Moye v. Saul

DEMETRIA YOLANDA MOYE, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL,¹ Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

CASE NO. 19-CV-60332-VALLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

March 24, 2020

CONSENT CASE

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Demetria Yolanda Moye's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security Administration's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 20, 22, respectively) (together "the Motions"). Pursuant to the parties' consent, this case is before the undersigned for all proceedings, including trial and entry of final judgment. (ECF Nos. 15, 16); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Accordingly, after due consideration of the record, the Motions, Defendant's Response (ECF No. 23), Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 25), and being otherwise fully advised on the matter, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED, and the Administrative Law Judge's Decision ("ALJ's Decision") is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth below.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit initially involved applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (the "Act"). Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of July 2, 2015. (R. 204).² Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (R. 88-111, 112-37). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on January 3, 2018 before ALJ Rosanna D'Alessio. (R. 67-87, 159). Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a Vocational Expert both testified at the hearing. On April 20, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application and finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act.³ (R. 11-26).

Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's Decision the Commissioner's "final decision." (R. 1-7); see Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's Decision. (ECF No. 1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both parties have moved for summary judgment, and the Motions are ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the ALJ's Decision is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the ALJ's finding and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in making her determination. Carson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 863, 864(11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Carson, 440 F. App'x at 864 (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)); accord Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance") (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). A court, however, "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). Even if evidence preponderates against the ALJ's Decision, a court must affirm "if the decision is supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Within this narrow role, however, courts "do not act as automatons." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986); Brightmon v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 743 F. App'x 347, 351 (11th Cir. 2018). Rather, courts "must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053 (citing Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239); Brightmon, 743 F. App'x at 351 (citation omitted).

To qualify for benefits, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (standard for DIB), 1382 (standard for SSI). A claimant is disabled if she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A "physical or mental impairment" is one that "results from anatomical,physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

To determine eligibility, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person's impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart. P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings")?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding of disability. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). A negative answer to any question, other than Step 3, leads to a determination of "not disabled." Id.

Importantly, the burden of proof rests on the claimant through Step 4. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 n.10. At Step 4, the ALJ must consider: (i) the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"); and (ii) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The ALJ will "assess and make a finding about [the claimant's RFC] on all the relevant medical and other evidence" in the case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC assessment is used to determine whether the claimant can return to her past relevant work under Step 4, and if so, "the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled." Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238 (citations omitted). If a claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, then the ALJ proceeds to Step 5. Id.

At Step 5, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant "can make an adjustment to other work." 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). The ALJ must determine if there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. If the claimant can make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is not disabled. Id. Conversely, if the claimant cannot make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is disabled. Id. The ALJ may determine whether the claimant can adjust to other work in the national economy by either: (1) applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (contained within 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2); or (2) using a Vocational Expert, who can opine on whether someone with the claimant's limitations can obtain employment in the national economy. Id. at 1239-40.

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

A. Claimant's Background and Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff, born in July 1969, was 48 years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (R. 67, 201). She has a twelfth-grade education and lives with her daughter, niece, and nephews. (R. 71-72). Plaintiff worked as a telemarketer, cashier, and cook. (R. 73-75, 85).

Plaintiff testified about her impairments. Plaintiff testified that in December 2014, she was hit by a car and injured her left ankle. (R. 76). As a result, Plaintiff's left foot swells, but she has not received any treatment for this. (R. 76-77). Plaintiff also suffers from multiple sclerosis ("MS"), which has affected her ability to speak and walk. (R. 77-78). Plaintiff uses a cane, which was not prescribed by a doctor, to help with her MS. (R. 77, 84). Plaintiff uses the cane every day and can walk for about five minutes before having to stop due to left leg pain. (R. 78-79). Plaintiff testified that she can stand for approximately five minutes, sit for 30-45 minutes, and lift five to ten pounds. (R. 79-80). Plaintiff's MS affects her ability to dress herself, bathe, and grasp objects.(R. 78). Plaintiff's MS is treated with an injection, but she could not recall the name of the medication. (R. 86).

Plaintiff testified that she has chest pain every day, and she must sit down when she is in pain. (R. 81-82). Other than her chest pain, Plaintiff does not have any other pain in her body. (R. 82). Furthermore, Plaintiff's diabetes is asymptomatic and under control. (R. 81).

Plaintiff's daily activities include eating, taking her medicines, and watching television. (R. 80). Plaintiff sleeps about five hours in a typical night. (R. 80-81). Plaintiff cannot sweep or mop the floor for more than five minutes because she tires quickly. (R. 81). Plaintiff testified that she has trouble with her concentration and memory, and has no hobbies or social activities. (R. 82-83).

During the hearing, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's counsel's request that the ALJ subpoena records from Broward Health. (R. 83). The ALJ indicated that she would try to obtain these records without a subpoena. (R. 83-84). Plaintiff's counsel advised the ALJ that the Broward Health records dealt with a two or three-night inpatient stay for breathing trouble. (R. 83, 86).

B. Vocational Expert's Testimony

A Vocational Expert ("VE") testified at the hearing and...