Murguia v. Childers

Submitted: June 14, 2023

Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas

Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

Maria Murguia sued the Director of the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services ("DWS") in her official capacity, alleging discrimination on the ground of

national origin under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The district court^[1] entered summary judgment in favor of the Director. We affirm.

I. Background

Murgma is an immigrant from Mexico who lives in Arkansas and speaks only Spanish. After Murgma lost her job because of COVID-19, she applied for unemployment insurance at a DWS office in April 2020. During her visit, Murguia's daughter Alejandra-who speaks English and Spanish-helped her fill out and submit a paper application for unemployment insurance. Murgma and Alejandra were not offered an interpreter.

After Murguia submitted her paper application, a DWS employee converted the application to an electronic one. That electronic application erroneously listed Murgma's last employer as Molly Maid. In fact, Murguia had quit her job at Molly Maid in November 2019 and began working for Holiday Inn thereafter. In part because Holiday Inn incorrectly recorded Murgma's social security number, the district court noted it is "unlikely" the error in the electronic application was Murgma's fault.

Murgma tried to correct the misunderstanding about her last employer, but her initial attempts were unsuccessful. In June 2020, for example, DWS issued a Notice of Agency Determination in which it disqualified Murgma from benefits based on the understanding that she quit her job with Molly Maid in November 2019.^[2]

Murguia's second visit to a DWS office was in late August 2020. Murgma and Alejandra spoke with DWS employee Raymond Michaud, explaining Murguia's

last employer was Holiday Inn-not Molly Maid. According to Murgma, Michaud had "a mad, mean look" and asked for supporting paystubs from Holiday Inn. The next day, Murguia and Alejandra returned with the requested paystubs and again interacted with Michaud. Michaud stated he no longer needed the paystubs and explained that Murguia needed to work somewhere for thirty days before she could be eligible for benefits. Alejandra was under the impression that Michaud was "annoyed" and "irritated" during the encounter. Michaud did not offer an interpreter.

Interactions between Murguia and DWS continued, albeit not in person. At times, Murguia communicated with Corina Parra, a DWS employee that helps claimants who possess limited English proficiency. Indeed, Parra helped Murguia translate and often returned Murguia's phone calls within a day. Alejandra also emailed Parra the requested Holiday Inn paystubs.

In September 2020, DWS issued an amended Notice of Agency Determination in which it acknowledged its prior determination "was issued in error since [Molly Maid] was not [Murguia's] correct last work." Murguia later began receiving unemployment benefits, but her bureaucratic woes continued.

In April 2021, DWS sent Murgma notice that she had failed to properly report her earnings. To avoid a "fraud determination," DWS asked Murgma to provide an explanation for the discrepancies. Later that same month, Murguia and Alejandra visited DWS to provide a copy of her identification and residency card. Murguia asked for an interpreter, so DWS began looking for one. Murguia waited for less than twenty minutes before signing a document entitled "Waiver of Interpreter Services" and leaving so that she would not be late to work. Notably, this April 2021 visit was the only time Murguia requested DWS provide an interpreter.

Murguia was unable to satisfy DWS's request for supporting documentation, as evidenced by an August 2021 Notice of Agency Determination that Murguia did not correctly report her earnings. Murguia appealed the adverse agency

determination. At a corresponding telephonic hearing in January 2022, an interpreter was available for part, but not all, of the proceeding. Nonetheless, in February 2022, the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal reversed the agency determination. While acknowledging Murgma incorrectly reported earnings between December 2020 and March 2021, the Appeals Tribunal concluded the error was not willful because she "testified that she did not realize she was required to report her part time earnings, due to her inability to speak English."

Based on these experiences and DWS's failure to provide interpretation and translation services, Murgma filed this lawsuit against the Director of DWS in her official capacity. She asserts she was discriminated against on the ground of national origin in violation of Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Following discovery, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Director after concluding there was no genuine dispute of material fact and Murgma's claim failed as a matter of law. While the district court empathized with Murguia's plight, it considered the pandemic's effects on her bureaucratic obstacles and ultimately concluded she did "not produce sufficient evidence to support an inference of intentional discrimination as a matter of law." Murgma timely appealed.

II. Analysis A. National Origin Discrimination

Murgma argues the district court erred by concluding there is no genuine dispute of material fact on her Title VI claim. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High Sch., 618 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2010). A district "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is

no genuine issue for trial." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The parties agree with the district court that the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies.^[3] McDonnell Douglas established a burden-shifting framework in which the plaintiff "must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination." 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [action]." Id. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show the defendant's "stated reason for [the action] was in fact pretext." Id. at 804.

Title VI includes an implied private right of action to enforce the statute's prohibition against intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001). Under Title VI, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of . . . national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The terms of the provision have been clarified by precedent. "To 'discriminate' against a person meant in 1964 what it means today: to 'trea[t] that individual worse than others who are similarly situated.'" Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S.Ct. 2141, 2208 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020)). "On the ground of" means but-for

causation. Abdull v. Lovaas Inst. for Early Intervention Midwest, 819 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 2016).^[4]

Murgma does not present a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Murgma's prima facie case largely hinges on her position that this court must provide Chevron^[5] and Auer^[6] deference to regulations and agency guidance issued under Title VI and the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act. In her view, these regulations and agency guidance define "national origin" under Title VI, and DWS's failure to comply with those "language access" regulations is therefore relevant to whether DWS discriminated against her on the ground of national origin. We struggle to see how such a view can be reconciled with Alexander v. Sandoval, where the Supreme Court held there is no freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1-a statute that confers authority to promulgate certain regulations. 532 U.S. at 293.

But even if Murgma is correct that we can consider the regulations she relies upon, DWS's violation of those regulations-by itself-is insufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Cf. Mumid, 618 F.3d at 795 (concluding "deficient programming in and of itself is not evidence of intentional discrimination based on national origin"); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1998) (concluding failure to comply with a regulation "does not itself constitute 'discrimination' under Title IX"). And the other evidence Murgma points to runs headlong into our precedent that "language and national origin are not interchangeable." Mumid, 618 F.3d at 795

(citing Hannoon v. Fawn Eng'g Corp., 324 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2003)). See also Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980).

For example, Murgma points to DWS continuing to provide her forms and services in English despite knowing she spoke Spanish. But the first and...