Murphy v. Franklin, Civil Action No. 2:04cv1218-MHT.

Page 558

510 F.Supp.2d 558

Jason MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. Bill FRANKLIN, etc., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:04cv1218-MHT.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

March 28, 2007.

Jay Lewis, Keith Anderson Nelms, Law Offices of Jay Lewis, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Bill Franklin, Wetumpka, AL, pro se.

Charles Richard Hill, Jr., Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

Gary Bowers, Wetumpka, AL, pro se.

OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jason Murphy brings this lawsuit against defendants Bill Franklin (in his individual capacity as Sheriff of Elmore County, Alabama) and Gary Bowers (in his individual capacity as administrator of the Elmore County Jail) under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Murphy alleges that, as a pretrial detainee in Elmore County Jail, he was subjected to treatment that was punitive, degrading, inhumane, and which served no valid penological purpose, and that he was afforded no hearing or other avenue to object to such treatment when it occurred.¹

I.

According to Murphy,² he was detained in the Elmore County Jail after being arrested by the Elmore County Sheriff's Department on December 30, 2003. Without explanation, he was moved into a `lockdown' cell for one day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot and his right leg was shackled to the other end of the cot's frame. Again without explanation, he was then, moved to an isolation cell, where he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is actually nothing more than a hole in the ground covered by a grate. He was held in this configuration for almost 12 days and was not released to allow urination or defecation, which caused him to soil himself. He was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry clothing, personal hygiene items, or bedding.

II.

Franklin and Bowers filed a motion to dismiss that was referred to a magistrate judge. In her recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended that the case be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. She explained that the Fifth Amendment claims were improper because that amendment applies only to the federal government and that all claims for punitive damages should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. She also explained that the Fourth Amendment claims failed because claims involving mistreatment of pretrail detainees are governed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claims, the magistrate judge found that Murphy's complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has developed for § 1983 cases and failed to state a claim for a violation of his procedural-due-process rights.

Murphy filed objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation, arguing that the recommendation erred in concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed. He may also have objected to the magistrate judge's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed.³

III.

For the reasons that follow, the court will sustain Murphy's objection with respect to the substantive-due-process claim and overrule his objection with respect to the procedural-due-process claim. To the extent Murphy objected to the magistrate judge's recommendation on the Fourth Amendment claims, that objection will also be overruled. Although Murphy did not raise this objection, the court will also depart from the magistrate judge's recommendation to the extent it suggests dismissing the claims for punitive damages.

A. Substantive Due Process

Section 1983 claims may not proceed under a theory of respondeat superior. Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir.1994). Thus, Murphy may proceed against the defendants only under supervisory liability, which arises either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when the actions of the supervising official are causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation. Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2003). The complaint does not allege that Bowers or Franklin personally participated in the alleged misconduct, so Murphy may proceed only under supervisory liability premised on a causal connection.

"A causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so, or when the supervisor's improper custom or policy resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). A causal connection can also be established if allegations support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Id. Murphy's complaint alleges that Franklin promulgates all policies and procedures at the Elmore County Jail and that Bowers supervises the jail. It also " alleges that Franklin ordered Murphy removed from his cell for an interview and then reshackled to the toilet grate.

The magistrate judge concluded that these facts were not sufficient to meet the heightened pleading requirement established by the Eleventh Circuit in § 1983 cases premised on supervisory liability. Passmore Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir.2004). Although the complaint alleges that Franklin promulgated, and Bowers implemented, official policies at Elmore County Jail, it does not allege that Murphy was subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific official policy. Thus, the complaint fails to explicitly state a key step in the logical chain of supervisory liability.

However, at least with respect to Franklin, the court believes the complaint alleges facts that outline a theory of supervisory liability with sufficient specificity. If Franklin ordered Murphy shackled to the toilet grate for no apparent reason on one occasion, a reasonable inference arises that he was at least aware of the policy or practice of shackling inmates in that exact manner as punishment for breaking jail rules and did nothing to stop it. Moreover, it is obvious from reading the complaint that Murphy's claim is premised on the understanding that his mistreatment occurred pursuant to an official policy promulgated by Franklin and implemented by Bowers. Though the complaint fails to explicitly say so, the court does not find it appropriate to bar all possibility of relief for what may be egregious violation of Murphy's civil rights based solely on a technical oversight in his complaint.

Accordingly, the court will sustain Murphy's objection to the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss this claim with prejudice. Instead, the court will grant Murphy leave to amend his complaint to include specific details regarding the missing step in the chain of supervisory liability. When he amends his complaint, Murphy may also find it helpful to reference the numerous allegations by other inmates at Elmore County Jail that detail almost identical treatment, see supra note 1, as that information could support a constructive notice theory of supervisory liability to buttress his causal connection theory of supervisory liability.

B. Procedural Due Process

Murphy contends he was denied procedural due process because he was punished without an adequate hearing. His reliance on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), to support this argument is misplaced. The discussion in Bell makes clear that any such punishment of a pretrial detainee without adequate hearings is a violation of substantive due process, not procedural due process. See id. at 534-35, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting that right to be free from punishment in pretrial context is a fundamental liberty interest and referencing the substantive due process rights of a parent to choose their child's education, marital privacy, and bodily privacy). Therefore, Murphy's due process claim, to the extent it relies on a theory of punitive steps taken against a pretrial detainee without any hearing, is actually a substantive due process claim, not a procedural due process claim.

Murphy's complaint also states that he was denied procedural due process because the jail did not create official administrative remedies for such mistreatment and his unofficial complaints were ignored. However, "a procedural due process violation is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process." McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994). A state "may cure a procedural deprivation by providing later procedural remedy; only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983 arise." Id.

Murphy's complaint does not allege that all state remedies were foreclosed to him. Although he alleges that any administrative remedies at the jail were exhausted, he does not claim that he was barred from seeking relief from the state courts. In fact, a state-law remedy was available to him. Although a sheriff and the sheriff's subordinates are granted immunity from state-law actions for personal liability arising from their actions and omissions in their official capacities, the sheriff is subject to state-law actions "to enjoin him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law." Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598 So.2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1992) (citing Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 445 (Ala.1987)). The alleged conduct here certainly seems to fall within this exception, so a state court could have awarded Murphy injunctive relief.

If this court entertained Murphy's procedural-due-process claim, it would foreclose the...