Mouzone v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys.

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QUIANA MOUZONE v. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH SYSTEM, THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 23-19

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

October 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM

MURPHY, J

Those seeking a remedy for employment discrimination do not rush directly to court. They file charges with one or more administrative agencies responsible for investigating discrimination - at the federal, state, and even city level if the city has its own discrimination law (e.g. Philadelphia). This may bring about a negotiated resolution or even government-led litigation. But typically, it is more of a necessary placeholder that later gives them the right to bring claims in court under the applicable federal, state, or city law. Here, we face a question that many other judges in this district have addressed: is filing a complaint with Philadelphia's agency a necessary precondition for later bringing claims in court under Philadelphia's discrimination law? We hold that it is. Therefore, we deny the plaintiff's motion to amend her pleadings to add such claims.

I. Background

Procedurally, we are here on a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (DI 24) that is opposed for futility. But the underlying issue is whether Ms. Mouzone is barred from advancing claims under the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (PFPO) because she failed to file a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Rights (PCHR or, to help distinguish from Pennsylvania's similarly acronymed commission, PhilaCHR). Only a few facts are needed.

Ms. Mouzone believes that her former employer, the University of Pennsylvania, discriminated against her because of her disability and wrongfully terminated her. DI 21. Around September 9, 2022, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was also dual filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC or PennHRC). DI 24 at 2. She filed this action on January 24, 2023, alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and wrongful termination. DI 1. We held a pretrial conference on May 10, 2023, and discovery has been ongoing. DI 13. On September 18, 2023, Ms. Mouzone filed an amended complaint, adding claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). DI 21. The next day she moved to file a second amended complaint, this time to add claims under the PFPO. DI 24. Ms. Mouzone expected, and received, opposition because she never filed a charge of discrimination with the PhilaCHR. DI 25. The University argues that this failure bars any remedy under the PFPO. Id.

Ms. Mouzone's motion relies on the majority of decisions from this district holding that plaintiffs need not have filed charges with the PhilaCHR so long as they have done so with the PennHRC and/or EEOC. E.g., Higgins v. MetLife Inc., 2023 WL 5309893 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2023) (thoroughly cataloging the history of the issue in the district). The University's response relies on a smaller number of decisions from this district holding the opposite. E.g., Lee v. Bay, LLC, 2023 WL 1971209 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2023). We are asked to pick a side in this ongoing debate.^[1]

Because this opinion discusses three tiers of discrimination laws and investigative authorities with analogous functions and similar names, here is a brief glossary before we move on to the analysis:

• Title VII: The federal employment law that prohibits discrimination.

• EEOC: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency that investigates Title VII violations.

• PHRA: Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pennsylvania's discrimination law, or in a sense Pennsylvania's version of Title VII.

• PHRC or PennHRC: Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the Pennsylvania agency that investigates violations of the PHRA.

• PFPO: Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, Philadelphia's discrimination law, or in a sense, Philadelphia's version of Title VII.

• PCHR or PhilaCHR: Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, the Philadelphia agency that investigates violations of the PFPO.

II. Analysis

Leave to amend should be freely given, but we may deny an amendment that is futile because it would not survive a motion to dismiss. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). Our analysis is essentially the same as it would be for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Holst v. Oxman, 290 Fed.Appx. 508, 510 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, the only question is whether Ms. Mouzone may pursue a claim under the PFPO without having filed a charge with the PhilaCHR.

The decisions that address this question frame it as whether relief is available under the PFPO only where the plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the PhilaCHR. Courts have long held that as a matter of “judicial administration . . . no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). The decisions that Ms. Mouzone relies on tend to find that the purposes of an exhaustion requirement are generally satisfied by litigants who file a charge at the EEOC and/or PennHRC, because “[t]hese purposes seem equally likely to be achieved when a complainant files a complaint with the PHRC and/or EEOC as when they file with the Philadelphia Commission.” Higgins, 2023 WL 5309893, at *7; see also Ives v. NHS Hum. Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4039644, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2016); Vandegrift v. City of Philadelphia, 228 F.Supp.3d 464, 482 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

And that's probably true. But, as Higgins recognized, the gating question is whether PFPO on its face has a charge-filing requirement as a precondition for bringing a claim in court.^[2]Higgins, 2023 WL 5309893, at *5. Several decisions in this district have held that the plain language of the PFPO requires exhaustion of administrative remedies without too much explanation. See Lee, 2023 WL 1971209, at *3 (citing Phila. Code § 9-1112(1)) (“The PFPO imposes an administrative exhaustion that requires potential plaintiffs to file a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations before filing a lawsuit.”)^[3]; Smith v. RB Distrib., Inc., 498 F.Supp.3d 645, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Phila. Code § 9-1122) ([P]laintiffs may only exercise a private right of action after invoking the Commission's procedures and receiving notice from the Commission.”); Peterkin v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 2021 WL 2400753, at *21 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2021) (citing Phila. Code § 9-1122(1)) (“The PFPO also requires Ms. Peterkin to obtain notice from the Commission before filing an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.”). We agree with the result of those decisions, but recently, the decision in Higgins put Phila. Code § 9-1122(1) under the microscope and concluded that Lee, Smith, and Peterkin were wrong. See also Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F.Supp.3d 663, 667-68 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“The PFPO statute does not explicitly indicate that a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies to bring suit.”). So our conclusion bears some explanation.

The debated ordinance provision is under the heading “Private Right of Action” and reads as follows:

(1) If a complainant invokes the procedures set forth in this Chapter, that person's right of action in the courts of the Commonwealth shall not be foreclosed. If within one (1) year after the filing of a complaint with the Commission, the Commission dismisses the complaint or has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party, the Commission must so notify the complainant. On receipt of such a notice the complainant may bring an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County based on the right to freedom from discrimination granted by this Chapter.

(2) An action under this Section shall be filed within two years after the date of notice from the Commission closing the case. Any action so filed shall be served on the Commission at the time the complaint is filed in court. The Commission shall notify the complainant of this requirement.

(3) The court may grant any relief it deems appropriate, including the right to recover for each violation:

(a) Compensatory damages;

(b) Punitive damages;

(c) Reasonable attorneys' fees;

(d) Court costs; and

(e) Such other relief, including injunctive relief, as the court may deem appropriate.

(4) Nothing in this Chapter limits the right of an injured person to recover damages under any other applicable law or legal theory.

Phila. Code § 9-1122 (emphasis added). Section 9-1122 is dispositive of the issue presented here because it defines who may bring suit under the PFPO. This section creates the private right of action, and the action exists under the terms dictated by the PFPO. Cf. Alexander v Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (explaining how causes of action are created by statute).^[4]And in creating that private right of action, the PFPO defines the action as available only to a person who satisfies the key claim-processing rules: first, the complainant has to file a complaint with the Commission; then, unless there is conciliation, the complainant must receive appropriate notice from the Commission; finally, after notice, but within two years, the complainant may file claims in court under the PFPO.^[5]Id. If a complainant has not processed her claim in the manner set forth by § 9-1122 - e.g., by not filing a charge, by not waiting for the notice letter, or by waiting more than two years after the notice letter - then she is not a person entitled to the private...