Mundy v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication

Willie Mundy Jr., Appellant v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication

No. 1984 C.D. 2012

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted: February 22, 2013

April 5, 2013

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON

In this appeal, Willie Mundy, Jr. (Mundy), representing himself, asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) erred in dismissing as untimely his appeal from a decision of a parking hearing examiner of the City of Philadelphia, Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA) that upheld several parking citations against him. Upon review, we conclude Mundy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an appeal with the trial court, thereby precluding the trial court from properly assuming jurisdiction over his appeal. As a result, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Mundy's appeal on other grounds.

From the record certified by the BAA to the trial court, see Certified Record (C.R.), Item #3, we glean the following facts.¹ Mundy received numerousparking tickets in Philadelphia for various violations. He challenged several of the tickets at an administrative hearing before a BAA parking hearing examiner on October 5, 2011. That same day, the hearing examiner dismissed four of the parking tickets and sustained the remaining tickets. More than 60 days later, on December 22, 2011, Mundy filed an appeal of the BAA hearing examiner's decision with the trial court.

Before the trial court, the parties filed briefs and a patient trial judge held oral argument.² Thereafter, the trial court issued an order dismissing Mundy's appeal as untimely. Mundy sought reconsideration, which the trial court denied.Mundy then appealed to the Superior Court, which later transferred the matter to this Court.

After Mundy filed his notice of appeal, the trial court issued an order, directing Mundy to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). In response, Mundy filed a timely, but lengthy, 1925(b) Statement.

In turn, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) in which it opined Mundy did not preserve any issues for appeal. Specifically, it stated Mundy's 10-page 1925(b) Statement "failed to assert any cognizable error," precluding "a clear and meaningful review of his claims." Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 11/7/12, at 3. In any event, the trial court stated Mundy's appeal from the BAA's decision was untimely as it was taken more than 30 days after the BAA hearing examiner's decision.³ This matter is now before us for disposition.

Initially, the BAA asserts Mundy waived all of his issues on appeal because his statement of matters complained of on appeal did not comply with Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). Specifically, it contends the issues raised in Mundy's 1925(b) Statement were vague and repetitive, leaving the trial court to guess as to the issues he would raise on appeal. The BAA argues that where, as here, a court has toguess which issues an appellant will raise on appeal, meaningful review is precluded and a waiver of all appellate issues results. See Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2006); Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, amended in 2007, states, in pertinent part:

(4) Requirements; waiver.

(iv) The Statement should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding waiver.

Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv).

In Jiricko, a case decided under the prior version of Pa. R.A.P. 1925, the Superior Court found waiver based on an appellant's five-page 1925(b) Statement, which was not only "lengthy," but, even more problematic, was an "incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory rant." Id. at 213. Viewing the self-represented appellant's 1925(b) Statement in the context of his lack of good faith throughout the litigation, the Superior Court determined the 1925(b) Statement amounted to a deliberate attempt to circumvent the purpose of Pa. R.A.P. 1925 and to overwhelm the court system.

In Jiricko, the Superior Court discussed in detail our Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 595 Pa. 366, 938A.2d 417 (2007), in which the Court indicated the number of issues raised in a 1925(b) Statement alone should not foreclose appellate review, but rather a court should examine whether the circumstances of the litigation reveal a lack of good faith. Only where the record reveals a lack of good faith should a litigant "suffer the loss of appellate review due to the volume of issues raised." Jiricko, 947 A.2d at 213 (quoting Eiser, 595 Pa. at 383, 938 A.2d at 427 n.16); see also Jones (seven-page 1925(b) Statement raising 29 issues in narrative form evidenced a lack of good faith, thereby precluding appellate review).

Further, in Reeves, the Superior Court explained:

The Rule 1925(b) statement must be detailed enough so that the judge can write a Rule 1925(a) opinion, but not so lengthy that it does not meet the goal of narrowing down the issues previously raised to the few that are likely to be presented to the appellate court without giving the trial judge volumes to plow through.

Reeves, 907 A.2d at 2-3.⁴

With regard to Mundy's 1925(b) Statement, the trial court here stated:

[Mundy] was ordered pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) to file of record '... a detailed and itemized Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal ....' 1925(b) Order (10/04/2012). The Court notes that [Mundy] is proceeding pro se; [Mundy] isheld to the same standard as practicing attorneys. First Union Mortgage Corp., v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 1999). Pro se litigants are not afforded any particular advantage because of their lack of legal training. Id. at 333, 337. In reality, pro se litigants assume the risk that their 'lack of expertise and legal training will prove [their] undoing.' Id. at 337-38. First, [Mundy] submitted a ten (10) page 1925(b) Statement complete with an 'affidavit in support of matters complained of' purporting to name several 'Jane Doe' parties, and a list of 'articles' that [Mundy] sought to bring to the Court's attention. This is not the proper form for a 1925(b) Statement. Second, [Mundy] failed to assert any cognizable error made by the Court. Essentially, [Mundy] appears to be primarily upset with the Court because the Court precluded him from reading his prepared notes at [oral argument before the trial court]. 1925(b) Statement. [Mundy's] inability to comply with Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) has precluded this Court from providing a clear and meaningful review of his claims. Therefore his claims are waived.

Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 11/7/12, at 3.

We agree with the trial court that Mundy's 1925(b) Statement is unnecessarily lengthy, redundant and hard to follow. As the trial court indicated, more than half of the purported 14 issues stated by Mundy relate to his disagreement with the trial court's decision to limit him from reading his prepared notes at oral argument. We also agree with the trial court that, of the remaining issues set forth in Mundy's 1925(b) Statement, it is difficult to clearly discern the cognizable legal errors asserted by Mundy. However, Mundy does raise a vague contention assigning error in the trial court's determination that his appeal from the BAA was untimely as well as a brief assertion that he exhausted his administrative remedies before the BAA.

While the trial court opined Mundy's unwieldy 1925(b) Statement should result in waiver of all issues on appeal, the trial court did not indicate that Mundy's prolix 1925(b) Statement evidenced a lack of good faith. Additionally, the trial court's 1925(a) opinion addressed Mundy's challenge to the trial court's determination that his appeal was untimely, and his claim that the trial court erred in limiting him from reading from his prepared notes at oral argument. For these reasons, we decline to hold that Mundy waived all issues on appeal. See LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. Evaluation Services, Inc., 951 A.2d 384 (Pa. Super. 2008) (where trial court did not indicate it found a lack of good faith in appellant's presentation of issues in its 1925(b) Statement, Superior Court would not deny appellate review); Co. Image Knitware, Ltd. v. Mother's Work, Inc., 909 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. 2006) (declining to find waiver based on appellant's 11-page 1925(b) Statement that contained numerous statements that were not allegations of error, where Statement included issues raised on appeal and trial court fully addressed issues).

As an additional threshold matter,⁵ the BAA contends Mundy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdictionover his appeal. Specifically, the BAA asserts that after the parking hearing examiner's decision, Mundy did not seek review before the parking appeals panel as required by Section 12-2808(2) of the Philadelphia Code. The BAA maintains Mundy's failure to do so constitutes a failure to exhaust an administrative remedy that precluded the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over Mundy's appeal. We agree.

"The courts of this Commonwealth have long held that a party challenging administrative decision-making must first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review; where such remedies exist, courts lack jurisdiction." Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 733 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Thus, a party challenging administrative decision-making is precluded from obtaining judicial review without first exhausting administrative remedies. Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 492 Pa. 68, 422 A.2d 141 (1980).

Further, as this Court...