Mullholland v. Hoffman

1

PAUL MULLHOLLAND, Plaintiff, v. NATE HOFFMAN et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-338

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 23, 2023

OPINION

SALLY J. BERENS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No 5.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may at any time, with or without motion, add or drop a party for misjoinder or nonjoinder. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. Applying Rules 18, 20, and 21 regarding joinder, the Court will drop Defendants Unknown Burgess, J. Erway, Unknown Montague, Unknown Majerczyk, and Unknown Clouse, and dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice.

With regard to the Defendants and claims that remain, under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against remaining Defendants Unknown Hoffman, Unknown Miller, Unknown Horrocks, John Gibson, Thomas Perttu, and the Michigan Parole Board for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

T. Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility and the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan.

Plaintiff sues the MDOC Parole Board. He also sues the following personnel from AMF: Deputy Warden Unknown Hoffman; Residential Unit Managers Unknown Miller and Thomas Perttu; Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Horrocks; and Prisoner Counselor John Gibson (collectively, the AMF Defendants). Plaintiff sues the following personnel from ECF: Warden Unknown Burgess; Assistant Deputy Wardens J. Erway and Unknown Clouse; Residential Unit Manager Unknown Montague; and Unit Chief Unknown Majerczyk (collectively the ECF Defendants).

A. The Parole Board and the AMF Defendants (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gibson informed Plaintiff that Gibson, the other AMF Defendants, and the Parole Board were considering giving Plaintiff a parole. But Plaintiff did not want to be released on parole. He reports that he will “max out” on October 30, 2023, and he would like to return to Chicago. He does not believe that would be possible if he is paroled. Plaintiff's complaint suggests that a parole would result in conditions and supervision to which he would not be subject if he were simply discharged after serving his maximum sentence.

Plaintiff told Gibson that Plaintiff did not want to be paroled. The Parole Board and the AMF Defendants, apparently collectively, attempted to convince Plaintiff to take the parole. Plaintiff declined. Defendants paroled him anyway. Plaintiff claims that granting parole without notice and a hearing violated his due process rights.

On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to ECF to participate in the “Start Now” program. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff claims that the transfer was a retaliatory act by “defendants,” presumably the Parole Board and the AMF Defendants.

B. The ECF Defendants (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4)

Plaintiff refused to participate in the Start program. He was written a ticket for disobeying a direct order. He was found guilty and was sanctioned with 10 days loss of privileges.

Plaintiff is apparently now participating in the Start program. He contends it is unconstitutional. Plaintiff reports that he is not being permitted to participate in group counseling, which is required if he is to move forward in-or perhaps out of-the program. Plaintiff has asked for a work assignment to alleviate the boredom of being cell-bound for 22 hours per day. He has apparently been offered work, but not for monetary compensation. Instead he would be paid by food trays and extra time out of his cell.

Plaintiff reports that he should not be compelled to participate in the Start program because he is not mentally ill. He also complains that the conditions in the program amount to cruel and unusual punishment.

Plaintiff asks the Court for an unspecified declaratory ruling and for $1,600,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.

IT. Misjoinder

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in a single lawsuit, whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Rule 20(a)(2) governs when multiple defendants may be joined in one action: “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Rule 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”

Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:

Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18....

Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all.

7 Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1655 (3d ed. 2001) quoted in Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009), and Garcia v. Munoz, No. 08-1648, 2008 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2008); see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965) (discussing that joinder...