Murphy v. Moore

MARCUS A. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. AMANDA CAMERON MOORE, BLATTNER ENERGY, Defendants.

2:20-CV-190-Z

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO DIVISION

May 6, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Moore's and Blattner Energy's respective Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 7, 12). Both Defendants also move for sanctions under Rule 11 (ECF Nos. 21, 23). After reviewing the Motions, pleadings, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Court also GRANTS Defendants' Motions for Rule 11 Sanctions.¹

BACKGROUND

This case is the second of three suits brought by Plaintiff Marcus Murphy in this Court. Murphy v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, No. 2:20-CV-048-Z, 2021 WL 40779 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021); Murphy v. Hernandez, No. 2:20-282-Z (N.D. Tex. 2020). In all three of his suits, Plaintiff, a licensed attorney, has chosen to represent himself. Here, Plaintiff sued Defendants for trespass, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All these claims arose from an alleged altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant Moore which resulted in the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff.

A. Plaintiff is not entitled to leniency based on his "pro se" status

Plaintiff is a lawyer licensed in Colorado who is proceeding pro se in this case — he is not licensed in Texas or admitted to practice before this District. Further, Plaintiff has not sought to proceed pro hace vice as an attorney in this matter, since he is representing only himself and there are no other plaintiffs to this matter. Plaintiff argues he is entitled to leniency in his pleadings before the Court because he is technically a pro se litigant.

While pro se parties are normally accorded more leniency in the construction of their pleadings, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Court need not afford a licensed attorney such leniency when the attorney appears pro se. Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Villalobos v. United States, CR B:12-374-1, 2018 WL 2248517, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, CR B-12-374-1, 2018 WL 2234838 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2018).

Additionally, throughout his Complaint and Responses, Plaintiff continually offers legal conclusions by using the phrase "that in Plaintiff's professional legal-opinion, as an asserted-fact." See e.g. ECF No. 3 at 2, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, etc. Although the Court is unsure what Plaintiff means when he uses that phrase,² Plaintiff apparently believes his conclusions should have greater weight because he is a trained lawyer. It is only fair then to hold Plaintiff to the standards expected of a trained lawyer. Moreover, this determination should come as no surprise to Plaintiff as this Court has already determined that Plaintiff should be held to same standard as other lawyers. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 2021 WL 40779 at *4.

Plaintiff's pleadings are rambling, unprofessional, barely understandable, and, as explained below, frivolous. Furthermore, even if the Court were inclined to afford Plaintiff the leniency due to a pro se litigant, the result in this case is no different. "[P]ro se litigants must still comply with the law and procedural rules." Washington v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Sys., 471 F. App'x 306, 306 (5th Cir. 2012). Even under a lenient standard of pleading, Plaintiff's claims do not entitle him to relief.

B. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Marcus Murphy is a licensed lawyer who resides in Colorado but maintains a secondary residence at 307 Garrett St. Borger, Texas 79007. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 10 ("Comp."). Defendant Amanda Moore was, at the time of the alleged incident, an employee of Defendant Blattner Energy.

On the evening of August 13, 2018, Plaintiff saw Moore enter and exit a pick-up truck with Blattner Energy markings at 305 Garrett Street. Id. This house, located next to Plaintiff's house, was the residence of Defendant Moore's mother. ECF No. 17 at 15. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Moore, who was wearing Blattner clothing, was "off-duty." Comp. ¶ 10.

At some point in time that evening, Plaintiff alleges Moore started an argument. Id. Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding the circumstances before, during, or after the argument. Plaintiff alleges during the argument that Moore said "What the F*** is your problem, dude? What do you think you're some kind of cop? I'm gonna get you fired, arrested, and thrown in jail, or I'll shoot you myself." Id. ¶ 16.³

Plaintiff further alleges Moore "stayed in her company-vehicle in front of Plaintiff's resident that night until 2:00am, while he was sleeping." Id. During that time, Moore had a loaded handgun in her glove box. Id. No other altercations took place that evening.

On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff was criminally prosecuted for "Disorderly-Conduct" in Borger municipal court for his actions stemming from the August 13, 2018 altercation. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff contends Moore falsely testified during the trial that Plaintiff verbally threatened her. Id. Plaintiff alleges the jury acquitted him. Id. But Plaintiff then contends new, still-pending charges of "Disorderly-conduct" were filed in Borger municipal court on March 26, 2019 and April 26, 2019. Id.

LEGAL STANDARDS

"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal marks omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." In re Katrina, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal marks omitted). "The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)) (internal marks omitted).

The Court must "begin by identifying the pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). After assuming the veracity of any well-pleaded allegations, the Court should then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citation omitted). This standard of "plausibility" is not necessarily a "probability requirement," but it requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief." Id. (internal marks omitted). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

ANALYSIS

This case is before the Court solely via diversity jurisdiction — all of Plaintiff's claims in this case arise under Texas state law. Accordingly, this Court's task is to apply substantive Texas law to the facts alleged in this case under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.⁴ Having done so, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for any of his causes of action.

A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for trespassing

"To recover damages for trespass to real property, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff owns or has a lawful right to possess real property, (2) the defendant entered the plaintiff's land and the entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary, and (3) the defendant's trespass caused injury to the plaintiff." Russell v. Coward, 2014 WL 5093990, at *2 (Tex.App.—Waco 2014, no pet.) (quoting Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied)).⁵

Upon a thorough examination of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court determines that Plaintiff has not alleged (1) that Moore entered Plaintiff's property at 307 Garrett Street, (2) that Moore's entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary, and (3) that Moore's trespass caused injury to Plaintiff.

For ease of analysis and understandability of the Court's conclusion, the pertinent allegations from the Complaint are reproduced below, broken into paragraphs for ease of reference:⁶

1. On the evening of Mon., Aug. 13, 2018 (8-13-18) at Plaintiff's secondary-residence, 307 Garrett St, Borger, TX 79007; Plaintiff-Murphy suffered a wrongful, unauthorized Temporary-Trespass by Defendant Blattner-Energy's off-duty employee, Defendant-Moore, who (1) entered (2) the property of Plaintiff (3) without the Plaintiff's (i.e., property-owner) consent or authorization.

2. Plaintiff-Murphy saw Defendant-Moore entering and exiting a white Blattner-Energy pickup-truck, with either License-Plate #: AYW-956 or AYX-589, on the evening of Mon., Aug. 13, 2018 (8-13-18) at the house located at 305 Garrett St, Borger, TX 79007, next to Plaintiffs secondary-residence. Plaintiff-Murphy has previously seen Defendant-Moore driving a white Blattner-Energy pickup-truck, with either License-Plate #: AYW-956 or AYX-589.

3. Subsequently, Defendant-Moore falsely-testified that Plaintiff verbally- threatened her, for which Plaintiff was acquitted by a jury of his peers

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