Muhammad v. Jones

1

AKEEM MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULIE L. JONES, individual capacity, JOHNNY FRAMBO, in his official and individual capacity Florida Department of Corrections State Chaplain, SHANE PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CHIEF, BUREAU OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-12563

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

August 25, 2023

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00212-HLA-JBT

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Akeem Muhammad, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, against Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) and Florida State Prison (FSP) officials, alleging violations of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the RLUIPA. His claims centered around the timing and nutritional adequacy of meals and medication provided to inmates during Ramadan. He appeals the district court's orders: (1) granting in part the defendants' motion to dismiss; (2) entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his First Amendment and RLUIPA claims; and (3) denying his motion to reimburse service costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2). Although we partially affirm based on qualified immunity, we reverse and remand in part for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Muhammad has been a practicing Muslim since 1996. As part of his faith, he observes Ramadan, an annual month-long period of prayer and fasting. Muhammad believes he must abstain from consuming food, water, and medication during the day during Ramadan. Importantly for this case, Muhammad believes the fasting period begins at astronomical twilight, which precedes sunrise. He must consume a nutritionally adequate meatless, Kosher diet during two meals each day-one pre-fast meal before astronomical twilight and one post-fast meal after sunset. Muhammad also takes medication for several medical conditions, which is typically provided by prison officials in the morning after astronomical twilight and in the afternoon. He must take his medication in presence of medical staff, and his doctor will discontinue treatment if he refuses his medication for three days.

When Muhammad filed this prisoner civil rights action in February 2018, he was being detained at FSP. He alleged prison officials provided his pre-fast meal and medication before sunrise but not before astronomical twilight, leaving him to choose between his religious beliefs and receiving adequate nutrition and medical care. As a result, he stopped fasting 17 days into Ramadan in 2017 and has allegedly been unable to fast in the years since then. He alleged that his qualitative religious experience was destroyed, and he suffered serious physical injuries, including "exacerbated hypertension, exacerbated [Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS)], severe dehydration, severe physical pain, severe fatigue, and severe lethargy."

Muhammad sued four FSP employees in their official capacities: Food Service Director Jeffery Andrews; two vocational instructors, R. Davis and H. Sellers; and a correctional officer, A. McGregor. Muhammad also sued four FDOC employees in their official and individual capacities: Julie Jones, the FDOC's Secretary; Johnny Frambo, Chaplaincy Services Administrator; Shane Phillips, Chief of the Bureau of Contract Management and Monitoring; and Craig McCormick, Public Health Nutrition Program Manager. Three of the FDOC defendants were later substituted in their official capacities: Mark Inch for Jones; Angela Gaskins for Phillips; and Brenda Patterson for McCormick.

As for relief, Muhammad sought (1) an injunction against Jones in her official capacity only; (2) a declaratory judgment that Frambo, Phillips, McCormick, and the FSP defendants violated the RLUIPA in their official capacities; and (3) compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages from the original FDOC defendants in their individual capacities-Jones, Frambo, Phillips, and McCormick- for violating his First Amendment rights. Muhammad did not seek monetary damages under the RLUIPA, nor did he seek monetary damages against any defendant in an official capacity.

A month after filing the operative complaint, Muhammad informed the district court that he had been transferred from FSP to another state facility and conceded the transfer mooted his official capacity RLUIPA claims against the four FSP defendants- Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor. In response to that stipulation and the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims against Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor as moot. It also denied qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim, but it dismissed Muhammad's claim for compensatory damages based on the physical injury requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

The defendants answered, again asserting qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to all monetary damages, and moved for summary judgment.

In March 2022, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. It found they were entitled to qualified immunity as to nominal damages and that Muhammad was not entitled to recover punitive damages because it found the "Defendants' statements made under penalty of perjury to be more credible than Plaintiffs unsubstantiated claims that these Defendants 'maliciously participated' in refusing to accommodate his religious beliefs during Ramadan in 2017." With respect to the FDOC defendants on the RLUIPA claim, the district court concluded:

Statements made by the plaintiff are insufficient to establish that that plaintiff's religious practice has been substantially burdened.... Because Defendants have provided support that they made substantial efforts to accommodate Plaintiff's religious beliefs and Plaintiff has not met his burden to support that his religious exercise was substantially burdened-that his physical health was detrimentally affected by not being able to fast in the periods as required to observe Ram-adan-and having no material facts at issue, judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants.

After the court denied Muhammad's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the defendants moved for taxation of costs. Muhammad then appealed from the final judgment, and the district court stayed the costs motion pending the outcome of this ap-peal.^[1]

II. DISCUSSION

We take the following issues in turn: (1) whether Muhammad's transfer from FSP to a different Florida prison mooted his claims and, if not, whether the defendants' policies substantially burdened his religious exercise under the RLUIPA; (2) whether qualified immunity precluded Muhammad's First Amendment claim; and (3) whether Muhammad was entitled to reimbursement for service costs.^[2]

A. RLUIPA Claim for Prospective Relief

(i) Mootness

First, Muhammad contends his transfer from FSP did not moot his claims, and we agree to the extent he seeks prospective relief on the FDOC's statewide policies. "The general rule is that a prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief," even when "there is no assurance that he will not be returned to the jail." McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an inmate's claim was moot where he challenged "unconstitutional conditions in a single jail where [he] is no longer incarcerated"). But a transfer between state prisons does not moot a request for injunctive relief against the head of the state prison system. See Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 799-801 (5th Cir. 1975).^[3]

As Muhammad acknowledged in the district court, the claims against the FSP defendants were mooted by his transfer from FSP.^[4] See McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363. But injunctive relief can still be granted with respect to the FDOC defendants because an injunction against them would apply to any state prison in Florida. See Hardwick, 523 F.2d at 800-01. We read the district court's order to be consistent with this understanding. Because there is still a live controversy as to injunctive relief against the FDOC defendants, we turn to whether summary judgment was proper.

(ii) Summary Judgment Order

Muhammad argues that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the district court erred by finding the FDOC's refusal to accommodate his Ramadan beliefs did not place a substantial burden on his religious exercise. We agree.

The RLUIPA protects inmates "who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S 709, 710 (2005). "While the First Amendment requires only that prison restrictions be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015), "[t]he RLUIPA provides greater religious protection than the First Amendment," Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022).

To make a claim under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff must first show that a government rule, regulation, practice, or policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion. Id. If successful, it becomes the defendant's burden to show that the challenged directive is the "least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest." Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). A plaintiff's religious exercise is substantially burdened when the prison's policy makes him choose between violating that policy-and risk...