Moudis v. United States

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LESLIE MOUDIS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 20-CV-05674 (JMA) (AYS)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

June 20, 2024

FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JOAN M. AZRACK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Leslie Moudis brought this Federal Tort Claims Act case against Defendant United States of America asserting that, in March 2019, a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) employee negligently drove a USPS truck into Plaintiff's vehicle at an intersection in Roslyn New York. (See generally, Compl., ECF No. 1.) After the parties completed discovery and unsuccessfully mediated this case, the Court scheduled a bench trial for January 16 2024. (See July 17, 2023, Order; Dec. 8, 2023, Joint Status Report, ECF No. 34; Minute Entry for Dec. 18, 2023 Conference, ECF No. 35.)

Two weeks before trial, Plaintiff filed letters seeking to adjourn the trial and substitute a new expert for her treating physician because that physician became indefinitely unavailable due to an unspecified medical situation. (See ECF Nos. 37, 38.) After requiring status reports with more details underlying Plaintiff's requests and holding two conferences, the Court bifurcated the bench trial such that it would first adjudicate only liability; if necessary, further proceedings would address damages. (See Jan. 3, 2024, Status Report Order; Jan. 5 2024, Status Report, ECF No. 39; Minute Entry for Jan. 9, 2024, Conference, ECF No. 43; Jan. 11, 2024, Status Report, ECF No. 41; Minute Entry for Jan. 12, 2024, Conference, ECF No. 44.)

The Court held the liability bench trial on January 16, 2024. (See Minute Order for Jan. 16, 2024, Bench Trial, ECF No. 48.) Now, based on the Court's evaluation of the trial testimony- including the credibility of the witnesses-and the other evidence introduced at trial, the Court issues the below findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1).

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

At approximately 10:00 AM on March 27, 2019, Plaintiff (who was then forty-nine years old) drove her 2017 Range Rover from her Port Washington, New York home toward a Jericho, New York Home Depot. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 9, 18-22.^[1]) Approximately thirteen minutes into the trip, Plaintiff drove south on West Shore Road toward where the east-west portion of Old Northern Boulevard intersects with and merges into West Shore Road (the “Intersection”). (Tr. 21.) The Intersection is mapped as follows:

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(Def.'s Ex. D-2, ECF No. 50-2 at 2; see also Tr. 23 (explaining that the Intersection is “[l]ike a T” rotated ninety degrees clockwise).)

Plaintiff drove in the south-bound left lane of West Shore Road (i.e., the east-most lane on the west side of West Shore Road) at the speed limit. (Tr. 22-30); see also Tr. 25-26, 58-59, 62-63 (Plaintiff's testimony that the speed limit on West Shore Road decreased from forty-five miles per hour to twenty-five miles per hour as she approached the Intersection). It was a “clear, nice sunny day.” (Tr. 28.) Plaintiff had not consumed alcohol or medication in the prior twenty-four hours. (Tr. 23-24.) Plaintiff was neither eating nor using her cell phone, her car's navigation system, or any other electronics. (Tr. 24-25.) Plaintiff was familiar with the route she took from her home toward Home Depot. (Tr. 22.) Plaintiff did not need to arrive at Home Depot at a particular time. (Tr. 21.) Plaintiff was in “no rush” to get to her intended destination. (Tr. 28.)

The traffic lights in the Intersection (1) continuously displayed a green light to Plaintiff as she approached with the south-bound traffic, and (2) simultaneously displayed a green light to the north-bound traffic.^[2] (Tr. 27, 69-71.) When she was “3 or 2 cars away” from the Intersection, Plaintiff first observed a USPS truck in the north-bound right lane of West Shore Road (i.e., the east-most lane on the east side of West Shore Road). (Tr. 26; see Tr. 69, 81-82 (Plaintiff's testimony that she was “near” Mott Avenue but more so “at the intersection of the light” when she saw the USPS truck); see also Def.'s Ex. D-2, ECF No. 50-2 at 2 (showing that Mott Avenue is the cross-street with West Shore Road just north of the Intersection).) Robert T. West (“West”) was driving that truck during his USPS employment. (Tr. 99-100.)

West then drove the truck “fast” across the northbound middle lane, into the northbound left lane, and, without slowing down, began to turn left toward Old Northern Boulevard. (Tr. 23, 27-30, 32-33, 80-82, 94-95.) West crossed those two lanes of traffic and began his turn without using the USPS truck's turn signals. (Tr. 27, 32.) At the same time, the left-pointing arrow signal in the Intersection's traffic light that faced West was not illuminated. (Tr. 100-01.) Thus, the Intersection traffic light that faced West appeared like this:

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(Pl.'s Ex. 3 at 00:24 (post-accident video footage replicating West's path and point of view); see also id. at 00:20-00:23 (depicting how the same traffic light appears when its left-pointing green or yellow arrows illuminate alongside its green light).^[3]) Plaintiff noticed West's abrupt movement into the northbound left lane and believed West would stop there-without turning-because Plaintiff had a green light and was already in the Intersection. (Tr. 83, 85-87; see also Tr. 79-80, 94-98.) West, however, did not see Plaintiff's vehicle and proceeded into the Intersection; the vehicles collided (the “Accident”). (Tr. 32-35, 99-100.) The front left corner of the USPS truck struck the front left corner of Plaintiff's vehicle. (Tr. 33.) The airbags in Plaintiff's vehicle did not deploy. (Tr. 34.) This post-Accident photograph depicts the damage to the vehicles:

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Tort Claims Act

This case arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-80 (the “FTCA”), which makes the United States liable for “personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” § 1346(b); see Dooley v. United States, 83 F.4th 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2023) (explaining that the FTCA “waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain classes of torts claims”). The FTCA applies to this case because West was an employee of the United States acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the Accident. (Tr. 99-100.)

“[I]n an FTCA action, ‘courts are bound to apply the law of the state where the tort occurred'- in this case, New York.” Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal alterations omitted). “Under New York law, a tort plaintiff seeking to prove a defendant's negligence must show: ‘(1) the existence of a duty on defendant's part as to plaintiff; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result thereof.'” Id. (quoting Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 333 (1981)). “[E]vidence of negligence is not enough by itself to establish liability, for it must also be proved that the negligence was a proximate, or legal, cause of the event that produced the harm sustained by the plaintiff.” Dooley, 83 F.4th at 164 (quoting Hain v. Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524, 528 (2016)). “[N]egligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury.” Id. at 162 (quoting Mazella v. Beals, 27 N.Y.3d 694, 706 (2016)). “By contrast, ‘proximate cause will be found lacking where the act merely furnished the occasion for but did not cause' the injury.” Id. at 164 (quoting Hain, 28 N.Y.3d at 530) (ellipsis omitted).

B. Standard Of Proof And Credibility Assessments

Plaintiff bears the burden to prove her claims by a preponderance of the evidence. See Velasquez v. United States Postal Serv., 155 F.Supp.3d 218, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). The burden of showing a preponderance of the evidence “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)). Under that standard, “the party with the burden of proof would lose in the event that the evidence is evenly balanced.” Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 731 (2d Cir. 2001); see United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The preponderance standard is no more than a tie-breaker dictating that when the evidence on an issue is evenly balanced, the party with the burden of proof loses.”).

After a bench trial, it “is within the province of the district court as the trier of fact to decide whose testimony should be credited. And as trier of fact, the judge is entitled, just as a jury would be, to believe some parts and disbelieve other parts of the testimony of any given witness.” Diesel Props S.r.l. v. Greystone Business Credit II LLC, 631 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, following a bench trial “the weight to be given to particular pieces of evidence” is “peculiarly within the province of the [judge as] trier of fact” and these determinations are “entitled to considerable deference.” Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Lone Eagle Shipping (Liber.), 134 F.3d 103, 104 (2d Cir. 1998).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Credibility of Witnesses

Pla...