Mucha v. Wagner

378 N.C. 167

861 S.E.2d 501

Marisa MUCHA

v.Logan WAGNER

No. 307PA20

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed August 13, 2021

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by Erik R. Zimmerman, Andrew R. Wagner, Chapel Hill, and Jazzmin M. Romero, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.

Parrott Law, PLLC, by Robert J. Parrott Jr., for defendant-appellant.

EARLS, Justice.

¶ 1 Before the advent of mobile telephone technology and before call forwarding was available, a person making a telephone call would know the approximate physical location of anyone who answered the phone based on the area code and prefix of the telephone number they dialed. However, the number of landlines is rapidly dwindling, and a person's phone number alone no longer provides a reliable indication of that person's location.¹ As a result, it is important to determine whether, and under what circumstances, a telephone call to a cell phone can subject the caller to personal jurisdiction in the state where the phone happens to be when it is answered.

¶ 2 Specifically, in this case, we examine whether the District Court, Wake County, could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Logan Wagner, in a proceeding initiated by the plaintiff, Marisa Mucha, who was seeking to obtain a domestic violence protection order (DVPO). The only contact Wagner had with North Carolina was a series of phone calls he made to Mucha's cell phone on the day she moved to the State. We conclude that Wagner did not have the requisite minimum contacts with North Carolina because he did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of North Carolina's laws. Therefore, we hold that the trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Wagner consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision to exercise jurisdiction, and we vacate the trial court's order for lack of personal jurisdiction over Wagner.

I. Factual Background

¶ 3 Wagner and Mucha were previously in a romantic relationship for some time. After the relationship ended, Mucha—who was attending college in South Carolina—told Wagner—who lived in Connecticut—never to contact her again. Wagner did not abide by Mucha's request. While Mucha was living in South Carolina, Wagner sent her a letter and a text message. His unwelcome efforts to reach Mucha culminated on 15 May 2018. That afternoon, unbeknownst to Wagner, Mucha moved from South Carolina to North Carolina after finishing her college semester. That evening, Mucha received twenty-eight phone calls from an unknown number. When she answered one of the calls, Wagner identified himself, and Mucha hung up. Wagner kept calling. Mucha picked up again and told Wagner to stop. Wagner left a voice message. When Mucha listened to the message, she suffered a panic attack. The next day, she filed a pro se complaint and motion for a DVPO in District Court, Wake County.

¶ 4 Wagner's attorney entered a limited appearance for the purposes of contesting the trial court's personal jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss. According to Wagner, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over him because he neither "affirmatively direct[ed] any phone calls [to] North Carolina" nor "purposefully avail[ed] himself of any protections of the State."² Wagner contended that because he did not know or have any reason to know Mucha would be located in North Carolina when he called her, he lacked "fair warning that he might be required to defend himself there."

¶ 5 The trial court denied Wagner's motion to dismiss and, after a hearing during which Mucha and two witnesses testified, entered a DVPO. Wagner appealed solely the trial court's order finding personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. According to the Court of Appeals, because Wagner "knew that [Mucha's] semester of college had ended and she may no longer be residing [in South Carolina] ... his conduct—purposefully directed at Mucha—was sufficient for him to reasonably anticipate being haled into court wherever Mucha resided when she received the calls." Mucha v. Wagner , 271 N.C. App. 636, 637–38, 845 S.E.2d 443 (2020).

II. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis

¶ 6 The reason Wagner's phone calls to Mucha brought him into contact with North Carolina is because Mucha had traveled here, just hours before Wagner made the calls to her cell phone. Although Wagner may have known or had reason to know that Mucha would be leaving South Carolina at the end of her semester, there is nothing in the record to support the inference that Wagner knew or had any reason to know that Mucha was present in North Carolina.³ Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored this distinction. In doing so, the courts below failed to adhere to the fundamental due-process principle that there is no personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has not initiated "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

¶ 7 In examining a defendant's connection to the forum state, the Due Process Clause "requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis." J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 884, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011). Here, Wagner's only connection with the State of North Carolina resulted from "random, isolated, or fortuitous" events. Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc. , 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). Under these circumstances, the Due Process Clause does not permit a North Carolina court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Wagner.

A. Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause

¶ 8 "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant." Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021). "The primary concern of the Due Process Clause as it relates to a court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is the protection of ‘an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.’ "

Beem USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P'ship v. Grax Consulting LLC , 373 N.C. 297, 302, 838 S.E.2d 158 (2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 471–72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ).

¶ 9 In order for a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state⁴ and who is not present in the forum state, the defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) ). Although this canonical formulation has been tested over the years, the United States Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that the due process inquiry is "focused on the nature and extent of ‘the defendant's relationship to the forum State.’ " Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (emphasis added) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) ). Courts must not "improperly attribute a plaintiff's forum connections to the defendant and make those connections decisive in the jurisdictional analysis." Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 289, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (quoting Rush v. Savchuk , 444 U.S. 320, 332, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980) ).

¶ 10 To ascertain whether a defendant's contacts are of the frequency and kind necessary to surpass the "minimum contacts" threshold, courts must first examine whether the defendant has taken "some act by which [he or she] purposefully avails [himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). To establish that a defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of the benefits and protections of the laws of a forum state, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant "deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship centered there." Ford Motor Co. , 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (second alteration in original) (quoting Walden , 571 U.S. at 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115 ). The focus on the defendant's conduct reflects one of the core concerns underpinning personal jurisdiction doctrine and the Due Process Clause, "treating defendants fairly." Id. at 1025. Due process requires "that individuals have fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," so that they may "structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (cleaned up) (first quoting Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) ; then quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ).

¶ 11 Under the "purposeful availment" test, the absence of any evidence suggesting Wagner had any reason to know Mucha was in North Carolina at the time he called her is dispositive. In prior cases where this Court has found a defendant's one-time contacts sufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that by undertaking some action, the defendant was establishing a connection with the State of North Carolina. This...