Mueller v. Department of Public Safety

595 F.Supp.3d 920

Elizabeth A. MUELLER, Plaintiff,

v.State of Hawaii DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; Freddie Carabbacan; Nolan Espinda, Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 17-00571 HG-WRP

United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.

Signed March 31, 2022

Kelly Anne Higa Brown, Margery S. Bronster, Lanson K. Kupau, Noelle Emi Chan, Sasha A. Hamada, Bronster Fujichaku Robbins, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff.

David N. Matsumiya, Marie Manuele Gavigan, Caron M. Inagaki, Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety, Nolan Espinda.

Marie Manuele Gavigan, Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant Freddie Carabbacan.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59(a) AND/OR REMITTITUR AND RELIEF UNDER RULE 59(e) (ECF No. 514)

Helen Gillmor, United States District Judge

On November 12, 2021, following a seven-day trial, the jury returned a split verdict. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff Elizabeth Mueller against Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety and Defendant Freddie Carabbacan. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant Nolan Espinda for the claims Plaintiff brought against him.

The jury awarded damages against Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety, as follows:

(1) Negligence against the Department of Public Safety with general damages in the amount of $1,000,000 ;

(2) Respondeat Superior against the Department of Public Safety, finding that Russell Ching, the supervisor of Defendant Freddie Carabbacan, negligently retained and supervised Carabbacan because Ching knew, or reasonably should have anticipated, that Defendant Carabbacan would commit an intentional tort against Plaintiff Mueller, and Ching was in a position to take reasonable precautions against the anticipated harm against Plaintiff but failed to do so, causing her harm in the amount of $2,000,000 ;

(3) Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress against the Department of Public Safety finding its negligent conduct caused Plaintiff serious emotional distress and a physical injury or mental illness for damages in the amount of $2,000,000 .

The jury awarded damages against Defendant Freddie Carabbacan in the amount of $2,050,000.

On November 15, 2021, Judgment was entered. (ECF No. 510).

On December 13, 2021, Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety filed a Motion for a New Trial Under Rule 59(a) and/or Remittitur and Relief Under Rule 59(e). (ECF No. 514).

On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (ECF No. 526).

On January 19, 2022, Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety filed its Reply. (ECF No. 534).

The Court elects to decide the matter without a hearing pursuant to District of Hawaii Local Rule 7.1(c).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 sets forth a basis to alter or amend a judgment or for the Court to order a new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), (e). Rule 59 does not specify the grounds for which a new trial may be ordered, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has outlined the grounds that have been "historically recognized." Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) ; see Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007).

The grounds on which a new trial may be granted include "claims that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving." Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (citation and internal quotations omitted). A new trial may also be ordered where the verdict "is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000).

The District Court "may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict" than the verdict returned by the jury. Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).

ANALYSIS

I. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) In General.

(1) Grounds for New Trial. The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues–and to any party–as follows:

(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court ....

(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.

The Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety moves for a new trial or to amend the Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and 59(e).

The State argues that a new trial, or an amended Judgment, is necessary on two grounds.

First, the State argues the jury's verdict against it was excessive.

Second, the State argues that it was unable to obtain a fair trial.

The Court does not find the arguments persuasive. Neither of the State's arguments support ordering a new trial or amending the Judgment in this case.

II. Defendant State Of Hawaii Challenges The Jury Verdict On The Grounds That It Was Excessive

A. The Court Applies Federal Law To Procedural Questions

On November 22, 2017, the State removed Plaintiff's Complaint from Hawaii State Court to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1). The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceedings based on Plaintiff's federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern actions in federal court, regardless of the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Moore's Fed. Prac. § 59.03 (3d ed.).

Here, the State moves for a new trial or amended Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 is a procedural rule and is applicable in all federal cases.

B. The Court Applies Hawaii Law To Evaluate The Substance Of Defendant's Rule 59 Motion Challenging The Jury's Damages Award

The substance of a Rule 59 challenge may require application of state law in limited instances. A federal district court applies state law in evaluating a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 motion when a party argues that a jury's verdict on a state law claim is excessive. T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that review of the excessiveness of a jury's verdict on a state law claim is governed by the State's substantive law, but if excessiveness is found, it is federal law that determines if a new trial should be granted).

Here, the State's Rule 59 motion is based on the jury verdict's purportedly excessive damages award and the State seeks remittitur¹ .

Excessiveness of a verdict on a state law claim is determined pursuant to state law. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426-31, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) ; see also Mason and Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Intern. LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the court applies state substantive law to state law claims based on supplemental jurisdiction).

C. The Jury's Verdict Is Supported By The Clear Weight Of The Evidence

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States" except "according to the rules of the common law." The Court must accept any reasonable interpretation of the jury's verdict. Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that "a search for one possible view of the case which will make the jury's finding inconsistent results in a collision with the Seventh Amendment." Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962). The Court may only grant a new trial if the jury's verdict was against the "great weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result." EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). Evaluating a jury verdict for excessiveness is a case-specific endeavor but for which there is no specific formula. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). The trial court cannot substitute its evaluations for those of the jurors. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 331 F.3d 735, 743 (9th Cir. 2003).

The State argues that it disagrees with the jury's verdict in awarding damages to Plaintiff on the basis that the verdict was excessive.

The State asserts that the verdict was excessive on three bases: (1) it was not supported by evidence; (2) it was duplicative and inconsistent; and (3) it was impermissibly punitive and based on inappropriate argument.

1. The Evidence Clearly Supports The Jury Verdict

The evidence at trial demonstrated that the Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety knowingly allowed Defendant Deputy Sheriff Freddie Carabbacan, a male, to conduct strip searches of females in custody. The evidence also demonstrated that the Department of Public Safety did not employ any female sheriffs at the First Circuit Court Cellblock and did not assign any female sheriffs from other locations to conduct searches at the cellblock.

There was evidence presented that when a complaint was lodged against Carabbacan for conducting a strip search on a woman in the cellblock, the Department of Public Safety removed Carabbacan from his position in the cellblock. The Department, however, knowingly returned Carabbacan back to his position in the cellblock and allowed him to continue to conduct strip searches of females in custody. Two days after his reinstatement, he conducted the strip search of Plaintiff ...