Murphy v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1239

ROBERT J. MURPHY, ESQUIRE,Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL,PAUL J. KILLION, ESQ., Chief Disciplinary Counsel, in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; MICHAEL GOTTSCH, ESQ.,in his official capacity and in his individual capacity; RICHARD HERNANDEZ, ESQ.,in his official capacity and in his individual capacity;ANTHONY SODROSKI, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; MARK GILSON, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; STEWART L. COHEN, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; DION RASSIAS, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; JANE G. PENNY, ESQ., in her official capacityand in her individual capacity; JERRY LEHOCKY, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; DAVID FITZSIMONS, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity; BRIAN CALI, ESQ., in his official capacityand in his individual capacity;and THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1239

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 30, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Smith, J.

The pro se plaintiff is an attorney currently in the midst of disciplinary proceedings in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He has filed a second amended complaint in which he attempts to assert various constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the office prosecuting his disciplinary action, disciplinary counsel, the state disciplinary board, and members of the board. He seeks injunctive relief (for which he has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction), declaratory relief, and monetary damages.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, essentially arguing that, inter alia, (1) this court should abstain from resolving the claims in this case based upon Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims (a) against the office of disciplinary counsel and the disciplinary board, (b) for declaratory relief, and (c) for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their official capacities, (3) absolute prosecutorial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and judicial immunity bar any individual capacity claims for damages against the individual defendants, (4) the plaintiff has failed to assert a plausible claim for a violation of his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and (5) the defendants are absolutely immune from any potential state law claims.

The court previously determined that abstention is necessary here under Younger when the plaintiff previously moved for a preliminary injunction, and nothing that the plaintiff asserts in his second amended complaint or in his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss changes this determination. Thus, the court must abstain from resolving the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. In addition to abstaining from these claims, the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiff's federal causes of action against the office of disciplinary counsel and the disciplinary board as well as any federal claims for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their official capacities. The court also finds that the doctrines of absolute prosecutorial immunity bars most of the claims against the individual disciplinary counsel defendants and quasi-judicial immunity bars the claims against the individual defendants. Further, the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief for any constitutional violation.

While the court does not agree with all the defendants' arguments in support of dismissal, the court grants portions of the motion which result in the ultimate dismissal of all causes of action in the second amended complaint. The court will not provide the plaintiff with leave to file another amended complaint because doing so is futile. The court will also deny the plaintiff's motion for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief.

I. ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The pro se plaintiff, Robert J. Murphy, Esquire ("Murphy"), on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of all others similarly situated, originally commenced this action by filing a complaint on March 20, 2017. Doc. No. 1. The original defendants named in the complaint included: (1) Paul J. Killian, Esquire ("Killion"),¹ Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, in his official capacity; (2) Michael Gottsch, Esquire ("Gottsch"), in his official capacity; (3) the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (the "Board"); (4) Jane G. Penny, Esquire ("Penny"), Chairperson of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in her official capacity; and (5) Julia Frankston-Morris, Esquire ("Frankston-Morris"), Secretary of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See Compl.at 1-2, Doc. No. 1. Murphy's claims in the complaint arise out of his attorney disciplinary proceedings that were ongoing in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See generally id. at 14-26.

The named defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to file the motion to dismiss under seal on April 4, 2017. Doc. Nos. 3, 4. Through a stipulation by the parties, Murphy filed a "corrected" amended complaint on April 27, 2017. Doc. Nos. 7-8. In the amended complaint, Murphy named as defendants: (1) The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC"); (2) Killion, in his official and individual capacities; (3) Gottsch, in his official and individual capacities; (4) the Board; (5) Penny, in her official and individual capacities; and (6) Frankston-Morris, in her official and individual capacities.² Corrected Am. Compl. at 1-2, Doc. No. 8.

On May 9, 2017, the named defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.³ Doc. No. 11. Murphy filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 5, 2017. Doc. No. 16.

On November 1, 2017, Murphy filed a motion for an emergency temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Doc. No. 17. The court held a telephonic hearing on this motion for injunctive relief on November 3, 2017, after which the court denied the motion. Doc. Nos. 19, 20. Murphy filed a notice of appeal from the court's denial of his motion for injunctive relief to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on December 1, 2017. Doc. No. 21. This court filed a written amplification of a prior written or oral recorded ruling or opinion as provided by Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 3.1 on January 2, 2018.⁴ Doc. No. 24.

While the case was on appeal with the Third Circuit, Murphy filed a motion titled:

PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND VACATE, AND ALTER, AND AMEND COURT'S ORDERS INCLUDING ORDER TO PLACE THE CAPTIONED MATTER IN CIVIL SUSPENSE AND STAY THE CAPTIONED MATTER, AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND IMMEDIATELY SCHEDULE AN EMERGENCY EVIDENTIARY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING, AND GRANT A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, AND GRANT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, AND GRANT A PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND/OR ADVISE THE APPELLATE COURT THAT THIS COURT WOULD GRANT THE WITHIN MOTION OR THAT THE WITHIN MOTION RAISES A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE, AND ENTER SUCH OTHER ORDERS AS ARE WARRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE TO PREVENT CONTINUING SERIOUS AND IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE

TO THE PLAINTIFF AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEYS PURSUANT TO F.R.A.P. 8(A) (C), 12.1, F.R.C.P. 62(c) (g) (1), 62.1 AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JUSTICE.

Doc. No. 28. On July 13, 2018, the court entered an order denying this motion. Doc. No. 29. Murphy then filed a notice of appeal from this order on August 9, 2018. Doc. No. 30.

In October 2018, Murphy voluntarily dismissed his appeals under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Doc. No. 32. This court then held a telephone conference with the parties on October 16, 2018, after which the court entered an order which, inter alia, gave Murphy 30 days to file a second amended complaint. Doc. Nos. 34, 35. Murphy timely filed a second amended complaint on November 15, 2018. Doc. No. 36. In the second amended complaint, Murphy once again asserts claims against the ODC, Disciplinary Board, Killion, Gottsch, and Penny, but he now also asserts claims against Richard Hernandez, Esquire ("Hernandez"), Antony Sodroski, Esquire ("Sodroski"), Mark Gilson, Esquire ("Gilson"), Stewart L. Cohen, Esquire ("Cohen"), Dion Rassias, Esquire ("Rassias"), Jerry LeHocky, Esquire ("LeHocky"), David Fitzsimons, Esquire ("Fitzsimons"), and Brian Cali, Esquire ("Cali").⁵ Pl.'s 2d Am. Compl. Pursuant to the Court's Oct. 16, 2018 Order ("2d Am. Compl.") at 1-3, Doc. No. 36.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on November 30, 2018. Doc. Nos. 38, 39. Murphy filed a response in opposition to the motion on December 21, 2018. Doc. No. 40. Murphy then filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on February 1, 2019, which the defendants responded to on February 13, 2019. Doc. Nos. 42, 43.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Background

1. The ODC, Disciplinary Board, and General Procedures for DisciplinaryProceedings

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board have exclusive jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary issues involving, among others, "[a]ny attorney admitted to practice law in th[e] Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Pa. R.D.E. 201(a)(1); see Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Examiners, 154 A.3d 899, 904 (Pa. Commw. 2017) (citing to Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c), which states: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules . . . for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch."). The ODC is responsible for, inter alia, "investigat[ing] all matters involving...