Muir v. Wasatch Front Waste & Recycling Dist.

547 P.3d 863

2024 UT App 48

Suzanne M. MUIR, Appellant,

v.WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT and Jason L. Gates, Appellees.

No. 20221054-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed April 4, 2024

Third District Court, West Jordan Department, The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, No. 220902274

Joshua P. Berrett, Attorney for Appellant

Gregory N. Hoole, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellees

Judge Gregory K. Orme authored this Opinion, in which Judges Ryan M. Harris and John D. Luthy concurred.

Opinion

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Suzanne M. Muir and Jason L. Gates were involved in a vehicular collision between Muir’s SUV and a garbage truck driven by Gates but owned by Wasatch Front Waste & Recycling District (Wasatch). Over two years after the collision, Muir filed suit against Wasatch and Gates alleging negligence on the part of Gates and vicarious liability on the part of Wasatch. She sought damages for her ongoing and future pain, suffering, and injuries. Wasatch and Gates filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Muir’s suit was untimely because it had been commenced after the two-year statute of limitations provided by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the GIA) had expired. The district court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶2 Muir now appeals, arguing that the court’s application of the GIA was incorrect She contends that her "notice" of Wasatch’s status as a governmental entity was not triggered until weeks after the collision occurred and, therefore, that the statute of limitations was tolled until such time as she "should have known" about Wasatch’s governmental status. Because the district court correctly applied the statute of limitations, we affirm.

BACKGROUND¹

¶3 On March 16, 2020, while driving her SUV, Muir was involved in a collision with a garbage truck driven by Gates.² Immediately following the collision, the drivers exchanged information, and each received a Driver Exchange of Information form from the police officer who responded to the scene. The information form specified that the garbage truck was owned by "WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLE" and insured through "GOVERNMENT TRUST." Within a few days, Muir retained counsel, and on March 20, 2020, counsel faxed a letter of representation and a request for confirmation of policies to Wasatch’s insurance carrier, identifying "Your Insured" as ‘WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT." On April 15, 2020, Muir received a response from the insurance carrier on the letterhead of "Constitutional State Services, TPA³ For Utah Local Governments Trust." There, the matter sat for many months, and then on March 3, 2021, Muir filed a notice of claim consistent with the requirements of the GIA. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-7-401, -402 (LexisNexis 2019 & Supp. 2023).

¶4 On April 12, 2022, Muir filed her complaint against Gates and Wasatch, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Muir’s complaint was untimely and should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," see Utah R. Civ. P 12(b)(6), because the suit was commenced after the two-year statute of limitations specified by the GIA had expired, see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023).⁴ The defendants contended that a claim governed by the GIA arises "when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run," see id. § 63G-7-401(1)(a), but acknowledged that the statute of limitations may be tolled until such time as "a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known: (i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or the governmental entity’s employee; and (ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee," id. § 63G-7-401(1)(b). Quoting our Supreme Court’s decision in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156, the defendants asserted that "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the [GIA]," id. ¶ 12, and that a plaintiff's "failure to comply … requires a trial court to dismiss a complaint," id. ¶ 16.

¶5 Muir opposed the motion to dismiss. She principally contended that her complaint was timely because she "lacked notice—actual, constructive, or inquiry—that Wasatch … was a governmental entity" and under the GIA, the two-year statute of limitations may be tolled until such time as she "knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known," that she had a claim against a governmental entity and the identity of the governmental entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(1)(b).

¶6 Muir argued that the defendants "failed to show" how she should have known about Wasatch’s status as a governmental entity earlier.⁵ She further asserted that, following the collision, she had diligently tried to iden- tify Wasatch’s status. She contended that her research, which included Wasatch’s corporate webpage, multiple web searches, and multiple police reports, did not point her to anything suggesting that Wasatch was a governmental entity. To the contrary, she argued, Wasatch’s website included the top-level domain designation of ".org," which she argued was more indicative of a private entity—as opposed to the ".gov" designation, which would be more clearly indicative of a governmental entity. Based on her research, Muir contended that there were no practical indications that she "should have known" that Wasatch was a governmental entity or that her claim fell under the GIA until April 15, 2020, when she received the insurance carrier’s letter on the letterhead of "Constitutional State Services, TPA For Utah Local Governments Trust." She contended that this case should be distinguished from Amundsen v. University of Utah, 2019 UT 49, 448 P.3d 1224, in which our Supreme Court held that there were numerous clear indicators that a physician working at a University of Utah clinic was working for a governmental entity. See id. ¶ 35. She asserted that before receiving the letter on April 15, 2020, any information she had been given or had obtained was insufficient to put her on inquiry notice regarding Wasatch’s status and the applicability of the GIA’s abbreviated statute of limitations.

¶7 Muir also argued that "the question of when a plaintiff knew or should have known sufficient facts to trigger a statute of limitations presents a classic factual dispute that should be resolved by the finder of fact." See Arnold v. Grigsby, 2010 UT App 226, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 294 (quotation simplified), aff'd on other grounds, 2012 UT 61, 289 P.3d 449. But she recognized that "[w]here the evidence is so clear that there is no genuine factual issue, … the determination can be made as a matter of law."

¶8 In its reply, the defendants made two arguments. First, they argued that Muir bore the burden to show reasonable diligence because the GIA plainly indicates that "[t]he burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant" Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(1)(c). Second, they asserted Muir had actual or, at the very least inquiry notice of Wasatch’s status because the information form provided to Muir on the very date of the collision, March 16, 2020, clearly showed that Wasatch owned the garbage truck and that it was insured by "GOVERNMENT TRUST." Additionally, the defendants pointed to the letter Muir sent to Wasatch’s insurance carrier on March 20, 2020, that listed Wasatch’s full name as "WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT," with the "district" reference further demonstrating that Muir "knew" or "should have known" that she was "dealing with a government district." Thus, the defendants argued, the information possessed by Muir "would have removed any doubt" about Wasatch’s status or, at the very least, triggered a duty of inquiry that could have easily been satisfied with a simple phone call on March 20, 2022, or a day or two thereafter. The defendants argued that based on the information form and the insurance letter, "no reasonable juror could conclude that [Muir] did not have either actual notice or inquiry notice" and, thus, no genuine issue of fact precluded dismissal.

¶9 The district court heard argument on the motion to dismiss. The parties’ arguments were consistent with their written submissions. Ruling from the bench and later memorializing its ruling in a written order, the court concluded that the defendants’ arguments were "well placed and well taken," and the court dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶10 Muir appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] ¶11 Muir contends that the district court incorrectly determined that she "knew" or "should have known" that Wasatch was a governmental entity before April 12, 2020—the date two years before she filed her complaint—and, therefore, that the court erred in dismissing her complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The propriety of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." HKS Architects Inc. v. MSM Enters. LTD, 2021 UT App 70, ¶ 17, 496 P.3d 228 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, "we accept all facts alleged as true, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (quotation simplified).⁶ Such a motion should be granted "only when, assuming the truth of the allegations that a party has made and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to that party, it is clear that the party is not entitled to relief." Calsert v. Estate of Flores, 2020 UT App 102, ¶ 9, 470 P.3d 464 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶12 The question before us is whether the court correctly determined that Muir’s complaint was untimely. This question turns on whether Muir exercised reasonable diligence in inquiring into Wasatch’s governmental status, given her early knowledge that Wasatch...