Murphy v. Bishop

ROBERT LEE MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. FRANK B. BISHOP, et al., Defendants.

No. GJH-19-3023

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

February 17, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGE J. HAZEL, United States District Judge

Self-represented Plaintiff Robert Lee Murphy, an inmate presently incarcerated at North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) in Cumberland, Maryland, initiated the above-captioned action alleging that Frank B. Bishop, W. Bohrer, and K. Lamp failed to respond to his repeated requests “to be circumcised - to practice [his] religion.” ECF No. 1. The matter was construed and instituted as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the three named Defendants. On February 10, 2022, Murphy filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21), which the Court granted (ECF No. 29). In the Amended Complaint, Murphy alleges violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq.; and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ECF No. 30. He seeks a declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction directing Defendants to allow him to be circumcised and to take part in a “religious preference count out,” as well as monetary damages. Id. at 6.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment. ECF No. 27. Pursuant to Roseboro v Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Court informed Murphy that the failure to file a memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion could result in dismissal of the case. ECF No 28. Murphy filed nothing further.

No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion construed as a motion for summary judgment, shall be granted and Murphy's request for injunctive relief shall be denied. As the case is not proceeding with regard to Murphy's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claims brought pursuant to the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Motion to Strike Entry of Appearance (ECF No 32) filed by counsel for Defendants shall be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Murphy alleges that on July 1, 2019, he submitted a request to Kevin Lamp, the Chaplain at NBCI, asking to be “added to the Islam count out and [to] inform the Warden that [Murphy] needed to be circumcised to practice [his] religion.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 30 at 2. Murphy also submitted a request to the Warden asking him to consult with the Chaplain regarding this matter. Id.

After not receiving any response, Murphy resubmitted his requests to the Chaplain and Warden on August 1, 2019, and sent a similar request to the Chief of Security. Id. Again having received no response, Murphy sent another round of requests to the Chaplain, Warden, and Chief of Security on September 25, 2019, asking for circumcision and inquiring why no one had responded to his prior requests. Id.

Murphy claims that Defendants' refusal to respond and to grant his request amounts to a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. It appears Murphy is alleging that unless he is circumcised, his prayers are not valid. Id. (citing “Islam Q&A @ https://islamqa.info ‘107701: Conditions of prayer being valid'”).

According to Defendants, when Murphy entered into the custody of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) in 2011, he registered his religious affiliation as “Islam Nation of Islam.” Case Management System, ECF No. 27-1 at 3. On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff changed his religious affiliation to “Islam Moorish, Temple of America,” and less than a year later, on December 7, 2018, to “Protestant, Seventh Day Adventist.” Id. Any inmate may change their religious affiliation, at any time, by simply filling out and filing a religious affiliation form. Decl. of Lamp, ECF No. 27-1 at ¶ 3. At the time of filing of Defendants' dispositive motion, Murphy remained registered as a “Protestant, Seventh Day Adventist.” Id. There is no information before the Court that after registering as a “Protestant, Seventh Day Adventist” in late 2018, Murphy filed a religious affiliation form declaring he was a Muslim.

Chaplain Lamp states that an inmate must be registered as affiliated with a particular religion in order to participate in that religion's services and activities. ECF No. 27-1 at ¶ 3. According to Lamp, there is nothing preventing or prohibiting Murphy from changing his religious affiliation to any denomination, including Islam. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6. There is no requirement that Murphy be circumcised in order to fully participate in the services and programs offered to Islamic inmates. Id. at ¶ 6. Rather, he only needs to submit an updated religious affiliation form. Id. at ¶ 3.

Contah Nimely, M.D., the Deputy Director of Clinical Services at DPSCS, states that DPSCS policy does not provide for medical procedures that are not medically indicated or necessary, including procedures for cosmetic or religious reasons. Decl. of Nimely, ECF No. 27-2 at ¶ 2.

The procedure requested by Murphy, circumcision, is performed if the DPSCS contractual medical provider determines that it is medically indicated. Id. Such a procedure would require transport of the inmate to an offsite location, which in turn would necessitate three correctional officers to accompany a maximum-security inmate. Id. at ¶ 3; see also Decl. of NBCI Warden Jeff Nines, ECF No. 27-3 at ¶ 3. In order to minimize any danger to the public as well as the cost and resources needed to transport a maximum-security inmate out of the institution, NBCI policy mandates that inmates are only taken out of the institution for court or medically necessary procedures. ECF No. 27-3 at ¶ 5.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the claims pled in a complaint.” Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,' and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)). However, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[.]” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, in ruling on a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “separat[es] the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assum[es] the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determin[es] whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer that ‘the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949-50).

Pro se complaints must be construed liberally and must be “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a valid claim is therefore only appropriate when, after applying this liberal construction, it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Spencer v. Earley, 278 Fed.Appx. 254, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972)). However, despite this liberal construction requirement, “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of Pro se complaints are not . . . without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). Courts are not required to “conjure up questions never squarely presented to them” nor “construct full blown claims from sentence fragments.” Id.

Defendants' motion is styled as a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment. If the Court considers materials outside the pleadings, the Court must treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). When the Court treats a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. When the moving party styles its motion as a “Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment,” as is the case here, and attaches additional materials to its motion, the nonmoving party is, of course, aware that materials outside the pleadings are before the Court, and the Court can treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998).

Further, the Court is not prohibited from granting a motion for summary judgment before the commencement of discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (stating that the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” without distinguishing pre- or post-discovery).

Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues...