Mount v. Fikes

1

Jeremy D. Mount, Plaintiff, v. Warden J. Fikes, D. Drilling, and J. Best, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-1489 (NEB/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

April 4, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This action comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 108); Plaintiff Jeremy D. Mount's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Damages (Dkt. 117); and Plaintiff Jeremy D. Mount's Motion for Extension of Time to Seek “Offer of Compromise” Resolution Where Both Parties are Willing (Dkt. 121). This case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Plaintiff Jeremy D. Mount's (“Mount” or “Plaintiff”) claims that Federal Correctional Institution - Sandstone (“FCI Sandstone”) mailroom staff Defendants J. Best and D. Drilling violated his constitutional rights related to his claimed right to mail and access to the courts, and that Defendant Warden J. Fikes oversaw the administrative remedy in this regard. (Dkt. 78.) In particular, the operative Amended Complaint alleges as follows:

Mount resided at FCI Sandstone when he filed the Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant Warden Fikes of FCI Sandstone was the warden when this action was filed and oversaw the “administrative rem[e]dy” that Mount submitted regarding allegedly unconstitutional acts of mailroom staff Defendants D. Drilling and J. Best. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant J. Best was working and overseeing the operations of the mailroom at FCI Sandstone was in charge of how the mail was handled, and was most directly involved with the unconstitutional treatment of Mount by the mailroom. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendant D. Drilling was also in charge of the mailroom procedures and allowed the unconstitutional actions against Mount to continue. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mount is suing Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id.)

Defendants have failed to follow Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) procedures, “such as 540.71 Procedures (b),” which provides that the Warden may reject a publication only if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Warden may not reject a publication solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant. (Id.)

The mailroom also failed to follow procedures allowing Mount to “inspect” the rejected publication and would send back rejected publications even after an appeal was timely filed, which allegedly violated a procedure stating the Warden would retain rejected publications for 20 days after the inmate was sent written notice of the rejection. (Id. ¶ 15.) The rejected publications included books that were rejected for having an unknown substance, including a book from Mount's mother, and an “Art Deco” book that was rejected on the grounds that it contained sexually explicit material or featured nudity. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17-20; Dkt. 78-1, Ex. A.) This was also in violation of the BOP Program Statement 5266.11. (Dkt. 78 ¶ 18.) Efforts to appeal and remedy these violations were ignored by the administrative remedy process at the district level. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that it is “more then obvious” and “it does not require a leap over a chasm of logic to conclude the mailroom staff had vexatious ends to their actions to block his constitutional rights to DUE PROCESS.” (Id. ¶ 21.)

Further evidence of D. Drilling and J. Best's malicious intents to stop the flow of mail against Mount included the constant and unrelenting rejection of federal mail postage stamps for no reason. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)

When this action was filed, D. Drilling and J. Best were running the majority of mailroom activity and made the decisions regarding rejection of Federal Mail Stamps and rejection of books. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff had no other way to mail his packages and mail. (Id.) Plaintiff also had no other way to receive books except from the mailroom that was being run by D. Drilling and J. Best. (Id. ¶ 28.)

D. Drilling and J. Best rejected hundreds of Mount's letters that were properly stamped with Federal Forever postage stamps, thereby committing mail fraud by blocking the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail for no penological reason. (Id. ¶ 29.) While Plaintiff properly used the prison grievance process, Warden Fikes, the BOP Regional Office, and Central Office failed to address this issue. (Id. ¶ 30.)

D. Drilling and J. Best further refused to cease blocking Plaintiff from receiving books from book clubs. (Id. ¶ 31.) They fabricated false pretenses to achieve their ends by using the mailroom procedures relating to “unknown substance” to justify their false and malicious acts. (Id.)

By refusing stamped envelopes, D. Drilling and J. Best stopped Mount from mailing religious mail, mail to loved ones, and even legal mail, which created a risk of having his legal mail be deemed untimely and thereby losing his legal claims. (Id. ¶ 32.) These acts violated Mount's due process right of access to the courts and freedom of religion. (Id.) It also resulted in late mail to Mount's family. (Id.)

D. Drilling and J. Best not only refused to cease their relentless attacks and practices on Mount, but when Mount attempted to remedy the misconduct with a face-to-face meeting with the Defendants, he was publicly disrespected and told to “shut the fuck up.” (Id. ¶ 34.)

Mount's Amended Complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants' actions violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated his First Amendment rights. (Id. at 8.) Mount also seeks injunctive relief relating to the FCI Sandstone mailroom conduct. (Id. at 8-9.)

Mount further seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9.)

B. Procedural Background

Mount was committed to the custody of the BOP on August 22, 2017. (Dkt. 110 ¶ 5; Dkt. 110-2.) He was designated to FCI Sandstone from August 22, 2017 to August 2, 2021. (Id.) From August 2, 2021, to May 5, 2022, Mount was released from BOP custody on Federal Writ, and was returned to the BOP on May 5, 2022. (Id.) Mount was again designated to FCI Sandstone until August 10, 2022. (Id.) Following a period of transit, he arrived at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (“MDC Brooklyn”), in holdover for transfer to another institution on August 24, 2022. As of December 6, 2022, he remained at MDC Brooklyn. According to the last Notice of Change of Address from Mount (Dkt. 115), and the BOP's inmate locator, Mount is presently designated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Milan, Michigan. BOP inmate Locator, www.bop.gov/inmateloc// (last visited April 4, 2023).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants bring the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)-and specifically, under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 108.) Rule 12(b)(1) concerns claims that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over part or all of an action. Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2008). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, subject matter jurisdiction “is a threshold requirement” that courts must assure themselves of “in every federal case.” Turner v. Armontrout, 922 F.2d 492, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Kronholm v. F.D.I.C., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990)).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “‘the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.'” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Mortenson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977)).

A court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must first determine whether the motion presents a “facial attack” or a “factual attack.” Id. at 729 n.6 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). “In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731-32 (11th Cir. 1982)). For a factual attack, in contrast, a court “‘considers matters outside the pleadings, and the non-moving party does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards.'” Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6)). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing cases).

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) do not concern jurisdiction instead, they assert that a plaintiff's pleadings “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court construes pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court must take a pleading's factual allegations to be true. See, e.g., Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, a court must afford the nonmoving party all reasonable inferences from a pleading's allegations. See, e.g., Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. ...