Motuzas v. Saul

565 F.Supp.3d 174

Julie MOTUZAS

v.Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, U.S. Social Security Administration

Civil No. 20-cv-327-LM

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire.

Signed August 25, 2021

Janine Gawryl, Gawryl MacAllister & O'Connor, Nashua, NH, for Julie Motuzas.

Rami M. Vanegas, Office of General Counsel (MA) Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, for Commissioner US Social Security Administration.

ORDER

Landya McCafferty, United States District Judge

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Julie Motuzas seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Motuzas moves to reverse the Commissioner's decision, contending that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in two ways: (1) by failing to consider fully whether Motuzas’ impairments meet or equal one of the impairments listed in Part A of Appendix 1 to Part 404, Subpart P of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and (2) by assigning improper weight to the medical opinions in the record. The Administration moves to affirm. For the reasons discussed below, the decision of the Commissioner is vacated, and this case is remanded to the Administration for further consideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner under Section 405(g), the court "is limited to determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence." Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) ; accord Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). The court defers to the ALJ's factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; see also Fischer v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). "Substantial-evidence review is more deferential than it might sound to the lay ear: though certainly ‘more than a scintilla’ of evidence is required to meet the benchmark, a preponderance of evidence is not." Purdy v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Rather, the court "must uphold the Commissioner's findings if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support her conclusion." Id. (citation and internal modifications omitted).

DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

To establish disability for purposes of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a claimant has made the requisite demonstration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) ; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The claimant "has the burden of production and proof at the first four steps of the process." Freeman v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 2001). The first three steps are: (1) determining whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) determining whether she has a severe impairment; and (3) determining whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iii).

If the claimant meets her burden at the first two steps of the sequential analysis, but not at the third, an ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is a determination of the most a person can do in a work setting despite the limitations caused by her impairments. Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1) ; see also S.S.R. No. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). At the fourth step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC in light of her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can perform her past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. See id. If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step, at which it is the Administration's burden to show that jobs exist in the economy which the claimant can do in light of her RFC. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2013, prior to filing the disability insurance benefits application at issue in this case, Motuzas filed a Title II disability insurance benefits application. The Administration denied that application on March 14, 2014. Motuzas requested a hearing to review the denial of her application but withdrew the request before the hearing took place. Accordingly, on August 11, 2015, the Administration dismissed her claim. Proceedings in connection with Motuzas's August 2013 application have not been reopened, and Motuzas did not timely request that the dismissal be vacated. As a result, the Administration's dismissal order of August 11, 2015 constitutes a final and binding determination that Motuzas was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.959, 404.960 ; see also Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual I-3-3-15C.

Motuzas filed the application for disability insurance benefits at issue in this case on August 25, 2015, alleging disability due to residual effects from a stroke, migraine headaches, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, left-side paresthesia, sleep apnea, insomnia, obesity, chronic fatigue, and prediabetes. Motuzas alleged that these conditions became disabling as of August 5, 2013. However, because the Administration's August 11, 2015 order dismissing Motuzas's August 2013 disability insurance benefits application is final and binding, the earliest allowable disability onset date in connection with Motuzas's current application is August 12, 2015. Motuzas met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2016.

After the Administration denied Motuzas's application on December 28, 2015, Motuzas requested a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ held an initial hearing on February 1, 2017 and a second hearing on May 1, 2017. Motuzas testified at both hearings and impartial vocational expert Dennis J. King testified at the second hearing. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 9, 2017. Motuzas appealed the ALJ's decision and on January 22, 2019 the Appeals Council granted her appeal, vacated the decision, and remanded the case for a new hearing. Accordingly, a third hearing was held before the ALJ on June 24, 2019. Motuzas testified at the third hearing, as did impartial vocational expert James L. Soldner. The ALJ issued a further unfavorable decision on September 26, 2019.

The ALJ found in support of his September 2019 decision that Motuzas had a combination of severe impairments consisting of late effects of cerebrovascular disease, obesity, and affective disorder.¹ He further found that Motuzas's combination of impairments did not meet or equal the severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In assessing whether Motuzas's combination of impairments met or equaled Listing 11.04 (vascular insult to the brain), the ALJ considered whether Motuzas's impairments met or equaled the criteria set forth at Listing 11.04A and 11.04B, but did not expressly consider the criterial set forth at Listing 11.04C.

The ALJ found that, during the period between August 12, 2015 (the earliest allowable disability onset date in connection with Motuzas's current application) and December 31, 2016 (the date Motuzas was last insured for purposes of the Act):

[Motuzas] had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). [She] has unlimited use of her upper extremities to push and pull. [She] can occasionally operate foot controls with the left lower extremity. [She] should never climb ladders, scaffolding or ropes. [She] can frequently stoop and occasionally climb stairs and ramps, bend, balance, kneel, crouch and crawl. [She] should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and even moderate exposure to unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts. [She] is limited to understanding, remembering and carrying out one to three step instructions and has the ability to sustain those instructions during typical two-hour periods over an eight hour workday and forty-hour work week.

Admin. Rec. at 38-39. In assessing Motuzas's RFC, the ALJ accorded "limited weight" to the opinions of treating neurologist Khawaja Rahman, M.D., examining psychologist Sherie Friedrich, Psy.D., treating nurse Sara Shipley, A.P.R.N., and treating social worker Colleen Mahoney, L.I.C.S.W. He accorded "substantial weight" to the opinions of agency consulting physician Phyllis Standell, M.D., and agency consulting psychologist Craig Stenslie, Ph.D.

In response to hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, impartial vocational expert King opined at the second hearing that a person with Motuzas's age, education, past work experience, and RFC could perform Motuzas's past relevant work as a retail cashier. Vocational expert King further opined that such an individual could additionally perform the job duties of a survey worker, an information clerk, and a school bus monitor. At the third hearing, impartial vocational expert Soldner opined in response to hypothetical questions posed by Motuzas's counsel that a person with Motuzas's RFC who, in addition, was unable to maintain concentration or complete tasks would not be able to perform the duties of any job existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Based in part on King's testimony, the ALJ found at Step Five of the sequential process that Motuzas had not been disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act at any time between her earliest allowable disability onset date of August 12, 2015 and her date last insured of December 31, 2016.

On January 15, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Motuzas's request for review. As a...