Mullins v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co.

LEONARD MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. HARCO NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:19cv573

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

September 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on two motions:

(1) Defendant Harco National Insurance Company's ("Harco") Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 14); and,

(2) Plaintiff Leonard Mullins' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 16).

Harco and Mullins filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.¹ Harco and Mullins each responded to the Cross-Motions. (ECF Nos. 19, 20.) These matters are ripe for disposition.

The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).² For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Harco's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Mullins's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Mullins brings this single count complaint for breach of contract against Harco seeking coverage under a motor vehicle insurance policy for injuries sustained during a physical altercation at a fueling station in West Point, Virginia on June 11, 2015.

A. Factual Background³

Harco is an Illinois-based insurance company which issued Commercial Package Policy Number CP 00171004 to Evelyn Logging, Inc. ("Evelyn Logging"). On June 11, 2015, the date of the underlying incident, Evelyn Loggings employed Mullins. (Stip. Facts ¶ 3.)

1. The Physical Altercation on June 11, 2015

On June 11, 2015 at 4:47 a.m., while in the scope of his employment for Evelyn Logging, Mullins arrived at a Milby Oil station in West Point, Virginia and began refueling his commercial Evelyn Logging truck with two fuel pumps. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7; Milby Oil Security Footage Ex. A 4:47:00 a.m.) Shortly thereafter, the security footage shows that at 4:50:30 a.m., Charles Alan Webb, a trucker employed by C.P. Anderson Trucking, Inc., and in the scope of his employment, arrived at the same Milby Oil station and exited his C.P. Anderson truck. (Stip. Facts ¶¶ 4, 6; Milby Oil Security Footage Ex B. 4:50:30 a.m.) "A conversation immediately ensued between Webb and Mullins in which Webb confronted Mullins about the manner in which he was fueling his vehicle." (Stip. Facts ¶ 8.) After "Mullins informed Webb that he was using both fuel pumps," Webb requested that Mullins "shut one of them off so Webb could add fuel to his vehicle." (Id. ¶ 9.) "Mullins went to the other side of his vehicle, and while Mullins was getting ready to shut off one of the fuel pumps, Webb confronted him about how long he was taking to finish fueling." (Id. ¶ 10.) The security footage shows that Webb did not reenter his truck for several minutes. (Milby Oil Security Footage.)

At 4:53:35 a.m., Webb opened the driver's side door of his vehicle to retrieve an item and then immediately closed the driver's side door. (Id.) "At approximately 4:54 a.m., Webb and Mullins encountered each other again, in the vicinity of the pumps, as Mullins was about to finish fueling his truck and retrieve his receipt." (Stip. Facts ¶ 11.) Moments later, at 4:54:19 a.m. "[t]he dispute between Webb and Mullins developed into a physical altercation, whereby Webb punched Mullins and threw him to the ground." (Id. ¶ 12.) The security footage shows that Webb, during the course of the roughly ten second physical altercation, threw Mullins to the ground further away from Webb's C.P. Anderson vehicle—which remained parked nearby. (Milby Oil Security Footage Ex. B 4:54:19-4:54:29.) As a result of the altercation, Mullins suffered injuries. (Stip. Facts ¶ 15.) Mullins seeks UM coverage from Harco in this action.

2. The Underlying Lawsuit in Virginia State Court

On June 7, 2017, Mullins filed suit against Webb in the Circuit Court for King William County, Virginia (the "King William Circuit Court"). (Stip. Facts ¶ 19.) On December 27, 2018, after a jury trial, the King William Circuit Court entered a judgment "in favor of Mullins and against Webb in the amount of $1,250,000 for injuries arising from the incident" (the "Judgment"). (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) The Judgment against Webb is final. (Id. ¶ 21.) No liability insurance is available to pay for the judgment, and despite Mullins's request, Webb "has not paid any portion of it." (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) Harco, as the insurer for Evelyn Logging, declined to participate in the underlying lawsuit in King William Circuit Court. (Id. ¶ 25.)

3. The Pertinent Policy Provisions

Harco issued Commercial Package Policy Number CP 00171004 to Evelyn Logging for the policy period of July 10, 2014 to July 10, 2015 (the "Policy"). (Stip. Facts ¶ 1; Compl. Ex. A "Policy," ECF No. 1-2.) At all times relevant to the underlying events, Harco provided insurance under the Policy to Evelyn Logging. The Policy provides that Harco "will pay all sums an 'insured' legally must pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies, caused by an 'accident' and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered 'auto.'" (Policy 26.) The Policy further states that coverage applies to "'bodily injury'" to "[a]n 'employee' of the 'insured' arising out of and in the course of: (1) Employment by the 'insured', or (2) Performing the duties related to the conduct of the 'insured's' business." (Id. 28.)

The Policy includes a "Commercial Automobile Coverage Part" that contains an "Uninsured Motorists Endorsement (Virginia)" providing uninsured motor vehicle insurance with a limit of $1,000,000 (the "UM Coverage"). (Id. 69, 70, 74.) The UM Coverage provision states that "'We' will pay in accordance with the Virginia Uninsured Motorists Law, all sums the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an 'uninsured motor vehicle.'" (Id. 70.) The UM Coverage states, under the section "Words And Phrases With Special Meaning," that:

The following words and phrases have special meaning throughout this endorsement and appear in quotation marks when used:

* * *

8. 'Insured' means any person or organization qualifying as an Insured in the Who Is An Insured section of this endorsement, including the personal representative of any insured. Except with respect to 'our' Limit Of Liability, the insurance afforded applies separately to each insured who is seeking coverage under this endorsement.

* * *

11. 'Occupying' means in, upon, using, getting in, on, out of or off.

* * *

14. 'Uninsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle

a. For which

1. There is no 'bodily injury' liability insurance and 'property damage' liability insurance . . . .

2. There is such insurance but the insurer writing the insurance denies coverage for any reason whatsoever . . . .

(Id. 69-70 (emphases added).)

The Policy states, under the section "We Will Pay" that "'We' will pay in accordance with the Virginia Uninsured Motorists Law, all sums the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an 'uninsured motor vehicle.'" (Id. 70.) The Policy defines an Insured as "[a]nyone else 'occupying' a 'covered auto.'" (Id.)

B. Procedural History

On August 9, 2019, Mullins filed his Complaint, asking the Court to find that Harco breached its contractual obligations to Mullins—as an employee of Evelyn Logging—and seeking benefits under the Policy in the amount of $1,000,000.00. (See Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.) After an Initial Pretrial Conference, the Court set a briefing schedule, (ECF No. 11), and the Parties filed their Stipulation of Undisputed Facts and Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Harco's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Mullins's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. Standards of Review

A. Rule 56: Summary Judgment

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate only when the Court, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-50.

"A fact is material if the existence or non-existence thereof could lead a [finder of fact] to different resolutions of the case." Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 193 F. Supp. 3d 623, 628 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248). Once a party has properly filed evidence supporting its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts illustrating genuine issues for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. The parties must present these in the form of exhibits and sworn affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A court views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. Whether an inference is reasonable must be considered in conjunction with competing inferences to the contrary. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cty., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, the nonmoving "party is entitled 'to have the credibility of his [or her] evidence as forecast assumed.'" Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)).

In the end, the nonmoving party must do more than present a scintilla of evidence in its favor. Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 818. Because the parties have provided the Court with stipulated facts and video footage of the incident, (see Stipulation of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 13), the Court relies on those agreed upon facts in resolving the Cross-Motions and reads them favorably to the nonmoving side.

B. Insurance Contract Interpretation Under Virginia Law

As with...