Plaintiffs, all of whom are black females, are Annie P. Moss, Tiffony Ruth, Evelyn Tolliver, Felicia Trimble, Lori Wheeler, Patricia Wheeler, Elaine Williams and Louise Williams. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 5-12.) In addition to naming W & A as a Defendant, Plaintiffs sued Wayne Carden and Allie Carden, the owners of W & A, as well as Al Haney ("Haney"), W & A's manager.¹ (Id. ¶¶ 13A, 13B, 13C.)

Plaintiffs allege that, during their employment at W & A, Defendants subjected them to race discrimination in the terms and conditions of their employment, which ultimately culminated in their terminations on March 23, 1998. (Id. at 5-11.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Allie Carden "used racial slurs in the presence of a number of the black employees" and that black employees, including Plaintiffs, were denied pay raises and promotions. (Id. at 5-6.)

Further, Plaintiffs contend that Wayne Carden restricted black employees to working in the "back" room, "where the cleaning and pressing process is undertaken" and which is "not air conditioned." (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiffs, Wayne Carden would not allow Plaintiffs to work "in the air conditioned front of the business" because he said that black employees "'can take the heat better'" in the "back" room. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that, on March 23, 1998, after Plaintiffs had "repeatedly stated that the owners were mistreating them in a discriminatory fashion," Haney fired all of the black employees, including Plaintiffs. (Id. at 8.) In sum, Plaintiffs "aver that they were subjected to poor working conditions, refused promotions and finally terminated because of their race ... when they protested the discriminatory actions of [ ] Defendants." (Id.)

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint contains four counts. In Counts 1 and 3, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "discriminated against them because of their race," in violation of Title VII and § 1981. (Id. at 9-10.) In Counts 2 and 4, Plaintiffs assert that, in violation of Title VII and § 1981, Defendants retaliated against them based on their "protest against race discrimination," involvement in "activities" with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and "assertion" of "rights" under § 1981. (Id. at 10-11.)

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, reinstatement, promotions, compensatory damages, punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00, costs and attorney's fees. (Id. at 11-13.) Plaintiffs also demand a trial by jury. (Id. at 1.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of each count in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The court addresses each of Defendants' arguments separately below.

I. Title VII And The Timeliness Of Plaintiffs' EEOC Charges (Counts 1 and 2)

In Counts 1 and 2, Plaintiffs bring claims under Title VII. Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants move the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Title VII claims and advance two arguments in support of their contention. See FED. R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1). First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action as required by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). (Mot. ¶ 1; Br. at 6-7.) Thus, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their Title VII administrative remedies. (Id.) Second, assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs timely filed their EEOC charges, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are "precluded from recovering for any alleged discriminatory acts by [ ][D]efendants which occurred prior to March 23, 1998." (Mot. ¶ 2.) Further, in ruling on their timeliness argument, Defendants ask the court to consider evidence outside the pleadings and convert their Motion to one for summary judgment. (Br. at 10, Exs. 1-11.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue, in part, that a "question" exists "as to whether the EEOC received the filing of ... Plaintiffs' charges in May or June of 1998"² and that, in any event, equitable tolling saves their claims. (Resp. at 11-15.) While Plaintiffs have submitted evidence in opposing Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, Plaintiffs urge the court not to treat Defendants' Motion as one for summary judgment until Plaintiffs have conducted discovery. (Id. at 2, 4-7.) In support of this contention, Plaintiffs point out that a scheduling order has not been entered in this case. (Id. at 10-12); see also M.D.Ala.LR 26.2(a) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source until after the scheduling order is entered under Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(b)."). Thus, Plaintiffs contend that they have not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery in order to fully respond to Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.³ (Resp. at 1-12.)

Before addressing Defendants' timeliness argument, the court must determine the appropriate standard of review. Although not raised by the Parties, the court first examines the propriety of examining Defendants' Motion To Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) & (b)(6); See Anjelino v. The New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir.1999) ("There is a fundamental difference between review under Rule 12(b)(1), where existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the court from evaluating the merits of the jurisdictional claim, ... and review under Rule 12(b)(6), where the court is required to accept as true all the allegations of the complaint and all inferences arising from them."). Because the failure to exhaust Title VII administrative remedies is a condition precedent, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite, the court finds that scrutiny under Rule 12(b)(1) is not appropriate. Instead, a motion to dismiss based on a plaintiff's failure to timely file an EEOC charge should be analyzed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982);⁴ Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir.1983) ("[A]ll Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as conditions precedent to suit rather than as jurisdictional requirements."); Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 n. 1 (5th Cir.1985).⁵

In determining that the court should proceed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must now decide whether to convert Defendants' Motion To Dismiss to one for summary judgment. Under Rule 12(b)(6), where the Parties have presented "matters outside the pleadings," the court in its discretion may treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b), 56; see also Jones v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir.1990).

After careful consideration of the Parties' arguments, the court declines to treat Defendants' Motion To Dismiss under the Rule 56 standard. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), 56. At this early stage of...