Mullins v. Mayor

JIMMY MULLINS, Plaintiff, v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, Defendant.

Case No. TJS-14-2698

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

August 11, 2016

MEMORANDUM

Jimmy Mullins ("Mullins") filed this lawsuit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the City") for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Mullins claims the City wrongfully excluded him from overtime work because of his disability. He also claims that the City failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Presently pending are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 34 & 40.) Having considered the submissions of the parties, I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the City's motion will be granted as to Mullins' claims arising before January 1, 2009, but denied in all other respects. Mullins' motion will be denied in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are not in dispute. Mullins has been employed by the City as an "auto body and fender repairer" since April 1998. (ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 1.) In March 2000, he injured his right knee and has since undergone several surgeries to his knee. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.) After injuring his knee, Mullins has been restricted from climbing ladders and from lifting over 75 pounds.¹ (Id.) On August 22, 2008, Mullins' supervisor, Robert Brown, told him that he could no longer work overtime because of his medical restrictions. (Id. ¶ 10.) Brown's instruction was apparently based on a memo from the City to the Fleet Management Division dated November 18, 1997. (ECF Nos. 39-1 at 10-11 & 39-13.) This memo states that employees within the Fleet Management Division may not "work overtime while on restricted duty." (Id.) Following his supervisor's instructions, Mullins stopped working overtime as of August 22, 2008, but continued to perform his usual work on a full-time basis during regular hours. (ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 11.) Mullins' supervisors had no complaints about his work. (ECF Nos. 39-9 at 16 & 39-10 at 23.)

On January 20, 2009, Mullins met with the City's Labor Commissioner and other officials employed by the City to request that he be permitted to work overtime, as he had done before August 22, 2008. (ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 12.) On that same day, Mullins met with the City's Human Resource Administrator, Regina Grande-Brown, to repeat his request. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mullins explained that, in his view, he had always been able to perform his work during overtime hours without difficulty. (Id.) As a result of his request to work overtime, the City directed Mullins to undergo a medical evaluation to determine whether he was fit for duty. (Id. ¶ 14.) The examination took place on April 12, 2010. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Mullins received a letter dated April 28, 2010 from the City regarding the results of his medical evaluation. (Id. ¶ 15.) In the letter, the City informed Mullins that he was "unable to perform all of the essential functions of [his] position." (ECF No. 39-6 at 1.) The letter went on to explain that the City did not "provide restricted or light duty assignments on a permanent basis," and provided Mullins with several options for "resolv[ing] [his] work status." (Id.) Theseoptions included applying for disability or retirement benefits, seeking alternative employment, providing "reasonable worksite modifications," resigning, and contesting the medical determination. (Id.) The letter warned Mullins that if he did not respond to the City by May 12, 2010, he would be "recommended for termination." (Id. at 2.)

Mullins responded to the letter on May 3, 2010.² (ECF No. 39-7.) He stated that, although his preference was for retirement, if retirement was not possible, he would "provide a worksite modification" that would allow him "to perform all essential functions." (Id.) Later that month,³ Mullins requested that he be permitted "to use one of two mechanical lifts, that were available [at his worksite], in order to work on top of dump trucks, when necessary."⁴ (ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 26.)

Additional facts will be supplied below.

II. ANALYSIS

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing predecessor to current Rule 56(a)). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of the party opposingthe motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented and summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] position" is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. "When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, [courts] consider each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law." Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 636-37 (4th Cir. 2007). "The court must deny both motions if it finds that there is a genuine dispute of material fact, but if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment." Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc'ns., LLC, 95 F. Supp. 3d 860, 869 (D. Md. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008). A party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but instead must, by affidavit or other evidentiary showing, set out specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Supporting and opposing affidavits are to be made on personal knowledge, contain such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively the competence of the affiant to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

A. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment

The City moves for summary judgment as to Mullins' claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA.

1. Disability Discrimination

"To establish a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove '(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is a 'qualified individual' for the employment in question, and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took other adverse employment action) because of her disability."⁵ Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000)). The ADA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), which took effect January 1, 2009, broadened the definition of "disability." Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 572. "In passing the ADAAA, Congress was concerned lower courts [had] incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities," and had thereby "eliminate[d] protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect." Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Before the enactment of the ADAAA, courts relied upon cases that demanded that the terms "substantially" and "major," as used in the ADA definition of disability, "be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). Under that standard, an individual was considered disabled only if he had an impairment that "prevent[ed] or sever[ely]restrict[ed] the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. at 198. Because the ADAAA does not apply retroactively, courts must apply the pre-ADAAA standards of the ADA regarding disability to claims arising before January 1, 2009. Reynolds, 701 F.3d at 152.

a. Before January 1, 2009

The City argues that Mullins is not disabled under the ADA because he was not substantially limited in his ability to engage in the major life activity of working. (ECF No. 34-1 at 14-15.) While acknowledging that Mullins could not climb ladders, the City argues that this alone "does not rise to the level of a substantial impact" on his ability to work. (Id. at 14.) Mullins argues that the cases the City relies on in making this argument predate the ADAAA, and therefore apply a more rigorous standard that does not apply to claims arising after January 1, 2009. (ECF No. 39 at 7.) Mullins fails to explain, however, why reliance on pre-ADAAA cases is inappropriate with respect to his claims before January 1, 2009.⁶

In the pre-ADAAA context, the Fourth Circuit has noted that in order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be precluded from working in a broad range of jobs. Pollard v. High's of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)). Applying pre-ADAAA standards, the Fourth Circuit has held that "as a matter of law, . . . a twenty-five pound lifting limitation . . . does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity." Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds...