Murphy v. Raimondo

MAUREEN MURPHY individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals; JOHN HUDDLESTON, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. GINA RAIMONDO et al, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-05377-DGE

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

January 3, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 22) AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 26)

David G. Estudillo, United States District Judge

I INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds Plaintiffs Maureen Murphy and John Huddleston's claims are not ripe and as such GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 22). The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 26) and DENIES as moot Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Dkt. No. 12).

II BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this suit challenging the constitutionality of the Census Bureau's ability to compel Americans' responses to the American Community Survey (“ACS”). The ACS “is a nationwide survey that collects and produces information on social, economic housing, and demographic characteristics about our nation's population every year.” (Dkt. No. 22-2 at 4.) Various federal, state, and local agencies rely on the information collected by the ACS to allocate sparse funds and to effectively provide needed services. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 2.) The ACS was implemented in 2005 and replaced the “long form” decennial census, which collected similar information. (Id.)

13 U.S.C. § 141 directs the Secretary of Commerce to:

in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year, which date shall be known as the “decennial census date”, in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys. In connection with any such census, the Secretary is authorized to obtain such other census information as necessary.

13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (emphasis added). 13 U.S.C. § 193 further provides “[i]n advance of, in conjunction with, or after the taking of each census provided for by this chapter, the Secretary may make surveys and collect such preliminary and supplementary statistics related to the main topic of the census as are necessary to the initiation taking, or completion thereof.” Id.

The Census Bureau considers completion of the ACS to be mandated by law and failure to complete the ACS to constitute a criminal offense. The Census Bureau cites to 13 U.S.C. § 221 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571, 3559 in informational materials as providing the legal basis for imposing criminal penalties on those who refuse to complete the ACS. (See e.g., Dkt. No. 1-3 at 3). These penalties can range as high as $5,000 per violation, but do not carry with them any corresponding prison time. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 221.

Participants in the ACS are selected via a random sample of addresses. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3.) Questionnaires are sent to a random assortment of addresses annually and the information collected is used in the five-year ACS data. (Id.) Murphy and Huddleston received the ACS questionnaire in 2021 and 2022 respectively. (Dkt. Nos. 27 at 2; 28 at 2.) To ensure completion of the questionnaire, the Census Bureau sends reminder mailings to addresses from which the agency has received no response. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3.) Census Bureau agents may also visit select non-responsive households in-person to encourage completion. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendants assert “Census Bureau field representatives are instructed never to antagonize, threaten, or frighten respondents by emphasizing the illegality of not responding or by quoting fines or penalties for refusing to participate.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs allege and assert via affidavit they either received correspondence or were visited in person by Census Bureau agents to encourage them to complete the ACS. (Dkt. Nos. 27 at 2; 28 at 3.) No one has ever been prosecuted for failing to complete the ACS and no individuals have been prosecuted for failing to complete the long form census since the 1970s. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 7.)

On May 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit against Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, the Department of Commerce, Director of the Bureau of Census Robert Santos, and the Bureau of Census (together the “Defendants” or the “Census Bureau”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and injunctive relief to ensure they are not compelled to answer the ACS. (Id. at 12.) They claim the Census Bureau's actions are ultra vires, the statutes that authorize the Census Bureau to conduct the ACS violate the non-delegation doctrine, and that the ACS compels speech in violation of the First Amendment and invades the Plaintiffs' rights to privacy.

(See generally id. at 14-21.) Plaintiffs also seek relief on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals and have filed a motion for class certification. (Dkt. No. 12.)

III DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Additionally, “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). At summary judgment, the plaintiff “must ‘set forth' by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,' which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. (citation omitted).

B. Ripeness

Federal courts' jurisdiction pursuant to Article III extends only to “cases” and “controversies.” Alaska Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts do not “wade into disputes that would require us to ‘issue advisory opinions' or ‘declare rights in hypothetical cases.'” Arizona v. Yellen, 34 F.4th 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2018)). Concerns over the justiciability constraints of Article III have given rise to several doctrines federal courts use to determine whether they may properly hear a case before them. See, e.g., Trump v. New York, 141 S.Ct. 530, 535 (2020). Chief among these are the doctrines of ripeness and standing.

The ripeness doctrine seeks to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Abbott Lab'ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). “Ripeness has both constitutional and prudential components.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). Ripeness's constitutional elements are often conflated with those of standing and ripeness is often “characterized as standing on a timeline.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). Prudential ripeness, by contrast, assesses “the fitness of the issues for judicial review, followed by the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. Constitutional Component

Courts often treat the constitutional components of ripeness the same as those of standing. See, e.g., Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 10 F.4th 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2021). To establish ripeness in a pre-enforcement challenge, ‘“the plaintiff must be subject to a genuine threat of imminent prosecution.”' Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sacks, 309 F.Supp.3d 908, 918 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (quoting Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1058). To determine if a plaintiff is subject to a genuine threat of imminent prosecution, courts must assess “(1) whether the plaintiff has articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings; and (3) the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute.” Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1058.

a. Concrete Plan to Violate the Law

The parties do not dispute the first Thomas factor is satisfied here. (See Dkt. Nos. 22 at 20-22; 26 at 40.) Plaintiffs have refused to complete the ACS, in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 221(a). However, the parties do dispute whether the Census Bureau has communicated a “specific” warning or threat of prosecution to the Plaintiffs as well as the relevance of past prosecution under the statute to the Court's analysis.

b. Specific Warning or Threat

Defendants argue courts have consistently held as unripe cases when “there was no specific threat of enforcement or history of prosecution under the relevant statutes.” (Dkt. No 22 at 20.) Specifically, they argue the Census Bureau and its agents never subjected Plaintiffs to a specific threat of enforcement. (Id. at 22.) Defendants submit a declaration from Donna Dailey, Chief of the ACS, who asserts “the Census Bureau does not threaten non-responding addresses with the enforcement of fines or with referral to DOJ for prosecution” and that the contacts described in Plaintiffs' complaint are consistent with the procedures used by the ACS to encourage completion of the survey. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 4, 6.) Dailey also asserts...