MuLqueen v. Herkimer Cnty.

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WENDY S. MULQUEEN and BRIAN G. MULQUEEN, Plaintiffs, v. HERKIMER COUNTY CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

No. 6:22-CV-1301 (TJM/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

August 2, 2023

WENDY S. MULQUEEN, Plaintiff, pro se

BRIAN G. MULQUEEN, Plaintiff, pro se

ORDER

ANDREW T. BAXTER, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

On December 5, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1) (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs also moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. Nos. 2, 3), and for appointment of counsel (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5). On January 13, 2023 I recommended that plaintiffs' motions to proceed IFP be denied, and the complaint be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs submitting the filing fee, based on the representations made in plaintiffs' IFP applications.^[1] (Dkt. No. 9). In particular, this court relied on the plaintiffs' reported income in denying them IFP status, as it appeared to exceed the federal poverty guidelines and did not suggest that payment of the filing fee in this matter would impose a “serious hardship” on them. (Id.). Plaintiffs subsequently filed objections to my recommendation with the district court, and submitted additional information concerning their financial status. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13). On June 13 2023, upon review of my recommendation and in consideration of the plaintiffs' objections, U.S. Senior District Court Judge Thomas J. McAvoy recommitted this matter back to me with instructions to allow plaintiffs to submit updated accurate, and complete IFP applications. (Dkt. No. 15). Plaintiffs submitted their updated IFP applications on June 27, 2023, which are now before me pending review. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 17).

I. IFP Applications

In order to proceed IFP in federal court, the court must be satisfied by plaintiffs' affidavits that they are unable to pay the “cost of these proceedings.” (Dkt. Nos. 16 at 1; 17 at 1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915. After reviewing plaintiffs' updated applications and supporting documents, this court finds that plaintiffs are financially eligible for IFP status.

However, in addition to determining whether plaintiffs meet the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee).

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).

In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does “demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Houston v. Collerman, No. 9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB), 2016 WL 6267968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading that contains allegations that “‘are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them' is subject to dismissal.” Id. (citing Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)). The court will now turn to a consideration of the plaintiffs' complaint under the above standards.

II. Complaint

Plaintiffs' allegations stem from the investigation of child abuse claims against them by defendant Herkimer County Child Protective Services (“CPS”) and its employees. According to the complaint, on June 16, 2022, defendant Michelle Coddington, a senior case worker with CPS, came to the plaintiffs' home to investigate a “false” claim of abuse made by the plaintiffs' 16-year-old daughter, I.M. (Compl. at 1). Plaintiffs allege that I.M. had actually started a physical altercation with her mother, plaintiff Wendy Mulqueen. (Id.). The complaint states that the defendants “searched plaintiff[s'] home on all levels . . . then questioned . . . I.M. as well as plaintiffs['] five other children.” (Id.).

On June 18, 2022, defendant Ashley DiFlillippo, a CPS case worker, placed I.M. and her son, G.J., plaintiffs' grandson, out of the home with a friend of I.M.'s “against plaintiff[s'] consent under false claims of a verbal altercation.” (Id.). Ms. DiFlillippo informed plaintiffs that I.M. and G.J. would be returning home two days later, on June 20^th. (Id.). However, neither I.M. nor G.J. returned home on that date. Instead, plaintiffs state that the defendants “authorized I.M. and G.J. to leave the county without plaintiffs' consent and placed them “in an inappropriate home that contained an individual who exhibits sexually explicit behavior.” (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that there was no “emergency hearing, no warrant, no court order without due process,” and that the defendants “seized without . . . compelling circumstances.” (Id.).

Plaintiffs allege that defendants failed their duty to provide services or offer service to assist with I.M.'s behavior. (Compl. at 2). In addition, plaintiffs allege the following “failures” on the part of defendants: failure to inform plaintiffs of I.M. and G.J.'s whereabouts for an extended period; failure to provide medical information “with I.M. being pregnant at the time[;]” failure to return or answer numerous phone calls; interference with plaintiffs' ability to file police reports concerning I.M.'s status; and preventing plaintiffs from filing a statutory rape charge against I.M.'s adult boyfriend. (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that the defendants “falsified documentation and information to the court .... [and] exaggerated falsified information.” (Id.). They claim that they did not see I.M. or G.J. from June 18, 2022, up until, at least, the time they filed their complaint on December 5, 2022. (Id.).

Plaintiffs allege violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the defendants. (Compl. at 4-6). In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs request an “investigation into the defendants . . . for violating the civil rights of parents in Herkimer County to prevent this from happening to other families.” (Compl. at 6). Plaintiffs ask the court to “hold the defendants . . . accountable for their actions[,]” and “prevent defendants . . . from falsifying information/documentation and illegally detaining or taking children from their families.” (Id.). Plaintiffs additionally seek $500,000.00 in damages. (Id.).

DISCUSSION

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A. Legal Standards

1. Younger Abstention

Under the Younger abstention doctrine, initially articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts are forbidden from enjoining ongoing state proceedings. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 100 (2d Cir. 2004); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has clarified the three circumstances in which courts should abstain under Younger: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) civil proceedings that implicate a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-7 (2013); Schorr v. DoPico, 686 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). A “state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents” falls within the second category. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79 (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-420 (1979)).

The Court considers three additional factors before applying Younger abstention: whether, “(1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.” Spargo, 351 F.3d at 75; Falco v. Justices of Matrimonial Parts of Supreme Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015); see Lowell v. Vermont Dep't of Child. & Fams., 835 Fed.Appx. 637, 639 (2d Cir. 2020), as amended (Dec. 15, 2020) (summary order) (“after applying the categorical Sprint approach, this court will consider three additional, non-dispositive...