Mura v. The City of Mount Vernon

1

ANTHONY DELLA MURA, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON and THE MOUNT VERNON BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-8699 (AEK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 30, 2022

DECISION AND ORDER

HONORABLE ANDREW E. KRAUSE, U.S.M.J.

Plaintiff Anthony Della Mura filed this action on September 19, 2019 against Defendants Richard Thomas, Lawrence Porcari, Benjamin Marable, the City of Mount Vernon (the “City”) and the Mount Vernon Board of Water Supply (the “MVBWS” and, together with the City, the “City Defendants”). See Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).

On September 30, 2021, the Court granted motions to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants and dismissed crossclaims that the City Defendants had brought against the individual defendants. ECF No. 141. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first cause of action-brought pursuant to the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964-as to the City Defendants. ECF No. 149. Accordingly Plaintiff's only remaining claims in this matter are his claims against the City Defendants for (1) failure to accommodate his disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (the “ADA”), (2) disability discrimination under the ADA, and (3) retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right to free expression pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. ¶¶ 60-77.

Before the Court is the City Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF Nos. 154 (Notice of Motion), 155 (Memorandum of Law)).^[1] For the following reasons, the City Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the allegations in the Complaint, which are set forth in detail in the Court's September 30, 2021 Decision and Order on the various motions to dismiss. ECF No. 141 at 3-6.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for Evaluating a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for “judgment on the pleadings.” The standard for assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001); Temple v. Hudson View Owners Corp., 222 F.Supp.3d 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcraft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020). The court must also “construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). That said, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions set forth in a complaint as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible when the complaint contains enough facts to allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. Put another way, a plaintiff must set forth enough facts to “nudge [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Although allegations that are conclusory are not entitled to be assumed true, when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Lynch, 952 F.3d at 75 (cleaned up).

On a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court considers “the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). “A complaint is also deemed to include any . . . materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint.” Id. (cleaned up).

B. Consideration of Matters Outside the Complaint

As a threshold issue, the Court must address whether it may consider Exhibits A through I to the Affirmation of Mount Vernon Corporation Counsel Brian Johnson, which was submitted as part of the City Defendants' motion. See ECF No. 156 (“Johnson Affirmation”). The City Defendants urge the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits A through H on the ground that these documents were all filed in a New York State court proceeding, and are therefore matters of public record. Defs.' Mem. at 6-7; Johnson Aff. ¶ 3. The City Defendants also request that the Court consider Exhibit I on the ground that it is a document incorporated by reference into the Complaint. See Johnson Aff. ¶ 15 (“Mr. Della Mura explicitly references this document in Paragraph 35 of his Complaint in this action.”).

Courts are permitted to take judicial notice of materials in the public record, such as documents filed in other courts. Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); The Cloister E., Inc., v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 563 F.Supp.3d 90, 105 n.101 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). If a court takes judicial notice of documents outside the pleadings, it does so “in order to determine what statements they contain[ ]” but “not for the truth of the matters asserted.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Additionally, “a court can only sensibly take judicial notice of facts relevant to the matters before the court.” Anthes v. N.Y. Univ., No. 17-cv-2511 (ALC), 2018 WL 1737540, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2018).

Exhibits A, B, and F through H to the Johnson Affirmation are only cited in connection with the City Defendants' arguments concerning Plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action, for discrimination on the basis of disability and First Amendment retaliation, see Defs.' Mem. at 912, which the Court does not substantively address in this Decision because Plaintiff has abandoned those claims, see Sections II.C.2, II.C.3, infra. The City Defendants do not cite to Exhibits D or E in connection with any legal argument. See Defs.' Mem. at 6-14. Accordingly, while the Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A, B, and D through H because they are documents filed on the public docket in another court, the Court declines to consider these documents because they are irrelevant to the Court's determination of the City Defendants' motion. See Anthes, 2018 WL 1737540, at *4.

Exhibit C to the Johnson Affirmation contains a memorandum from the former Mount Vernon Corporation Counsel to an investigator from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in connection with an EEOC complaint filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 1563. Among other things, the memorandum references arrangements made for Plaintiff upon his return to work at the MVBWS in June 2018. Id.; see Johnson Aff. ¶ 6. The City Defendants rely on Exhibit C as part of their argument in support of their motion as to Plaintiff's second cause of action, for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA in light of Plaintiff's disability. Again, the Court takes judicial notice of Exhibit C because it is a document filed on the public docket in another court. The Court will only consider this document, however, as an indication that the City has made the assertions contained in the document-it will not be considered for the truth of the matters asserted in that document. See Roth, 489 F.3d at 509. Accordingly, Exhibit C has no bearing on the Court's assessment of whether the Complaint plausibly gives rise to a claim for relief on the second cause of action against the City Defendants.

Exhibit I is a notice of claim submitted by Plaintiff to the City and dated September 6, 2018; the City Defendants assert that this document is “explicitly reference[d]” in the Complaint. Johnson Aff. ¶ 15. “For a document to be incorporated by reference [into a complaint], the plaintiff must make a clear, definite, and substantial reference to the document[ ].” Hall v Annucci, No. 19-cv-5521 (KMK), 2021 WL 4392526, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021) (cleaned up). In the Complaint, Plaintiff expressly refers to a notice of claim that was filed against the City “for subjecting [Plaintiff] to a hostile work environment by not making reasonable accommodation for him and because of the demotion and lower pay he received.” Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that the notice of claim “was received by the City of Mount Vernon on September 7, 2018.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the City took steps to retaliate against him after he filed the notice of claim. Id. ¶ 74. Because the notice of claim attached as Exhibit I to the Johnson Affirmation is explicitly referenced in the Complaint, and that reference is “clear, definite, and substantial,” it is proper to consider that document in determining the motion. See, e.g., Cummings v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-7723 (CM) (OTW), 2020 WL 882335, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020) (“the Complaint references the Notice of Claim, . . . making it proper to consider th[is] document[ ] in determining the motion”); Powell v. Dep't of Educ. of City of N.Y., No. 14-cv-2363 (PKC), ...